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Abstract 
Falsework is a temporary structure supporting the permanent structure while it is not 
self-supporting. Falsework is commonly required in concrete construction which 
involves a number of parties such as the design engineer, contractor, subcontractor, 
supplier and checking engineer. In the past, many failures occurred due to procedural 
inadequacy such as confusion in responsibility delineation and communication. In 
Hong Kong, during the last six years, at least eight major falsework collapses have 
been reported. 
Researchers studying falsework failures have devised models for analysis and 
prediction. However, procedural inadequacy has not been adequately considered and 
assessed in these models. Further, these models were mainly used to predict the 
likelihood of eventual failure at loading stage without evaluating the safety condition 
at various stages of falsework construction. 
The overall aim of this thesis was to develop a procedural framework that can be used 
to assess the proneness to failure at different stages of constructing falsework in Hong 
Kong, thus, warning can be given promptly. The objectives of the research were: 
• to review the practices of falsework scaffolding; 
• to compare the different control systems on the design and construction of 
falsework; 
• to analyse the causes of falsework failures; and 
• to develop a procedural framework for assessing the safety of falsework at 
various stages. 
III 
To identify the causes, fifty failure cases were analysed. Nine site visits to Hong Kong, 
Macao, China, Taiwan and Singapore, where falsework failures occurred, were made. 
A total of thirty-three tests of falsework scaffolding materials were performed in the 
laboratory. A procedural framework based on Balloon Theory was developed to assess 
the procedural errors for analysing and predicting falsework failure. 
The research yielded the following outcomes: 
• the identification of causes, frequency and impacts to falsework failures; 
• the classification of the key and critical activities of falsework under the five 
essential stages, i.e. design, erecting, loading, dismantling and anew; 
• recommendations on the loadbearing capacity of the new and used falsework 
scaffolding material; 
• the graphical presentation and assessment of the procedural errors 
accumulated throughout various stages; 
• the flowchart, showing the role of various parties and the impact due to 
changes in the construction method of the permanent works and falsework, for 
analysing and predicting failures; and 
• a procedural framework to analyse and predict falsework failures. 
Fifteen construction professionals confirmed that the procedural framework would be 
very useful in monitoring the performance of falsework as required under the latest 
Code of Practice for Metal Scaffolding Safety issued by the Labour Department of 
Hong Kong. 
Keywords: Falsework failures, analysis, prediction, Hong Kong 
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INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Falsework are temporary structures used to support a permanent structure while it is not 
self-supporting (BSI BS5975 1996). Falsework failures during construction have been 
reported quite frequently (Elliott 1973, Bragg 1975, Hadipriono & Wang 1986, Tsai & 
Hadipriono 1990, Poon 1997). During the last six years, at least eight major falsework 
collapses have occurred in Hong Kong. These accidents have not only resulted in delays 
to construction works and extra cost, but also the loss of human life (Poon & Price 1991). 
This research aims to develop a procedural framework for analysing and predicting 
falsework failure in Hong Kong. The causes of falsework failure have been extracted 
from failure reports. The cumulative effect of various causes is assessed at different 
stages of falsework activities in order to identify the most critical stage and to assess the 
proneness of failures. 
This introductory chapter presents a brief summary of: the background to the problem; 
definition and characteristics of falsework; a justification of the research; the research 
aim and objectives; the methodology used; a procedural framework for falsework failure 
analysis and prediction; organisation of the thesis and the summary of research 
achievements. 
1.2 Background to problem 
Concrete construction is very common in Hong Kong with an annual consumption of 
over 10 million cubic metres (Wang 1995). Massive quantities of concrete are not only 
required for public housing projects and private works, but also in new town 
development and infrastructure projects which often include the construction of a number 
of highway bridges and footbridges. 
2 
Concrete bridge construction always involves the erection of falsework. There have been 
a number of collapses of falsework during bridge construction in Hong Kong and in 
many other cities (Poon 1996a). Despite previous research that has been performed on 
the topic around the world (Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1986b), there is little in-depth 
investigation into the failures in Hong Kong. 
In the design and construction of concrete bridges, a number of parties are nonnally 
involved. The professionals responsible for falsework activities for a typical bridgework 
contract in Hong Kong are shown in Table 1.1 (BS5975 1996). 
Table 1.1 Responsible parties and falsework activities of a bridgework contract 
Pam res~onsible Falsework Activities 
Engineer/ Resident Engineer Overseeing falsework design and construction 
Contractor/Subcontractor Formwork and falsework design 
Checking Engineer Checking and approval of falsework design and 
construction 
Contractor Construction method 
Contractor Supervision of construction 
Specialist Subcontractor Post-tensioning/precast beam placement 
Supplier Supplying falsework scaffolding materials 
Subcontractor Falsework erection and dismantling 
Subcontractor Concreting 
As depicted in many falsework failure reports, inadequacy or improper practice of one or 
more of the above activities often leads to failure and collapse of falsework during 
construction (Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1985, 1986a, 1986b). The quality and extent of 
contribution of each member of the construction team will be different due to their 
experience and competence, control system etc. (Ayyub 1985), and will have an effect on 
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the safety of the structure during construction. 
There have been many falsework failures arising from the use of the conventional control 
system of "Design by Contractor and Check by Engineer" (Hadipriono 1986b, 1987). 
Subsequently, some failure reports suggested that the appointment of a Falsework 
Coordinator (Bragg 1975, BS5975 1996) or an Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) 
can minimise failures in communication between the parties (Hadipriono 1985b). 
However, a serious falsework failure occurred during construction in Hong Kong despite 
a third party checking system had been adopted for this project (poon 1996a). There was 
evidence that the contractor had ignored the role of the ICE in certifying the design as 
well as the revised construction method. 
As a result of the high rates of injuries and fatalities in the UK construction industry, the 
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 was developed and 
implemented. Amongst other recommended measures, the "designer" now requires to 
consider health and safety in the design and to assess the risk. The "designer" includes 
the Engineer who designs the permanent works as well as the Contractor who designs the 
temporary works. 
Likewise in Hong Kong, a high rate of accidents on building sites has stimulated the 
Buildings Department to enforce, in stages, the Site Supervision Plan System which 
requires professionals to assess the construction works and site conditions, and 
implement appropriate degree of supervision. 
1.3 Definition of falsework 
Falsework, in the British Standard BS5975 (1996), is defined as "Any temporary 
structure used to support a permanent structure while it is not self supporting". One 
typical application' of this definition is the steel scaffolds supporting the timber formwork 
on top of which concrete is being placed. When the poured concrete has developed 
sufficient strength, the falsework can be dismantled. However, this definition is not free 
of misunderstanding. Illingworth (1987) has commented that the definition is not 
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entirely satisfactory because some other construction works such as diaphragm walling 
also satisfies the definition, yet they are not considered as falsework. He defined 
falsework as any temporary structure, in which the main load carrying members are 
vertical, used to support a permanent structure and any associated raking elements during 
its erection and until it is self supporting. This definition distinctly emphasises on the 
main supports being vertical and has the merits of ensuring the Falsework Coordinator's 
activities, as listed in BS5975 (1996) are within the scope of works of the revised 
definition (Illingworth 1987). 
Emphasising the vertical members as the main supports can be far from the true situation 
on many construction sites. Many horizontal members are always spanning above a 
space where access is necessary, and are supported by vertical members at the ends. A 
number of collapses have been recorded regarding the buckling failure at the web of the 
I-beams (Braggs 1975, Po on 1997). Had Illingworth's modified definition of falsework 
been adopted, the I-beams need to be classified and included as formwork which by 
definition are those members in immediate contact with concrete. 
In this research, the BS5975 definition is adopted and the study concentrates particularly 
on the scaffolds that are structural systems providing mainly the vertical supports to a 
permanent structure which is not yet self-supporting. 
1.4 Characteristics of falsework 
As interpreted from BS5975 (1996), falsework is a temporary structure used to support a 
permanent structure during its strength development process. A simple timber strut, an 
adjustable metal prop, the tubular scaffold systems and I-beams are examples of 
falsework elements. The form and materials used are often dictated by the loads the 
falsework is designed to carry. In this research, the type of scaffolding system most 
commonly used in Hong Kong would be studied and tested. 
The falsework scaffold systems possess the following distinctive characteristics 
(Concrete Society 1971, Po on 1996b). 
5 
• Falsework has a very short life on site. Once the permanent works has been built, 
the associated falsework will be dismantled. 
• Falsework comprises slender units for ease of handling in assembling and 
dismantling. They should be durable and properly maintained for repeated use. 
• Falsework is subjected to varying loading conditions which arise from and during 
construction, and are often difficult to predict with a high degree of accuracy. 
• Falsework is not normally held down by permanent foundations, but relies on its 
own weight to restore stability. 
• Simple analysis and design techniques are considered as adequate for falsework 
scaffolding (Bragg 1975). However, there have been many common errors found 
in load assessment such as neglecting horizontal and inclined pressure of concrete 
on inclined formwork which can lead to collapse of falsework (Bragg 1975). 
• Falsework structures are designed by the Contractor or subcontractor, and require 
approval by the Engineer. In Hong Kong, for contracts involving substantial 
temporary works, an Independent Checking Engineer is required for checking the 
design and construction of the falsework (Hong Kong Government 1992). 
• The collapse of falsework for large works, causing delays and injuries, is often 
spectacular and usually attracts considerable public attention. 
1.5 Justification 
Since the seventies, several researchers have investigated the causes of falsework failures 
(Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1986b, 1987). They have identified the linguistic variables that 
are often used to describe the factors and conditions affecting the safety of construction 
operations. For instance, the designer could be described as having either 'adequate' or 
'inadequate' experience and the falsework erected is in 'new' or 'used' condition. 
Moreover, the effect of these factors on the safety of the construction operations has been 
expressed in linguistic terms too (Ayyub 1985). Fuzzy set theory was introduced by 
Zadeh (1965) and, since then, it has been used extensively to translate the linguistic 
variables into mathematical measures. For example, the fuzzy set concept was used to 
assess the safety and performance of temporary works (Ayyub 1985, Hadipriono 1985a, 
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1985b, 1986a). The procedural frameworks derived by Blockley (1977) and Hadipriono 
(1985a, 1985b, 1986a) for predicting failure, however, have not included the effect of 
procedural inadequacies which have been identified as one of the key causes for failures 
(Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1985b, 1986b). 
During the last six years, five workers were killed and over eighteen workers were 
injured in eight major falsework failures in Hong Kong. On average, at least one severe 
failure occurred every year. In 1982, the falsework scaffold supporting the crosshead of a 
bridge pier of the Tuen Mun Highway collapsed during concreting (Labour Dept. 1982). 
In 1986, the partially erected falsework collapsed during rectification at the Tsing Yi 
North Bridge site (Labour Dept. 1986). In 1995, a 75-ton precast concrete bridge 
segment crashed through the supporting scaffold while being moved to a pier of the 
Route 3 Highway (South China Morning Post 1995). In January 1996, two precast 
concrete beams temporarily supported by falsework scaffold fell to the road below, 
during the construction of a footbridge at Tseung Kwan 0 (po on 1996b). In December 
1998, seven construction workers were injured when a half-finished flyover collapsed on 
to a Tsing Yi construction site (South China Morning Post 1998). Two falsework 
construction collapsed during concreting in 1999 and as recent as in January 2001, a 
falsework scaffolding supporting a precast concrete beam and in situ concrete slab 
collapsed, killing a worker. In all these accidents, construction was delayed and fatalities 
recorded. It is not surprising that many minor failures involving no injuries go unreported 
or unnoticed by the public. Despite their occurrences, there has been no systematic study 
offalsework failures with prediction of their happening in Hong Kong. 
Modifications in controlling falsework activities have been suggested and implemented 
in many different ways. For example, BS5975 recommends the appointment of a 
Falsework Coordinator who is employed by the Contractor and is in charge of all 
falsework activities. For major construction contracts in Hong Kong, the Checking 
Engineer who is independent of the Contractor is required to check the design and 
construction of falsework. In the UK, the Construction (Design and Management) 
Regulations 1994 require the designer to pay adequate regard to health and safety risks in 
their design irrespective of the work nature, whether it is permanent or not. At various 
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stages of a project, designers have to contribute to avoiding and combating health and 
safety risks in construction so that foreseeable risks can be avoided. There is apparently a 
shift of emphasis in control from passive checking to pro active consideration for safety 
during the design stage. The effect on safety by adopting these pro active approaches, 
however, has not been studied and assessed. 
The main reasons for this research are: 
• the effectiveness of the control system employing the Independent Checking 
Engineer was doubtful in view of two recent major falsework collapses in Hong 
Kong; 
• there was no monitoring system available in the industry for checking the safety 
conditions of the metal scaffolding as required by Code of Practice for Metal 
Scaffolding Safety (Labour Department 2001); and 
• there was no procedural framework available for analysing and predicting 
falsework failure in Hong Kong. 
1.6 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this research study is to develop a procedural framework that will assess the 
safety conditions and the proneness to failure at different stages of designing and 
constructing the falsework in Hong Kong with the following objectives: 
• to review the practices offalsework scaffolding; 
• to determine the impact on safety of the falsework by adopting different control 
systems on the design and construction of falsework; 
• to analyse the causes of falsework failures; and 
• to devise a procedural framework to assess the safety condition for the falsework 
at different stages. 
1.7 Methodology 
In developing a procedural framework to analyse and predict falsework failure in Hong 
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Kong, different data sets were collected and verified. Thus, a number of different 
methods have been used in this research. 
• An extensive literature review of the topic and unstructured interviews were 
undertaken to determine the essential activities of falsework and the scope of 
professionals'responsibility. 
• In order to justify the confidence in determining the loadbearing capacity of the 
scaffold systems, different systems commonly used in Hong Kong were tested under 
compression load until failure. The test results were compared with the supplier's 
recommendations. 
• To understand the importance of communication and procedural causes, sixteen 
construction accidents were investigated for the possible causes. 
• To investigate the causes of falsework failures, visits to sites and case collection 
were undertaken. 
• Primary and secondary data for the failure causes were extracted from past failure 
reports using content analysis. The causes were retrieved according to a defined 
format stating the principal procedural cause and the stage at which failure had 
occurred. 
• The impact of procedural errors on the factor of safety of falsework were interpreted 
from falsework failure reports. 
• A procedural framework was developed for assessmg the safety condition of 
falsework at different stages, using anticipated procedural errors. 
• Professionals were interviewed to confirm the relevance and importance of the 
causes abstracted from various sources, and to provide feedback on the use of the 
procedural framework. 
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1.8 Procedural framework development 
The procedural framework for analysing and predicting falsework failure is based on the 
input and output approach. The input would be the procedural errors and the output from 
the procedural framework is failure or proneness to failure. 
The contribution of each procedural cause towards failure was identified from falsework 
failure reports. The severity of causes was ascertained for initiating a collapse. For a 
particular falsework construction, the possible procedural errors would be assessed with 
reference to the failure cases and aggregated at various stages in order to indicate the 
proneness of the falsework to failure at a certain stage. 
The development of the procedural framework consists of the following. 
• Establish the common key activities for falsework construction. 
• From falsework failure reports, identify the severity of procedural errors towards 
failure. 
• Establish the aggregation of the errors in justifying a failure. 
• For monitoring the safety performance of a particular falsework construction, assess 
the likelihood of the procedural errors and their severity with respect to failure reports 
or by professional judgement. 
• Sum the errors to indicate the safety of the falsework or proneness to failure. 
1.9 Thesis organisation 
This thesis comprises eleven chapters. The following is a guide to the organisation of the 
thesis and presents a brief description of the contents of each chapter. 
Chapter 1 introduces to the topic, identifies the aim and objectives, justifies the research, 
enlists the methodology, and outlines the development of the failure prediction 
procedural framework. Different sets of data were collected and verified in this research. 
The different research methods used are discussed in Chapter 2, with explanation of why 
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they were being used. Because of the characteristics of the falsework scaffolding, a 
review of the activities and responsibilities for falsework is presented in Chapter 3 which 
also discusses the different control systems together with their influence on failures. 
Chapters 4 and 5 include the review of failure reports and guidelines. Different types of 
failure reports were analysed in order to retrieve the causes and their importance for the 
failures. Chapter 6 includes case studies based on private investigation on failures 
occurred in Hong Kong and nearby cities. Chapter 7 gives an account of the process and 
the results of the load tests on the scaffolding systems commonly available in Hong 
Kong. The correlation of strength of the scaffolds with age was performed so as to 
derive a recommendation for determining their loadbearing capacity. A thorough review 
of the analysis, prevention and prediction of falsework failure is discussed in Chapter 8. 
Falsework failure analysis based on procedural inadequacies was presented in Chapter 9. 
The procedural framework for analysing and predicting falsework failure was developed 
in Chapter 10 with feedback from professionals on the usefulness of the procedural 
framework. The last chapter concludes the research, citing the limitation of the 
procedural framework developed and recommendations for further study. The layout of 
the thesis is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 1.1. 
1.10 Summary of research achievements 
A procedural framework is developed to analyse falsework failures and predict the 
likelihood of a collapse during construction. As inadequate procedures will lead to the 
reduction of factor of safety by increasing the stresses or by lowering the loadbearing 
capacity, the falsework will eventually fail due to the accumulation of the errors. The 
procedures are assessed in terms of the consequence, the frequency of the occurrence and 
the effectiveness in control. The assessment, relating to the allowable stress and factor of 
safety of the falsework, can be used to analyse the causes of a collapse and indicate the 
proneness of a failure. Some research findings have been incorporated into the Code of 
Practice for Metal Scaffolding Safety issued by the Labour Department of Hong Kong in 
2001. The professionals interviewed agreed that a checklist based on the developed 
procedural framework is useful for site staff to monitor the safety of the falsework on 
site. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH METHODOLODY 
2.1 Introduction 
There are many factors contributing to the collapse of falsework. In view of the variety of 
data to be collected, several methods have been used including literature review, interviews, 
load tests, content analysis and case studies. Research design is important as it shows the 
logical sequence that connects data to the research problem and ultimately to its conclusions 
of the research work (Yin 1984). The collected data can be of a quantitative or qualitative 
nature. This chapter outlines the methodology employed in order to realise the aim and 
objectives of this research. 
2.2 Background 
Investigations of construction failures have been undertaken by a number of researchers. 
Bragg's Committee (1975) studied falsework failures extensively. In 1976, Smith presented 
his study of the causes of bridge failures during and after construction. In 1979, two 
independent investigations of errors in concrete structures were undertaken in North America 
and Europe (Fraczek 1979, Hauser 1979). In the eighties, Hadipriono studied the various 
causes of falsework failures (Hadipriono 1987). Later Poon (1991) analysed the causes of 
fifty-seven bridges failures during construction. 
As a consequence of studying the failure causes, a number of approaches have been put 
forward by researchers to predict the perfonnance or failures of falsework. Blockley (1977), 
Ayyub (1985) and Hadipriono (1985a, 1986a) developed models to predict construction 
failures by an input and output mechanism. The input factors were derived from failure 
reports and, using the fuzzy sets logic, their importance and probability of failures were 
linked. Given a set of factors and with subjective assessment by the professionals, the output 
would be in the fonn of predictions of the likelihood of falsework failure. Similar 
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applications in damage assessment and decision making in construction operations have been 
suggested by other researchers (Yao 1980, Ayyub 1985). 
A similar approach for predicting falsework failure in Hong Kong has been adopted in this 
research for two reasons. 
• First, there is no feedback received from the construction industry in using the 
prediction models as proposed by other researchers. 
• Second, the failure prediction procedural framework to be developed in this 
research can provide a quick assessment of the conditions of falsework activities. 
In view of the falsework collapses in Hong Kong (po on 1996b), such device 
would be useful to resident staff on site. 
The procedural framework to be developed in this research will provide a better picture of 
falsework construction by presenting the activities of falsework in sequence and illustrating 
the contribution of the parties involved. It can be used to pinpoint and identify what has gone 
wrong should an accident occur. Further, it incorporates the effect of procedural inadequacies 
which had not been considered in the models devised previously (Blockley 1977, Hadipriono 
1985a, 1985b, 1986a). 
Inputs to prediction models can be classified as qualitative or quantitative by nature. For 
failure predictions, most of the input data are qualitative descriptions as suggested by 
Hadipriono (1985a, 1985b) and supported by other researchers (Blockley 1977, Yao 1980, 
Ayyub 1985). The classification of causes into enabling, triggering and procedural errors by 
Hadipriono would be discussed and adopted in this research. 
Most of these causes are usually specified in linguistic terms and it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to describe or classify them quantitatively. For example, the designer's 
experience cannot be simply represented by a figure are often described as very experienced, 
moderately experienced or inexperienced. The only input factor which may be described 
precisely by a figure is the loadbearing capacity of the falsework scaffolding which can be 
derived by load testing in the laboratory under conditions similar to those on construction 
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sites. 
Since both quantitative and qualitative data were required to develop the procedural 
framework, a number of different techniques were used including literature review, content 
analysis, case study, laboratory tests, accidents analysis and interviews. Figure 2.1 shows the 
research methodology adopted in this research and details of the methods used are described 
in the following sections. 
Literature review on the practices, guidelines and code of practices of falsework and failure 
mechanism was performed. 
Structural interviews with injured persons were conducted in determining the causes for 
construction accidents and failures. 
Content analysis (Berelson 1952, Holsti 1969) was used to extract the description of causes of 
construction failures and falsework failures, their frequency and their importance. 
Case study was adopted to investigate the process and causes of falsework failures on site. 
These were known cases with reports by the media or professional journals. Nine site visits 
representing fifty per cent of the failures known during the research period have been made. 
Load tests were carried out to determine the loadbearing capacity and factor of safety of 
falsework scaffolds commonly used in Hong Kong. Six out of about twenty major suppliers 
provided the ready to be used scaffold frames for testing. 
Unstructured interviews were conducted to collect professional opinions on falsework 
activities, procedures and responsibilities, and for the validation of the developed procedural 
framework. A total of fifteen professionals who have undertaken the roles of Independent 
Checking Engineer, resident engineer, falsework scaffold supplier, structural engineer from a 
government department, safety officer and contractor's project engineers were interviewed. 
They represented the parties taking part in the design and construction of falsework. 
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2.3 Falsework failure reports 
As causes of a failure can only be analysed after the accident has occurred, the best means to 
identify the causes is by retrieving them from failure reports. However, failure reports are not 
easy to obtain due to the following reasons. 
• Most parties involved in an accident are not willing to disclose further 
information because of legal restrictions imposed upon them and of the fear of 
jeopardising the relationship particularly with those possessing finance interest or 
future clients. 
• Recent events are still surrounded with litigation (pidgeon 1990). 
• Old events are difficult to research accurately (pidgeon 1990). 
Nevertheless, altogether fifty falsework failure cases during construction, large and small, 
were collected. The publications include Bragg's Committee Report, professional journals 
such as Engineering News Record, New Civil Engineer and Construction Today, and formal 
reports prepared by the relevant government departments. Private investigations also were 
performed on failures in Hong Kong and nearby places. These reported failures occurred in 
over twenty cities during the last forty years. The details of the incidents range from a full 
investigation report to a brief news description. 
In retrieving the information from the failure reports, the technique of content analysis has 
been used. Content analysis, as defined by Berelson (1952), is a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. 
To identify the causes in an objective way, the failure cases would be described or 
summarised using the following format: 
cause ~ event ~ consequence 
Figure 2.2: Description of failure cases 
The consequence was collapse of the falsework and, in most of the cases, the permanent 
works under construction. The event would be the stage that the incident started to occur. The 
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cause was identified as being the most important enabling cause. Since different types of 
report will have varying degrees of accuracies, each of the causes identified will carry a 
degree of reliability in the procedural framework based on whether the publication is the 
result of a full proper investigation or just a brief description in the news media. 
In a similar way, extensive review of the research reports on the analysis of falsework and 
other structural failures on a collective basis provided much information in the identification 
of the possible causes and their relative importance towards failures. 
Retrieval of the data from the reports must satisfy the requirements of objectivity, system and 
generality (Holsti 1969). Holsti (1969, page 3) further explained that: 
"Objectivity stipulates that each step in the research process must be performed 
on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures. Systematic means that 
the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done to consistently 
applied rules. Generality requires that the fmdings must have theoretical 
relevance. " 
As data from the failure reports were collected in accordance with the defined format, the 
above mentioned principles were observed and followed. 
2.4 Construction accident reports 
In view of scarce opportunity to actually undertake the investigation and analyse a falsework 
failure, a study of some general construction accidents has been undertaken in order to apply 
the techniques used in analysing the falsework failure. The processing of these accidents is 
similar to falsework failures despite of the different nature of the incidence. These accidents 
were simple and involved just a, few persons, but full of human errors which can be identified 
as enabling, triggering and in particular procedural causes. In many instances, no supervision 
was provided as commonly found in falsework collapses. Study of procedural inadequacy in 
these accidents can be applied to analysis of falsework failures. Causes of accidents can be 
investigated as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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causes ~ event ~ consequence 
~ ~ ~ 
substantial, triggering accident 
major or minor incident 
lack of 
procedural control 
Figure 2.3: Investigation of construction accidents 
Experience gained in investigating these accidents can help understand the occurrence of 
falsework failures. Accidents can also be presented and better interpreted by Event Sequence 
Diagrams (ESD). 
ESD (pidgcon et al. 1990) is similar in basic philosophy to the event tree technique. The 
diagram provides a powerful means of representing and accessing information about the 
sequences of events preceding a failure or near-miss incident. The ESD are simple tree 
structures showing the temporal order and relationship of events leading up to a particular 
outcome. 
Appointed by the Legal Aid Department in Hong Kong, the author was asked to investigate 
construction and industrial accidents which involved injuries or casualties. Since 1997, a total 
of sixteen reports were analysed using the following procedures: 
• study documentary evidence such as witness reports and accident reports prepared by 
officials of Labour Department; 
• carry out structural interviews/ interrogatives with the plaintiff (with the solicitor's 
presence); 
• use ESD to list the sequence of activities leading to the accident; 
• use professional! research knowledge to ascertain the sequence and justify the 
responsibilities; 
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• confirm findings within the report material with the plaintiff; and 
• check with relevant legal or contract obligations to ascertain whether there were 
breaches of regulations. 
The sixteen reports are summarised in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1: Sixteen reports of accidents 
. .,. 
.. 
'. 
.. . ... " .... 
." ... 
.... 
Name of injured Event 
Idecea.sed person ~ .. , : .... ,. ..... : .. . .. 
1. Siu Kit Tai Fell from a canopy during washing and cleaning. 
2. Wong Wing Yee Hit abruptly by the breaker used in drilling the surrounding 
concrete when excavating a hand-dug caisson. 
3. Lee Long Ching Fell from a height when trimming and splitting a large rock 
mass. 
4. Mok Shun Fong Hit by the descending hoist inside the hoist-way during fixing 
of a water tap. 
s. Tsang Pik Man Fell from the inadequately fenced platform during overhead 
installation of air conditioning ducts. 
6. Ngan Chung Tak Hit by a piece of steel bar during its swinging and lowering. 
7. Chan WaiHo Hit by a trolley due to improper procedures in the movement 
of trolleys. 
8. Hung Man Wing Hit by the swinging of chute (duck-tongue) of the ready-mixed 
concrete truck due to lack of communication. 
9. Chow Yum Hung Electrocuted under an improper and unsuitable conditions for 
welding works. 
10. Wong Loi Fat Back injury in lifting a cement bag. 
11. Shin Yang Yen Hit by collapse of the false ceiling during dismantling of the 
door and the door frame. 
12. Wong Loi Tim Hit by a slewing hydraulic breaker during demolition of 
concrete caisson column in top down basement construction. 
13. Chui King K wong Crushed by the collapse of a power-operated working platform 
during its testing operation. 
14. ChanLungKwan Hit by the collapsing wall of a water tank during demolition of 
the tank and the roofing material. 
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15. Leung Yiu Wah Back injury when handling a bale of waste paper after 
compressing and tying. 
16. Tse Yeung Sing Hit by the collapsing structural steelwork during the 
dismantling of a strut supported by a prop in basement 
construction 
2.5 Case studies 
At least seventeen major falsework collapses occurred in Hong Kong and nearby places 
during the period of this research. Nine sites were visited in order to verify the causes and 
events identified from the failure reports. A case study approach was used in order to find out 
the sequence of the activities leading to collapses. It also helps to explore the causes and who 
has been involved in the collapse. Despite the traditional prejudices against the case study 
strategy, Yin (1989, page 23) made the following comment. 
"A case study from a research strategy point of view may be defmed as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not 
clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. It is 
particularly valuable in answering who, why and how questions in management 
research". 
The nine sites visited were located in China, Taiwan, Singapore, Macao and Hong Kong. 
Three collapses occurred in both Hong Kong and China, and one each in Taiwan, Singapore 
and Macau. Not all sites visited allowed entry and private enquiry. However, the site 
conditions surveyed and interviews with personnel involved in the project or who had 
knowledge about the incident did give valuable information which served as another source 
of opinion to confirm the information available. Furthermore, the practices and control 
systems used for falsework construction in these places were compared with reference to their 
possible causes offailure (poon 1991). Chapter 6 presents the study of the cases visited. 
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2.6 Laboratory tests 
Defective material is one of the possible causes of falsework collapse. On many occasions 
falsework scaffolding systems are made up of used materials. Quite often they have not been 
properly maintained or repaired as observed from sites of failure (poon 1989). 
The loadbearing capacity of falsework scaffold is always uncertain. When the falsework 
supplier delivers the scaffolding material, a certificate of the test result can be available upon 
request. Load tests are often performed at the place of their manufacture when the 
scaffolding material is new. Different methods might have been used by the suppliers in 
determining the strength of the scaffold. Moreover, the reduction in strength due to age and 
deterioration of these used materials is unknown although BS5975 recommends a blanket 
reduction factor of 0.85 for used scaffold tubes. 
To determine the loadbearing capacity and the factor of safety of the falsework scaffolding 
used in Hong Kong, a series of load tests were undertaken in the structures laboratory of 
Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Hong Kong. Six main suppliers provided 
the materials which were in a ready-to-be-used condition. These six suppliers are listed 
below. 
(1) Modem (International) Plants & Machineries Ltd. 
(2) Canyon Engineering Work, the agent for Acrow Products. 
(3) Scaffolding Engineering Co. 
(4) Joint Constructional Plants & Machineries Co. Ltd. and Joint Formwork Co. Ltd. 
(5) Vector Scaffolding Ltd. 
(6) Advance Equipment Service. 
The most common scaffold frame systems, in both the new and used conditions, were loaded 
until failure. The factor of safety with respect to their recommended working loads was then 
tabulated. The thirty-three test results provided a useful guideline in recommending the 
strength to be used in design. Chapter 7 gives a full account of the load tests of the systems 
and the correlation of their strength with age and origin. 
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2.7 Review of practices 
In order to establish the key activities for falsework, a literature review was undertaken on the 
conditions of the contracts to ascertain personnel's responsibility with respect to the activities 
concerned. Professionals were interviewed so as to determine the sequence of activities, 
procedures and responsibilities under different control systems. 
There are principally three control systems regarding the use of falsework. The key difference 
is whether the falsework is checked and approved by the Engineer, the Contractor's Falsework 
Coordinator or the Independent Checking Engineer. These systems will be discussed in 
Chapter 3 and will be considered in the development of the procedural framework for failure 
analysis and prediction. 
2.8 Procedural framework 
The procedural framework is based on simple input and output mechanism. The inputs are 
causes of failures and their effects are shown in the event sequence diagram which was 
established by professional opinion and from failure reports. The following diagram shows 
the effect of the causes on a particular stage of falsework activities. 
Triggering causes 
Enabling causes. 
~ l l + 
-----0------ Ol --0--
Another stage Procedure causes --.I Other stage 
------t~-- A particular stage I .... ~I-----
Figure 2.4: Different causes of failure for a particular stage of falsework 
activities 
The whole project of falsework construction can be broken into a number of stages. Within a 
particular stage, there will be a number of essential procedures. Each procedure may 
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incorporate enabling causes which contribute to the design and construction of the falsework. 
The triggering cause is usually the event which initiates the failure. 
The contribution to failure by procedural causes accumulated at various stages and their 
consequence can be modified by the effectiveness in the control system. At certain events, 
triggering causes will have an effect on failure. The failure probability will be aggregated and 
checked at various stages. The failure of the falsework is similar to the bursting of a balloon. 
The development of the procedural framework based on Balloon Theory (Blockley 1992) is 
presented in Chapter 10. Validation of the procedural framework was performed with the help 
of professionals engaged in the falsework activities will also be discussed. 
2.9 Summary 
Different methodologies adopted in this research have been highlighted. To predict the 
proneness of falsework to failure, the causes of the past failures were analysed and extracted 
from failure reports. There has been considerable difficulty in obtaining the reports mainly 
due to confidentiality. The nature of the causes, as identified, required different approaches 
for data collection and verification. The methods employed in this research include content 
analysis, case studies, laboratory tests, literature review and interviews. A procedural 
framework based on Balloon Theory will be developed to analyse and predict the falsework 
failures. The usefulness of the procedural framework would be validated by professionals and 
practitioners involved in falsework design and construction. The practices of falsework 
scaffolding will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF PRACTICES OF 
FALSEWORK SCAFFOLDING 
3.1 Introduction 
Falsework is often required for concrete construction and is used to support the freshly 
placed plastic concrete until the concrete has sufficient strength to support itself (Hover 
1981). The falsework is then dismantled, maintained and, if necessary, repaired for the 
next job. Despite its temporary nature, a number of parties will take part in these 
activities of design, construction, dismantling and maintenance. This chapter, based on 
literature review and informal interviews, presents a review of the falsework activities. 
The responsibilities of individuals involved in the activities are examined and the 
principal control systems regarding falsework construction are discussed. 
3.2 Falsework activities and responsibilities 
Although falsework, as a kind of temporary works, is normally designed and constructed 
by the Contractor, other professionals such as resident engineer, Independent Checking 
Engineer are also involved (Hover 1981, BS5975 1996). Falsework may be hired from a 
specialist supplier but such subcontracting would increase the number of organisations 
under the control of the Contractor (lllingworth 1987). Sometimes, the falsework 
supplier may have taken part in the preliminary design of the temporary structure. To 
provide a clear picture of the falsework activities and the personnel responsibilities, the 
practices during the design and construction of the falsework are reviewed and 
generalised for the formulation of a procedural framework used for analysing and 
predicting failures. 
In a paper entitled "Analysis of structural accidents", Blockley (1977) described that the 
design, construction and use are the key stages of a structural project. The design is 
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perfonned by a designer whose discipline depends on the nature and details of the works 
to be perfonned such as architectural, structural, building services etc. Construction is the 
process of converting the design into reality and will be perfonned by the Contractor. 
The designer may have certain control in this stage, depending on the type of 
construction contract adopted. The loading stage refers to the functioning of the 
falsework as laid down in the design. 
As explained in Section lA, falsework is a temporary structure which has a relatively 
limited life span on site, i.e. starting from before the construction of the pennanent works 
until the latter is self supporting. Such work will nonnally take a number of weeks to 
complete for a typical concrete construction. Despite the fact that falsework has a short 
life span on site, it has five key stages of activities, i.e. design, erection, loading, taking 
down and anew stages. 
3.2.1 The design stage 
A rational design approach is required for any structure to satisfy the requirements of 
safety, services and economy. Falsework is of no exception (Hover 1981). It should be 
designed in accordance with recognised engineering principles including consideration of 
materials, workmanship and site conditions (Poon 1990). As falsework scaffolds 
comprise assembled members, the method of analysis should be based on the distribution 
of load between members (BS5975 1996). 
It is always possible to design falsework from first principles, but many construction 
problems are recurring and standard solutions can be applied with frequently used 
methods and equipment. Section Eight of BS5975 deals with the application of standard 
solution. All designed solutions need to be prepared by suitably experienced persons and 
in accordance with appropriate code of practice such as BS5975. The responsibility of 
the falsework designer is no different from that of the pennanent works designer's 
(lllingworth 1987). 
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3.2.1.1 The design brief 
This brief is the collection of all relevant data affecting the design of the falsework. It 
refers to the availability of materials and equipment and should provide necessary 
information to devise a complete plan regarding the method of construction about 
permanent and temporary works. It may include extra information on site conditions 
(Bragg 1975). Early collection of data is important so as to allow sufficient time for 
subsequent activities. The preparation of the brief materials depends on the scale of the 
works. For example, a large amount of infonnation will be required in a major bridge 
project with a special construction method. The resources of the- infonnation should 
include previous site operations, discussion with personnel having local knowledge and 
parameters in designing the permanent works. Section 6.2.1 of B85975 lists the typical 
examples of information that should be collected in the design of the pennanent works. 
In particular, Illingworth (1987) states that the following information must be known to 
the designer besides the structure's loading. 
• The sequence of construction planned, i.e. the order of loading the falsework. 
• Any plant loads that the falsework may have to accept. 
• The method of placing loads on to the falsework, e.g. any likelihood of shock or 
surge loads. 
• Any redistribution of loads as a result of post-tensioning the concrete which is 
poured in situ. 
• Any other loads or situations that are not obvious. 
3.2.1.2 The Designer 
In the case of using falsework scaffolding for buildings and bridges construction, the 
design and supply of the temporary structure is very often sublet to a scaffolding 
company which specialises in this type of work (ibid). Very often the engineer employed 
by the supplier prepares a preliminary design and a list of required components for 
acceptance by the Contractor. The Contractor's staff will scrutinise and alter the design 
should it be found necessary. 
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If the Contractor possesses sufficient amount of falsework scaffold materials which are 
either in stock or returned from a completed job, the design may be performed by the in-
house planning or engineering department. The loadbearing capacity of scaffold material 
is usually quoted in the supplier's catalogue. If the scaffolding material is new, the 
loadbearing capacity used in design may be based on the quote in supplier's catalogue. 
However, should reused or repaired materials be erected, the designer adopts a lower 
loadbearing capacity, based on his experience in examining the worn-out and 
deteriorated materials. The Concrete Society Technical Report NoA on Falsework 
(1971), a joint report of the Concrete Society and the Institute of Structural Engineers, 
suggested that where scaffold tube is corroded, the basic permissible stresses used in 
design should be reduced by a factor of 0.95 for lightly pitted tubes and 0.85 for heavily 
pitted tubes. BS 5975 adopts a factor of 0.85 across the board for used tubes. Sometimes, 
a strength lower than the recommended factor has to be decided by engineer's experience 
and technical expertise, owing to the uncertainty arising from the worn-out materials. 
3.2.1.3 Checking the design 
Whether the falsework design is performed by the Contractor, or is a modification based 
on the supplier's preliminary scheme, the Contractor is still responsible for the adequacy 
of the design. Under the Conditions of Contract (Sixth Edition) of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, the Contractor has to submit the design to the Engineer for approval. The 
Engineer will check the construction methods and ensure that the erection of the 
proposed falsework will not cause detriment to the permanent works. Even with the 
Engineer's approval, the Contractor is still held responsible for the falsework design. 
This type of conventional control system of "Design by Contractor and Check by 
Engineer" has been used for decades. One major criticism of adopting this approach is 
that the responsibility for falsework construction was not clear (Hadipriono 1986b). 
Many contractors have taken the advantage of this system. In many instances, they 
submitted incomplete falsework designs to the Engineer for checking and comments for 
improvement. The Engineer, in general, is more interested in the permanent works 
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construction than checking the temporary works thoroughly. While making comments on 
the Contractor's design, the Engineer always tries to avoid the implicit responsibility, e.g. 
in reply, they state ''No objection". In other words, for whatever reasons, there could 
have been no detailed checking of the falsework design by the professionally competent 
engineer. In view of the deficiency of this system which has been confirmed by many 
failure reports (Elliott 1973, Hadipriono 1985), many researchers have suggested ways so 
as to make some improvements to this conventional control system (Elliott 1973, 
Melchers 1977, Hadipriono 1986, Ellingwood 1987). The modified control systems 
which are adopted currently for large construction projects will be discussed in Section 
3.3. 
3.2.2 The erection stage 
Having received the Engineer's consent but with no formal approval on the falsework 
design, the Contractor can proceed to the erection stage of the falsework. The erection 
can be performed by the Contractor's workforce, or can be sublet to the labour 
subcontractor or the material supplier. The erection is normally a straight forward 
process during which the units are assembled although different proprietary systems may 
require special procedures for erection. The Contractor must ensure that the materials are 
erected in accordance with the approved drawings. The site conditions can be quite 
different from the expectation of the falsework designer, so deviation from the original 
design is always inevitable. The Contractor must assure that the designer is always 
aware of any changes and approval is obtained from appropriate personnel if necessary, 
as failures were often reported due to a lack of communication between the parties 
involved. 
3.2.3 The loading stage 
This is probably the most important part of the functioning of the temporary structure 
during its short life on site. For in-situ concrete construction, the falsework is subject to 
the loads from the dead weight of the falsework and formwork, the imposed load of the 
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concrete and construction plant, and environment loads such as wind and rain. This is 
the stage that the most severe loading condition affects the falsework. 
The imposed loads which are applied in different periods within this stage can cause 
different load distribution onto the falsework. For example, the falsework will support 
formwork and steel reinforcement dead loads before concreting as well as the concrete 
loads afterwards. Post-tensioning, if performed, will cause uneven loads on the scaffold 
systems. As a result, the Engineer's approval is normally required before the load is 
applied on to the temporary structure. 
A common practice in Hong Kong is to sublet the erection of formwork, the fixing of 
reinforcement and the placing of concrete to subcontractors. Post-tensioning in most of 
the cases will be undertaken by the specialist subcontractor. Proper coordination is very 
important when considering the so many different parties involved in applying loads to 
falsework within a relatively short time period. 
3.2.4 The taking down stage 
Falsework is no longer required once the permanent work becomes self-supporting. 
However, dismantling will require prior approval of the Engineer who is to ensure the 
permanent structure is really strong enough to support itself. In particular, if post-
tensioning has to be performed, the removal of falsework must proceed in a way that is 
not detrimental to the permanent works. Study of many failures has revealed that the 
premature removal of falsework was one of the common causes for failure at this stage 
when the concrete member has not gained the strength that can sufficiently support itself. 
The removal of falsework is usually performed by the same company but not by the same 
gang of workers who have erected them. Proper dismantling procedure should be strictly 
adhered to so as to reduce the risk of injury to the workers and damage to scaffolding 
materials. 
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3.2.5 The anew stage 
Scaffold materials must be regularly maintained and repaired so as to allow future reuse. 
After removal, the falsework will be returned to the stockyard for inspection by 
experienced workers. The purpose to repair the scaffold frames is to maintain the 
straightness of the components. The rust condition will decide whether the material is 
still good enough to be reused or not. One maj or supplier in Hong Kong has emphasised 
the importance of maintenance because of the labourers' carelessness which can cause 
undesirable damage to scaffolding materials during dismantling. 
3.3 Control systems 
As mentioned in section 3.2.1.3, a number of collapses have been reported for projects 
using the conventional control system of "Design by Contractor and Check by Engineer". 
Many failure investigation reports (Bragg 1975, BS5975 1996) and researchers have 
suggested modifications or changes in the control system are necessary to avoid failure 
recurrence. Two other principal control systems are discussed in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Falsework Coordinator 
In Bragg's Report (1975) on falsework failure investigations, proper procedures were 
recommended for the choice of parties, the design brief, checking of designs, acceptance 
of falsework drawings, loading of falsework and general site conditions. Further, at each 
stage of design and construction of falsework, a check or an inspection should be made 
by a technically competent person. Since many organisations are involved, correction of 
faults for example will require co-ordination between more than one of them (BS5975 
1996). It was recommended that an individual in the construction organisation be given 
the duty of ensuring that all procedures and checks have been carried out. This person 
was described as the Temporary Works Coordinator. In order to fulfil mandatory duties, 
the Temporary Works Coordinator should have the authority to sign the permit to load 
and to strike the various units of the temporary works (Bragg 1975). 
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In BS5975, the appointment of Temporary Works Coordinator was renamed as 
Falsework Coordinator who is responsible for the narrower scope of temporary works. 
With the appointment made known to all parties concerned, the Falsework Coordinator 
should normally be directly responsible to the site manager and would have been given 
adequate authority to stop work if it has not been performed satisfactorily. The principal 
activities of the Falsework Coordinator are stated in section 2.5.2.2 of BS5975 and are 
listed below: 
• coordinate all falsework activities; 
• ensure that the various responsibilities have been allocated and accepted; 
• ensure that a design brief which has been established with full consultation is 
adequate, and is in accord with the actual situation on site; 
• ensure that a satisfactory falsework design is carried out; 
• ensure that the design is independently checked for concept, structural adequacy 
and compliance with the brief; 
• where appropriate, ensure that the design is made available to other interested 
parties, e.g. the structural designer; 
• register or record the drawings, calculations and other relevant documents 
relating to the final design; 
• ensure that those responsible for on-site supervision receive full details of the 
design, including any limitations associated with it; . 
• ensure that checks are made at appropriate stages covering the more critical 
factors; 
• ensure that any proposed changes in materials or construction are checked against 
the original design and appropriate action taken; 
• ensure that any agreed changes, or corrections of faults, are correctly carried out 
on site; 
• ensure that during use all appropriate maintenance is carried out; 
• after a final check, issue formal permission to load if this check proves 
satisfactory; and 
• when it has been confirmed that the permanent structure has attained adequate 
strength, issue formal permission to dismantle the falsework. 
34 
It can thus be seen that the Falsework Coordinator's role is to ensure all activities 
associated with falsework are properly performed by the appropriate personnel with 
defined responsibilities. This is an effective way to prevent the recurrence of common 
failures which have been recorded from previous investigations. 
3.3.2 Independent Checking Engineer 
One of the most common causes for falsework failures is the lack of checking the design 
and construction (Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1986b) which leads to the suggestion of 
employment of a professional engineer who is independent of the Contractor to cross 
check at some critical stages. In Hong Kong, an Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) 
has been required in major projects involving substantial temporary works. The ICE is 
concerned primarily with checking of the design and construction of the temporary 
works, which normally and very often includes falsework. 
In a conventional contract system, the Engineer is accountable for the design of the 
permanent works and the Contractor is responsible for the construction; the Contractor is 
solely in charge of the design and specification of the temporary works. The ICE has to 
guarantee that the temporary works are constructed, used and removed without any 
adverse effects on the permanent works. Any examination, approval or consent by the 
Engineer on the documents submitted related to temporary works will not relieve the 
Contractor's responsibility (Hong Kong General Conditions of Contract 1992). 
The Checking Engineer must be a suitable professionally qualified engineer who is able 
to act independently and is not associated with the design of the temporary works. If the 
ICE fails to perform the assigned duties properly, the Engineer has the authority to turn 
down such appointment. Normally, a consulting firm is employed by the Contractor as 
the ICE. 
The temporary works design should be checked and certified as satisfactory by the 
Checking Engineer in which the effect of foundation, the construction method etc. have 
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been taken into consideration in affecting the safety and stability of the temporary works 
during their construction, use and removal. Before erection of the temporary works, the 
Contractor should have submitted the certificate, to the Engineer, which has been signed 
jointly by the Contractor and the Checking Engineer confirming the works has been 
properly designed and checked. Another certificate is also required before loading or 
dismantling of the temporary works to confirm that the works have been constructed in 
accordance with the design. The autonomy of the Checking Engineer can ensure 
checking is performed in a more effective manner and with professional accountability. 
3.4 The three control systems (poon 1997) 
The three principal control systems regarding the use of falsework, namely Conventional 
System, Falsework Coordinator System, and Checking Engineer System, have been 
reviewed in the previous sections. In accordance with the conditions of contract, unless 
otherwise stated the contractor is responsible for the design and construction of 
temporary works including falsework. For the conventional system, there has been much 
criticism of a lack of well-defined responsibility and accountability of the personnel 
involved in the design and construction of falsework. Both the Engineer and the 
Contractor have the feeling that the other party should and would have taken up, or 
shared the responsibility (Bragg 1975, Hadipriono 1985). The Falsework Coordinator 
system is to ensure that the Contractor has carried out appropriate checking at various 
stages of falsework activities and there will be effective coordination among the various 
parties to minimise the procedural errors which may lead to falsework failures (Bragg 
1975). The Checking Engineer, being independent of the Contractor, is required to 
ensure that the design and construction of the falsework have been properly checked, in 
particular, at the critical loading and unloading events. The responsibility of various 
parties taking part in falsework activities is illustrated in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3. They will be used in the procedural framework for assessing the likelihood of 
falsework failures in later chapters. 
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Table 3.1: Conventional System 
Party\Stage Design Erection Use Dismantle Maintenance 
Engineer Check * * Check * * Check ** Check * * 
Contractor Design Supervise Supervise Supervise 
Sub- Formwork 
contractor Concreting 
Prestressing 
Supplier Preliminary Erect Dismantle Maintain 
design 
Note: 
• Key falsework activities are bold in the table 
• Checking responsibility level: 
* for infonnation; 
** without responsibility/accountability; and 
*** with responsibility/accountability. 
Table 3.2: Falsework Coordinator System 
Party\ Stage Design Erection Use Dismantle Maintenance 
Engineer Check * Check * Check * Check * 
Contractor Design Supervise Supervise Supervise 
Falsework Check *** Check *** Check *** Check *** 
Coordinator Coordinate Coordinate Coordinate Coordinate 
Issue permit Issue permit 
Sub- Formwork 
contractor Concreting 
Prestressing 
Supplier Preliminary Erect Dismantle Maintain 
design 
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Table 3.3: Checking Engineer System 
Party\ Stage Design Erection Use Dismantle Maintenance 
Engineer Check * Check * Check * Check * 
Contractor Design Supervise Supervise Supervise 
Sub- Formwork 
contractor Concreting 
Prestressing 
Supplier Preliminary Erect Dismantle Maintain 
design 
Checking Check *** Check *** Issue permit Issue 
Engineer permit 
Each of the three types of control system mentioned earlier has its own merits and 
demerits. The conventional system which is still adopted on many projects, particularly 
in developing countries, has in general the least merits. The main deficiency of this 
system is that the Engineer has no accountability despite the fact that he or she may have 
checked or approved the Contractor's design and construction. In many cases, the 
Contractor's design is inadequate and a detailed checking of such design is always a 
painstaking process. 
The adoption of a falsework coordinator employed by the contractor appears to be in 
close proximity to the ideal situation where someone will be full-time responsible for 
falsework activities. However, it is uncertain that whether the contractor has the resource 
to employ such experienced personnel, and whether he can act independently of the 
Contractor in reviewing and approving the falsework related activities. 
The appointment of the independent checking engineer seems to get the best compromise 
by having an independent qualified personnel to oversee the whole matter. As this 
checking engineer is not resident on site, there can be misunderstandings in the 
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communication of falsework activities and contractor's cutting corner cases in 
controlling the safety of falsework during construction have eventually led to falsework 
collapses. The collapse of the falsework supporting the two post-tensioned beams in 
Hong Kong in 1996 was the best example to illustrate (Poon 1997). The demerit of this 
system in the captioned case will be detailed in Chapter six. 
The merits and demerits of the three systems are summarised in the following table: 
Table 3.4: Merits and demerits of the three systems 
(1). Thc:coriVentionalsystem· commonly· used:iin many deve!()pillgcountries 
Merits 
Demerits 
The Engineer or Resident Engineer will concentrate on permanent works 
construction while the Contractor will be responsible for the design and 
construction of temporary works. 
Generally the Engineer or Resident Engineer will not formally approve the 
Contractors' falsework design. They are always reluctant to comment or 
give advice on temporary works design and construction, and have no 
responsibility whatsoever. As a result, many failures occurred as a result 0 
the lack of proper control of temporary works by an appropriate party. 
(2). Systclll.used inth~UriitedKingdom...;;Falsework Coordin~t~r,· 
Merits 
Demerits 
The Contractor employs a Falsework Coordinator who is responsible for 
the checking of the design and construction of falsework. He is also 
responsible for coordination with other parties involved in falsework 
construction. 
He is not wholly independent of the Contractor's organisation. Small 
contractors may not be able to provide such personnel. 
(3). Systemnsed in Hong Kong: Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) 
Merits 
Demerits 
A consulting engineer, employed by the Contractor, checks the design and 
construction of falsework. His permit would be required at critical stages 
of construction. 
All checking and approval activities in connection with falsework will be 
undertaken by the ICE. However, the ICE is not working full-time on site 
and immediate control on Contractor's activity cannot be guaranteed as the 
Resident Engineer for this type of contract will always act passively. 
39 
In view of the above, there is a need to introduce a monitoring system which can help 
minimise or prevent the failure owing to communication problem between parties in 
particular when there are changes to be made swiftly during construction. 
3.5 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations, UK 
The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (1994) was introduced in the 
UK because of an unacceptably high rate of death and injury associated with all types of 
project. The Regulations have an impact on all stages of planning and management of 
health and safety of a project and place duties on clients, designers and construction 
organisations. The designer includes engineers or architects for the permanent works 
design and temporary works engineers designing the formwork and falsework. 
Designers may be the only people able to make the decision that will eliminate a 
foreseeable risk. They should be aware of the hierarchy of risk control which underlies 
the modem approach to health and safety management. It is best to prevent the hazard 
and alter the design to avoid the risk. If this is not reasonably practicable the risk should 
be combated at source. Failing this, priority should be given to controls that will protect 
all workers. The designers should look for ways of reducing and controlling the risks. To 
make judgements in a systematic way, designers need to adopt risk assessment. 
3.6 Site Supervision Plan System, Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Building (Amendment) Ordinance gazetted in 1996 introduced a 
supervision plan system which focuses on the classification of the safety roles and duties 
of the professionals, namely the Authorised Person (mainly the architects), the Registered 
Structural Engineer and the Contractor who work together in a typical building contract. 
The three parties are now required to prepare a site supervision plan together before the 
commencement of the construction work. 
The supervision plan system was introduced because there have been so many failures 
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and accidents on building sites in Hong Kong and these incidences were not only due to 
the negligence of the workers, but also structural failures that were induced by the lack of 
supervision. The aim of the system is thus to provide safe working conditions for 
personnel working on site. It also proposes to increase the degree of self-regulation in 
the practices of professionals by clarifying the roles and duties of professionals in the 
safety aspects for a building project. Another requirement in satisfying the system is 
professionals are to assign technical competent persons to reside on the building site and 
to supervise key work activities including erection and dismantling of falsework. 
Preliminary findings of implementing this system indicate that failures and accidents due 
to lack of communication and delineation of responsibility of personnel in building 
construction can be minimised (Ping 1998, Choy 1999). 
3.7 Summary 
Falsework construction commonly involves a number of parties - the supplier, the main 
contractor, the subcontractor, the Engineer, the Resident Engineer and sometimes the 
Independent Checking Engineer. Also three different systems have been used in 
controlling the falsework design and construction. 
Under the conventional design by Engineer and construction by Contractor system, the 
Contractor's design was not always satisfactory and there was an absence of an effective 
checking system. The two modified systems involve the Falsework Coordinator and the 
Independent Checking Engineer. The Falsework Coordinator, as an employee of the 
contractor, is required to coordinate with other parties on falsework activities. The 
Independent Checking Engineer, appointed by the contractor in accordance with contract 
specification, is to check the falsework design and construction as well as to issue the 
approval to load the falsework and dismantle the temporary works. 
In Hong Kong, both the Conventional Control System and the Independent Checking 
Engineer System are being used. The former is still adopted on small contracts whereas 
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the latter has been required in recent years for major construction works. According to 
the conditions of contracts adopted in Hong Kong, the Engineer in both cases has no 
responsibility regarding the design and construction of the falsework. The Contractor will 
be responsible for the overall safety of the falsework. The Independent Checking 
Engineer is employed to check the design of the falsework and sometimes the erection of 
the falsework. 
In recent years, in both the UK and Hong Kong, there have been new requirements on 
designers and professionals in exercising to follow a tighter control regarding site 
supervision and assessment on the likely risk of the construction work. It is apparent that 
the trend now is to follow a tighter proactive control of certain construction activities. 
Stringent control of falsework construction cannot be exempted in view of their frequent 
failures. 
In the next chapter a study of the falsework failure reports will be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FALSEWORK FAILURE REPORTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Falsework failures, like many construction failures, are spectacular and attract public 
attention. In many instances, the failures involved collapse of the partially built 
permanent works. The consequences always lead to not just a delay in completion, 
but also injuries and fatalities. This type of incidence has always been widely reported 
by the media. 
In case of a failure, the media will give the public an account of what have happened. 
In Hong Kong, intensive investigation is required, in particular when there is a 
casualty, by the Labour Department. The Government Departments, if they are acting 
as the clients of the project, would also require an investigation and reports produced 
by both the Consultant and the Contractor, in order to explore the possible reasons and 
clarify the contractual and legal responsibilities. Expert reports are needed in case a 
court thinks it necessary in disputes for compensation or enforcement of the 
legislation. For severe incidences, the Government may set up a formal enquiry to 
investigate as well as to recommend for any remedial or preventive measures. 
The different types of report on failures used in this research are: 
• newspaper / television reports; 
• engineering journals; 
• professional reports; 
• accident reports; 
• court hearings; and 
• formal commission enquiry. 
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4.2 Press / Television reports 
Reports by the media have the fastest and most widespread impact in news 
announcement. Newspapers provide a written description which is enhanced by 
photographs of the accident; whereas television reports are verbal description with a 
closer look to reveal more detail. Though labelled with pictures or views, they are all 
short and brief descriptions only. Some report fmdings may be gathered through 
interviews with relevant personnel on site. They are plain descriptions by reporters 
who may not have the technical or professional knowledge to justify their findings. 
Though interviews are carried out on site, the views are unconfirmed and may lead to 
speculations without foundation. Some reporters tend to draw premature conclusions 
based on interviews. Most of these conclusions are unfounded as interviewers cannot 
judge the causes of the collapse due to a lack of investigation. Thus, these reports are 
of very low reliability. When citing the reports prepared by professionals, the content 
will only be reliable and relevant provided all the information quoted are complete, 
undistorted and without unfounded comments added. 
In the case of the collapse at Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong, the following observations 
were reported by the media. 
• Academics suggested the rusted tabular scaffolds and the permanent support 
failure were causes in connection with the collapse of the beams; when 
interviewed by the press. 
• The high rank government official, who was responsible for all public 
construction works, even mixed up the actual construction method. 
The above ideas and comments were found to be contrary to the Court Hearings and 
the expert's investigation. 
4.3 Engineering journals 
From time to time, professional journals publish reports on accidents and structural 
collapses from places all over the world. Except incorporating the full reports they are 
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not lengthy in description although diagrams and photographs are sometimes 
included. 
The characteristics of these reports on accident can be similar to those found in 
newspapers or television reports which are brief, incomplete and sometimes bias. 
They roughly describe the accident scene with some unconfirmed hearsay. The 
reporters in many cases have not acquired the expertise in this field. No calculation or 
analysis is included in these reports. Descriptions are mainly based on observation 
and spokesman statement. Many comments given by professionals are based on 
observation solely and hence are subjective and unfounded. Sometimes, because of 
the Editorial Board's close contact with Professional's Association, professional report 
findings are available for pUblication. The journals may publish the available reports 
at different stages such as occurrence of the incidence, the course of preparation of 
reports, preliminary fmdings and even court settlements. The reliability of the contents 
published depends on the source of material available. 
4.4 Professional reports 
These are prepared by professionals generally involved in the project where an 
accident has occurred. The professionals include the Engineer together with the 
Resident Engineer, the Contractor with the subcontractor, the Independent Checking 
Engineer if appointed, and, in Hong Kong, the Labour Department if there is a serious 
injury or dangerous occurrence. 
The Engineer, appointed by the client to supervise the construction work, would be 
required to compile the accident report based on the findings by the Resident Engineer 
and the Contractor. The Engineer has to report in particular the responsibilities and 
the activities leading to the accident. Naturally, this report presents information for 
judgement on contractual liability. 
Often the Contractor is criticised for submitting an incomplete report with key 
information missing such as calculation, connection details or working drawing of the 
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temporary works. Both the Resident Engineer and the Contractor may be required to 
produce their reports and are subject to questioning in the court for fatal cases. 
The Resident Engineer's report is to include all necessary documents such as meeting 
minutes, contractors' submission of design calculation, drawings, comments or 
approval by the Resident Engineer, tests, and inspection results so as to give a 
complete picture of all relevant activities relating to the accident in an attempt to 
determine the fault and the responsibility. 
While the Resident Engineer and the Contractor has the perception that their reports 
may be used for judgement on their responsibilities under the contract, some 
information which may be detrimental to their reputation would not be included 
deliberately in their report or so called "experts making false statements". The 
incompleteness of the report is often complained by the client or Government 
Department. 
However, these reports, to a certain extent, serve as a reliable account of instances 
about the accident although they are not available to the public partly because of the 
nature of the content and partly because of the unresolved legal responsibility. 
4.5 Accident reports by Labour Department 
The Labour Department inspectorate prepares the report of industrial accidents. The 
report provides the following infonnation. 
• Infonnation source - people or companies providing the infonnation in compiling 
the report. 
• Background infonnation - the parties, the project and the work to be undertaken .. 
• Construction of the element in concern. 
• Events before the collapse. 
• The collapse. 
• Observation and comments. 
• Possible causes of the collapse. 
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• Recommendations. 
• Appendices. 
These inspectors, though have been trained and experienced to carry out investigation 
of general construction accidents, are not professionally qualified to judge and make 
recommendations on engineering failures. Furthermore, they lack objective analysis 
and tests to back up their argument. These reports may be presented to the court and a 
charge may impose on the party concerned should a breach of regulatory requirement 
be found. 
4.6 Court bearings 
Court hearings are necessary whenever a fatality has been reported or settlement for 
dispute over liabilities and compensation is required. Although information 
unfavourable to certain parties may not be disclosed or admitted in the court, the 
reliability of information presented is very high. Sometimes independent expert 
reports for both the plaintiff and defendant are needed despite a general accident 
report has been prepared by the Labour Department. In this report, the expert presents 
the professional investigation of the failure, and the view on the accident together with 
the failure causes identified and supported by objective assessment e.g. computer 
simulation, laboratory test etc. 
Disputes are needed to be settled in the court for the following reasons. 
• Coroner's court for investigation of death of a victim in an accident as a legislation 
requirement. 
• Charges raised by the Labour Department in view of the breach of the regulation 
by the Contractor. 
• Civil cases - When the injured worker or relatives of the victim seeks for 
compensation because of the injury or casualty. Legal aids are available to those 
who are eligible under the regulations. 
The court will determine responsibilities and fines or punishment if appropriate. In the 
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coroner's court, the judge has no authority to punish in law any person who has 
negligence in any operation, but to establish the reason of death. 
In all these cases, the professional or personnel involved will be summoned by the 
court and questions will be raised by the Counsels. Reports prepared by professionals 
or experts would be read in court. Information presented during court hearings is 
reliable, in particular, the opinions expressed by professionals. 
The expert's reports can be presented by both sides in a dispute but one hundred per 
cent independence is practically difficult to achieve. It is impossible to eliminate 
totally the bias of the expert towards the side asking for the report. The process of an 
accident or a failure may be simulated by retrospective analysis or use of computer 
software. A typical expert report contains the following information. 
• Introduction including the information source. 
• Background information extracted from documents. 
• Sequence of events leading to the accident. 
• Other relevant information related to accident. 
• Probable cause of the accident. 
• Safety procedures that should have been adopted. 
• Safety regulations applicable and breaches of the regulation. 
4.7 Formal enquiry 
A fonnal enquiry was necessary after a major collapse such as the collapse of Hotel 
New World in Singapore in 1980, or as an intensive study of falsework in the UK in 
the nineteen seventies, when frequent collapses had been found. A commission of 
inquiry or a committee will be set up and may consist of a judge, academics, 
professionals and Government representatives. They are given the tenns of reference 
in carrying out the investigation. 
In the case of Singapore, the term of reference for the commission of enquiry was: 
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• to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon Road on 
13 March 1986; and 
• to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken to 
prevent a similar occurrence. 
The Report was published in 1987 with some of the recommendations listed as 
follows: 
• all structural plans and calculations of a building should be independently 
checked; 
• the system of voluntary registration of contractors should be expanded to cover 
projects in the private sector; 
• proper supervision of construction work by qualified person should be enforced; 
• various tests relating to structural work should be carried out under the supervision 
of a professional engineer; 
• spot checks on the construction particularly at the critical stage of constructing the 
major structural elements should be carried out; and 
• professional engineer's certificate on the structural plan is required for amended 
plans submitted by architects. 
The fmdings of a formal investigation is very reliable with few bias and relatively 
little missing information. Firstly, the background leading to a failure would be 
reviewed and all witnesses will be summoned on the history of the project and 
contract conditions including well-defined duties and responsibilities. There is usually 
a theory for the failure and the report contains the failure re-construction including all 
enabling events, procedural errors and triggering events. The mode of failure can also 
be confirmed by computer simulation. Detailed analysis of loads, stresses, structural 
analysis would be undertaken to check against the actual factor of safety. The enquiry 
panel will make the judgment from all views and information, and include 
recommendations. 
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4.8 Summary 
The publications which are pertinent to falsework failures have been reviewed. It is 
generally accepted that findings gathered from a formal enquiry are complete and 
authoritative. The Court hearings and professional reports including accident reports 
by Labour Department are deemed to be reliable. D~scriptions in Engineering 
Journals and reports produced by the media, due to a lack of professional 
investigation, are of low reliability. Different degrees of reliability are attached to 
these failure reports and should be interpreted in analysing the failures from the 
reports. The overall degree of reliability of different reports of failures is summarised 
in the following table. 
Table 4.1: Reliability of different accident reports 
Type of report Overall degree of reliability 
Media Very low - low 
Engineering report Medium 
Professional report High 
Accident report Medium - high 
Court hearings High 
Formal enquiry Very high 
In the following chapter, the investigation and study of falsework by institutions will 
be presented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FALSEWORK GUIDELINES 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the different types of falsework failure reports have been 
reviewed and compared. Because of the frequent occurrence and disastrous effect of 
falsework failure, study reports and practice guidelines of falsework have been 
published by Institutions in the UK and Hong Kong. They include recommendations 
for professionals in enhancing good practices in falsework construction and 
preventing failures. As early as in the nineteen seventies, the report on Falsework by 
Concrete Society and the Report of the Advisory Committee on Falsework were 
published in the UK. In 1982, BS5975, the Code of Practice on Falsework was 
published. In Hong Kong, the Guidance Notes for Prevention of Falsework Failure 
and the Code of Practice for Metal Scaffolding were only available in recent years. 
This chapter gives an account of these publications. 
5.2 Concrete Society Technical Report No. 4 - Falsework (1971) 
In 1971, a Joint Committee appointed by the Concrete Society and the Institution of 
Structural Engineers in the UK published a report on falsework. The report 
represented a distillation of the knowledge and experience of the construction 
industry. Although it was not an approved Code of Practice, it was stressed that much 
of it could be used in this way. The followings are the major contents. 
• Responsibility for falsework. 
• Classes of falsework. 
• Loadings. 
• Permissible stresses. 
• Design and detailing. 
• Workmanship and inspection. 
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• Limit state design. 
• Recommendations. 
The report was aimed at producing guidelines to those professionals responsible for 
falsework activities such as the design, construction and use. It recommended the 
responsible person, from the Contractor, should have specialist knowledge and 
experience of the design and erection of falsework. The design, erection, control and 
maintenance of falsework should be the responsibility of the Contractor whereas the 
Engineer should be responsible for safeguarding the interests of the client. 
5.3 Report of the Advisory Committee on Falsework (1975) 
Because of the frequent collapses of falsework in the UK during the nineteen 
seventies, a committee was set up to investigate the causes. Chaired by S.L. Bragg, the 
Advisory Committee on Falsework was appointed on 13 March 1973 with the 
following terms of reference: 
"To consider and advise on the technical, safety and other aspects of the design, 
manufacture, erection and maintenance of temporary load bearing falsework used to 
support formwork or permanent structures, particularly bridges, during construction, 
and, in particular, to: 
• identify any inadequacies in present knowledge, standards and practices, 
recommend such steps as may be needed, and indicate an order of priority; 
• draw up interim technical criteria, for use in advance of the publication of a 
British Standard Code of Practice, together with such procedural guidance as 
the Committee may consider appropriate; 
• recommend what research and development should be carried out in the short 
and long term; and 
• advise as to the training, organisational and manpower implications of the 
Committee's recommendations." 
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After extensive study of falsework failures and related topics, the Committee 
published an Interim Report and a Final Report in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The 
Final Report stated that the Committee had based their discussions on practice rather 
than on hypothesis and had tried to provide solutions that are realistic rather than 
utopian. The Report consisted of the following parts. 
• Details of some of the collapses studied by the Committee. 
• Commonest technical faults. 
• Common inadequacy in procedure. 
• Technical recommendation. 
• Recommended procedures. 
• Training and manpower. 
• Implementation of recommendations. 
Broadly speaking, technical reasons and procedural inadequacies were the main 
causes of falsework failures. 
5.3.1 Technical reasons 
The Final Report concluded that a single cause leading to the disasters was not 
common. In addition, there was no evidence to support that the reasons of failures 
were beyond existing knowledge. Technical failures could be classified into the 
following categories: 
• applied loads different from design; 
• inadequate design; and 
• works not constructed to the design. 
The principal technical causes extracted from the Report are described In the 
following sections. 
(1) Stability in horizontal plane 
Falseworks are designed to support vertical loads and to resist horizontal forces that 
55 
may arise from wind, vibration, water waves etc. Too often the designer is 
preoccupied with vertical loads. Absence of adequate resistance to lateral forces is one 
of the major causes of failures. 
Members out of plumb, whether by design or not, and concrete pressure on formwork 
will create horizontal components which must be allowed for at interconnecting points 
in the structure. Whereas accidental force such as impact by cranes if not considered 
in the design should be avoided or controlled on site. 
Scaffold falseworks comprising standard components should be jointed properly into 
a coherent structure. Connection by friction only is absolutely inadequate and 
unreliable. Lateral forces may move the structure sideways causing disruption and 
failure. 
(2) Progressive collapse 
The falsework system should be designed to avoid the progressive collapse because of 
failure of a single component. One solution to avoid this type of disaster is to separate 
sections of the falsework into independent self-supporting structures. 
(3) Overloads 
Overloading can result from three reasons: 
• inadequate design; 
• applied loading is different from design; and 
• loads are not applied as specified. 
Inadequate design is a particularly very common problem on small jobs. Some small 
contractors may fmd it difficult to justify the employment of an experienced engineer 
in designing the falsework. For some apparently simple jobs, proper design and 
thorough checking by a competent person were ignored just because the design was 
too simple. 
Actual applied loads can deviate greatly from those expected in the design office. 
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Underestimating the effect of floodwater causing the partial failure of the temporary 
foundation in the construction of a bridge over a river was an example. Different 
construction methods will create unexpected loading conditions in the structure. 
Effects of local stresses in particular must be carefully examined and allowed for. 
(4) Inadequate foundations 
It is important that the ground is strong enough to support the falsework and its loads. 
Information obtained from permanent works design may not be relevant for falsework 
design which is usually concerned with the ground surface. The changing environment 
effects such as surface water could weaken the soil overnight. 
Experience has shown that many verticals are not properly founded and the loads are 
not well spread by use of timber sleepers. Badly compacted materials under the 
sleeper are potential areas of falsework failure. Furthermore, inclined supporting 
surfaces always require additional treatment. Restraints against the slipping down of 
the base plate must be sufficient. Small settlements can cause undesirable effects on 
the structures. 
(5) Defective or inadequate materials 
Use of unsuitable and substandard materials are causes of a number of falsework 
failures. Most scaffolding materials have been previously used and need inspection for 
damage or deterioration before reuse. Unauthorised substitution, perhaps because of 
the temptation to complete the job early while in short supply of materials, could form 
areas of weakness not considered in the design. A common serious error on site is the 
replacement of proper pins by reinforcing bars in the props. 
(6) Dismantling 
Dismantling of falsework should be planned and carried out so that the stresses are 
relieved safely while the permanent work takes up its own weight. Instability of 
separate sections during dismantling constitutes partial collapse. Similarly inadequate 
re-propping of the permanent structure supporting other falsework may result in slab 
floor collapse. 
57 
5.3.2 Procedural inadequacies 
In addition to technical reasons causing falsework collapses, failures in procedure 
keep those weaknesses undetected or ill-treated. Procedural faults fall into the 
following two areas. 
• Failure of communication due to lack of a proper brief, inadequate drawings 
and absence of feedback on site conditions. 
• Failure of inspection when the design is not checked by a competent person 
and the structure is not inspected during and after erection. 
Falsework construction involves a number of parties from many organisations, 
therefore, effective co-ordination is important in the execution of a scheme. The 
following sections describe the areas where inadequacies in procedure, 
communication or inspection would allow the technical faults to occur. 
(1) Design brief 
It is of utmost importance that the client prepares a comprehensive brief incorporating 
all features that must be considered in falsework design. Insufficient information tends 
to cause delay, unnecessary alterations and failures. For example, introduction of 
access openings after the initial design is complete can lead to unnecessary weakness. 
(2) Design modification 
Actual site conditions are never as ideal as the assumptions laid down in the design. 
Modification of the original design is sometimes inevitable. The need for changes 
should be communicated between the falsework designer and site staff. Any alteration 
made on site without notifying the parties involved could weaken the structure. 
(3) Design error 
Some failures are direct results of fundamental errors in design. If thorough checks 
have been made, the error could be detected and thus rectified. It has been found that 
the existing knowledge of construction professionals is sufficient to prevent the errors 
by an adequate checking procedure. However, a problem arises, when an error has 
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been discovered, and the Engineer displays an inconsistent attitude or reaction. In 
various types of works, the Engineer's responsibility is defined in different ways. 
In 1972 the falsework for a concrete bridge collapsed near London, killing three and 
injuring ten (Engineering News Record 2 Nov 1972). Later a report cited the causes as 
"an error in falsework calculation, said to be so simple that they were not rechecked". 
(4) Site organisation 
A sound design is not the end of the job. The design must be translated into detailed 
working drawings, erected with correct materials and dismantled safely. Most errors 
and omissions from design become apparent on site. An efficient and effective 
management system will safeguard the essentials of the success of a falsework 
scheme. The following are some of the principal recommendations. 
• All falsework must be designed, even if it is a simple sketch on a small job. 
• The Contractor must appoint a properly qualified Temporary Works 
Coordinator (TWC) whose duties are to ensure that all procedures have been 
followed, that all checks and inspections have been carried out and that any 
modifications or changes have been properly authorised. Falsework may not 
be loaded or struck without the written permission of the TWC. 
5.4 Code of Practice for Falsework, UK (1982 & 1996) 
In 1982, the British Standard Institution published the BSS975, the Code of Practice 
for Falsework known as the first of its kind in the world. It was deemed necessary 
because of the increase in scale, frequency and complexity of falsework. During the 
drafting of this Standard, the main document drawn upon was the Falsework Report of 
the Joint Committee of the Concrete Society and the Institution of Structural 
Engineers published in 1971 described in Section 5.2. 
The Code has drawn together all those aspects that need to be considered when 
preparing a falsework design, including recommendations for materials, design and 
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work on site. The following sections are included in the Code. 
• General. 
• Procedures. 
• Materials and components. 
• Loads applied to falsework. 
• Foundations and ground conditions. 
. • Design of falsework. 
• Work on site. 
• Standard solutions. 
The Code also stresses. that success of falsework is closely tied up with its 
management, therefore procedures as well as technical aspects are included. It also 
endorses the Bragg's Report recommendation that a Temporary Works Coordinator 
needs to be appointed in order to ensure that all relevant procedures and checks have 
been carried out. However, the appointment is renamed as Falsework Coordinator so 
as to specify the duties to falsework activities only. 
In 1996, the revised edition was published. It was not a full revision of 1982 edition 
but technical changes have been introduced to bring in line with BS5268 Part 2: 
Structural Use of Timber- Code of Practice for Permissible Stress Design, Materials 
and Workmanship (BS5975 1996). 
5.5 Guidance Notes: Safety at Work (Falsework - Prevention of 
Collapse), Hong Kong (1998) 
This Guidance Notes was published by the Occupational Safety and Health Branch of 
the Labour Department, Hong Kong, in November 1998. Although guidance on 
design, construction, use and dismantling of falsework can be found in the BS5975 
(1996)- Code of Practice for Falsework, the Notes, as quoted, highlights the good 
practices sometimes overlooked by the contractor to prevent collapse of falsework on 
construction sites in Hong Kong. The Notes are intended to be read by site 
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management personnel and competent engineers and consist of the following sections. 
• Introduction. 
• Responsibilities. 
• Design stage. 
• Construction stage. 
• Dismantling stage. 
• Useful information. 
As duly specified, the guidelines should not be regarded as exhausting those matters 
which need to be covered under the relevant safety legislation. Compliance with the 
Notes does not confer immunity from relevant legal requirements. However, some 
important issues learnt from the local falsework failures have not been included in the 
Notes apart from its subtitle "prevention of collapse". 
Firstly, the importance of checking the falsework design and construction has been left 
out. Such checking is often performed by the Independent Checking Engineer. 
Secondly, consent of the Engineer or Independent Checking Engineer before loading 
the falsework is not stipulated. Also, before the dismantling of the falsework, the 
necessity of the approval and certification of the falsework and permanent works by 
the competent engineer are not specified. 
This Guidance Notes only outlines some of the good practices which are sometimes 
overlooked by the industry but without incorporating those weaknesses commonly 
leading to falsework collapse (po on 1999). 
5.6 Code of Practice for Metal Scaffolding Safety, Labour 
Department, Hong Kong (2001) 
This Code of Practice was published by Labour Department in June 2001. The 
drafting of the document is based on the revision of the previous code and consists of 
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the sections listed below. 
(1) Introduction and the status of the Code. 
(2) Definition of terms commonly encountered in metal scaffolding. 
(3) A summary of the legislation and statutory provision in relation to safe metal 
scaffolding. 
(4) A safe management and a safe system of work including the following. 
• Design and initial planning. 
• Selection of subcontractor for metal scaffolding work. 
• Site management and procedures. 
• Working places and access. 
• Monitoring safety performance. 
• Training of metal scaffolders. 
(5) Technical requirements for safety in metal scaffolding covering the list below. 
• General requirements. 
• Tubular scaffolds. 
• Proprietary scaffold systems. 
• Falsework. 
(6). Inspection, maintenance and dismantling of metal scaffolding. 
This Code stresses the importance of monitoring safety performance of metal 
scaffolding which is also commonly used in falsework construction, as illustrated in 
the following: 
Section 4.5.1 "Requirements on safety and health, particularly those relating to 
compliance with safety legislation are advisable to be incorporated into the conditions 
of contract for engagement of subcontractor for metal scaffolding work or other 
subcontractors using the scaffold." 
Section 4.5.2 "Records on the safety conditions of the scaffolding should be kept. 
Such records should consist of detailed information on work hazards, precautions 
taken, accident analysis and recommendations. These records should be constantly 
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reviewed for hazard identification and for improvement of the scaffolding work." 
Section 4.5.4 "A monitoring system should be developed, implemented and 
maintained on site for checking the safety performance of the subcontractor for metal 
scaffolding work or other subcontractors using the scaffold." 
It is interesting to note that a monitoring system should be implemented on site to 
monitor the safety performance of personnel involved in metal scaffolding work. This 
Code comprises a thin section of falsework. It highlights the good practices sometimes 
overlooked in order to prevent collapse. However, the title of the Code does not 
indicate the inclusion of such important topic. In view of the importance and frequent 
collapse of falsework, a separate code of practice on falsework is recommended. 
Based on the experience and study of the local failures, the following should have 
been included in the Code. 
• The effectiveness of the liaison and control mechanism for falsework in the 
event of a change in the construction method of the permanent works. 
• The inspection and approval requirement at critical stages of erection, loading 
and dismantling of falsework. 
5.7 Summary 
The Concrete Society Technical Report and Bragg's Committee Report had led to the 
publication of the BS5975, the Code of Practice for Falsework. This Code of Practice 
is a very comprehensive document providing recommendations not only on design but 
also the practice of falsework construction. On the contrary, the Guidance Notes and 
the Code of Practice published in Hong Kong are incomplete as weaknesses identified 
from failure reports have not been taken into consideration. However, all these reports 
and codes emphasise not just the importance of checking the design but also 
controlling the construction in preventing falsework failures. In the next chapter, case 
studies on falsework failures will be presented. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDIES OF FALSEWORK FAILURES 
6.1 Introduction 
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are 
being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is 
on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life content (Yin 1994). In order to 
study the causes and to collect relevant information regarding falsework failures, site 
visits were made to failures in Hong Kong and nearby places. Between 1986 and 2001, 
there were seventeen known major falsework failures. Nine occurred in Hong Kong, two 
in Taiwan, four in Southern China and one each in Macao and Singapore. This chapter 
presents the findings of failure cases investigated. Cases with relatively few information 
available are grouped in one section. The significance of having the site visit will also be 
discussed. 
6.2 Case study 1 - May 1986, Hong Kong 
The failure occurred at the Tsing Yi North Bridge Site where square-prop falsework was 
used for the construction of a post-tensioned concrete bridge deck. The falsework for 
one span of the deck had been erected the day before the incident. Because of the strong 
gusty winds at night, workers discovered that some props were found out of plumb early 
next morning. The workers then rectified the verticals. Suddenly, part of the erected 
falsework collapsed and caused one death and one injury. Formal access to the 
construction site was not allowed in this case, which is similar to many other cases, due 
to a number of reasons which are listed as follows. 
• Workers may still have been trapped under the wreckage and only parties such as 
firemen or police can get access to the scene. 
• Investigation is still underway by related parties such as the Engineer, the 
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Contractor, the Labour Department, the insurance company and the Police if there 
is any question of a criminal offence. 
• While busy in dealing with other parties, the Contractor will not like to entertain 
outside visitors at this particular instance of time. 
• Conditions of contract usually do not allow any trespassers for security and safety 
reasons. 
• Usually the Contractor will not release any information because people regard 
accidents particularly structural failures may cause damages to the Contractor's 
reputation. 
Photos of the collapsed falsework together with the accident report prepared by the 
Labour Department were being studied. The major cause for the collapse was the 
absence of a proper procedure for rectifying the falsework. There was neither proper 
inspection nor suggestion given by the Professional Engineer regarding the safety 
procedures to be followed during rectification. 
6.2.1 The bridge (Labour Department 1986) 
The highway bridge was known as Tsing Yi North Bridge. It consisted of two 
carriageways, the north and the south, spanning across the Channel. The main span was 
supported by two major columns. There were five piers, El to E5, with four of them E2 
to E5 completed, all on one side of the Channel. 
6.2.2 Falsework 
Square props were used as the falsework for the concrete bridge deck between Piers E3 
and E4 of the north carriageway. It consisted of four tubes, and made up of intermediate 
sections of various lengths (Figure 6.1). Each prop rested on a concrete slab. 
On top of the topmost section was a U-head which would hold the steel I-beams 
transversely. Another layer ofl-beams was placed longitudinally on top of the first layer. 
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Wooden formwork would then be erected at the top. 
On the day before the incident, the erection of Stage 1 (Figure 6.2) falsework was 
completed and fixing of wooden formwork had already commenced. The erection of 
Stage 2 falsework had started three days earlier. The square supports of Stage 1 were 
tied both transversely and longitudinally at five levels. The six rows of Stage 2 
falsework were erected upright on site. They were tied horizontally both in the 
transverse and longitudinal direction at two levels near the top and the bottom. 
6.2.3 The collapse 
At 7:40 a.m., on 14th May 1986, the Stage 2 falsework (Figure 6.3) was found leaning in 
a southerly direction. The leaning falsework was allowed to rest against the jib of a 
crawler crane parked nearby. At about 9:00 a.m., the contractor and falsework 
subcontractor agreed to lift the leaned temporary works to its upright position first. The 
crawler crane was used to lift the falsework. Two chain blocks were anchored at the 
North to pull the temporary structure with the aid of two wire ropes which were secured 
to the top part of the leaned falsework. 
During the course of the remedial work, one foreman and five workers from the 
falsework subcontractor were mobilised. They needed to climb up the falsework to 
check the clamp joints for damages, then fastened or adjusted the coupling between 
bracing and secured additional bracing as necessary. One worker stayed on ground to 
check the verticality of the props. 
At 10:00 a.m., the foreman ordered the workers to release the wire ropes and chain 
blocks which were used to secure the top part of the falsework and pull the falsework 
northerly. At about 11 :00 a.m. most of the work was nearly completed. Only two 
workers remained on top of the falsework in order to finish the last bit of the work. 
Suddenly the whole of the Stage 2 and part of the Stage 1 falsework collapsed in the 
south-east direction. The two workers fell with the props. One of them, being trapped by 
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the collapsed props, was certified dead later. 
The collapsed area was about 24m in length and 12m in width. A total of ten rows of 
props with each row consisted of eight individual props fell. The height of the props was 
about 14.5 m and 16 m for Stage 1 and Stage 2 props respectively. 
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6.2.4 Design and supervision 
The drawings and calculations of the collapsed falsework were based on those which had 
been accepted for use at the other spans previously constructed in the same project. 
Features unique to the Stage 1 falsework had been reviewed by the Engineer, however, 
no drawings nor calculations had been submitted for the Stage 2 falsework. 
A total of sixteen bays of the bridge deck had been concreted by using the same kind of 
falsework in the same contract. No adverse effect had been reported so far before the 
collapse. 
According to the contract requirement, the contractor must satisfy the Engineer that the 
completed falsework would perform its function safely and satisfactorily. The day-to-day 
management of the erection was supervised and under the control of the contractor. The 
completed falsework required the Engineer's consent before it was being put into use. 
According to the Labour Department's Report, staff from the Resident Engineer's office 
did observe the leaning of the falsework and workers' performance of remedial work, but 
it was difficult to discern the communications between the contractor/ subcontractor and 
the Engineer/ Resident Engineer regarding the method of remedial work. 
6.2.5 Causes 
The bracings of the square supports of Stage 2 falsework at two levels only were far from 
the requirement as stipulated in the design. Thus, they would be easily displaced and 
tilted by any foreign force. It was reported that strong winds and thunderstorm affected 
the site area in the night before the accident. The maximum gust of wind recorded was 
43 kmIhr. 
The use of the crawler crane and tie-wires to stabilise the falsework appeared to be 
reasonable to achieve temporary stability for the falsework. However, the subsequent 
premature release of the tie-wires and the tie with the crane was unwise before adequate 
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diagonal bracing had been installed. 
6.2.6 Recommendations 
The props should be braced adequately in every stage of erection in order to. prevent 
displacement effected by any foreign force. Critical assessment and detailed procedures 
on remedial work should be made before any action could be conducted. Any remedial 
work should be approved and supervised by qualified professionals specialized in 
falsework and the devised procedure must be strictly adhered to. 
6.3 Case Study 2 - December 1987 & April 1988, Taipei, Taiwan (poon 
1989) 
6.3.1 The bridge 
The highway bridge was located along the central part of Hsinhai Road at the southern 
part of Taipei City. The bridge was designed as two parallel structures, running from 
East to West, connected by a tied beam or separated by an expansion joint. The 
collapsed portion of the bridge deck was the northern part of four continuous spans about 
120m in length and was of post-tensioned concrete construction as shown in Figure 6.4. 
The average longitudinal fall was 3.5 per cent and the height of the soffit above ground 
varied with a maximum of around 6m. 
The bridge deck was a box girder constructed in two stages (Figure 6.5). The bottom 
slab together with the vertical stems were cast first. Formwork was then erected across 
the tops of the stems to form the hollow cells. The top slab was concreted across the 
cells and made integral with the stems. A number of access openings of 800mm square 
were left in the top slab for ease of removing the shuttering and, afterwards, to be refilled 
with concrete using suspended forms. 
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6.3.2 The falsework 
The falsework supporting the concrete deck were of two structural forms. The lower 
portion was system scaffolding or steel frame structures depending on whether the access 
was required below the deck during construction. At the top, there was a planked 
platform laid above which timber posts and beams were nailed to fix the formwork. 
The vertical load carried by tubular uprights of the frames was spread in a conventional 
way through a 40mm thick timber sole plate placed on the ground. The stanchions of the 
steel frame structure, bearing higher loads, were supported by plies of steel plate on 
either concrete plinths or directly laid on the ground. 
6.3.3 The collapse 
The collapse occurred during casting of the top slab. The concrete pouring which started 
from the lowest span and working towards the top was about completed. Initially, the 
third span dropped to the ground as a loss of support from the tubular scaffold from 
below. Consequently, the other three spans collapsed after a chain reaction. 
The fourth span, being the uppermost and with tubular scaffolding below, rotated about 
the continuous support and fell to the ground. The second span was retained by the much 
stronger steel frame structure which was erected to provide access below the deck during 
construction. The first span, which was at a greater distance away, had had similar 
damages as the second one. Fortunately and miraculously, no one was hurt during the 
collapse. 
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6.3.4 The causes 
As pointed out in the Bragg's Report (1975), there can be many causes for most 
falsework failures. Based on the field observation and the discussion with the consultant 
for the project and other professionals, the collapsed falsework had the following 
weaknesses. 
• Absence of a proper and an adequate design with checking by competent 
persons. 
• Lack of bracing members both longitudinally and transversely. 
• Overloading of the slender tubular scaffolds. 
• Horizontal forces, such as those due to concrete pumping had not been 
allowed for in the design, which may be negligible only in small works and in 
a sheltered location. 
• Settlement of the ground was not taken into account. 
Immediate remedial work after the incident such as strengthening the remaining scaffolds 
by adding timber struts and diagonal braces justified some of the above-mentioned 
points. 
According to Tsai & Hadipriono (1990), the failure of deck BG1 was caused by the 
insufficient support of the falsework and this accident prompted the Department of 
Public Works to request the contractor to replace the falsework scaffolds by structural 
steel members. However, since the contractor had already completed the falsework 
foundation, they simply strengthened the existing falsework scaffolds by adding timber 
struts. 
In April 1988, the deck BG3 collapsed only two weeks after concrete pouring was 
completed (Isai & Hadipriono 1990). 
An independent investigation performed by a commission appointed by the Department 
of Public Works concluded that the following were the enabling causes: 
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• weak connections of the steel pipes (frames); 
• weak timber structure at the upper level of the falsework; 
• inadequately spliced and incompletely installed cross bracings; and 
• weak foundation for the falsework. 
The following were identified as triggering causes. 
• Several days of heavy rain that resulted in water ponding on the top parts of 
the falsework. 
• Differential settlement of the soil beneath. 
The request of the Department of Public Works to replace the steel scaffolds with 
stronger components such as H-beams or columns was ignored by the contractor, as the 
contractor had already completed the falsework foundation. 
6.3.5 Second failure 
Five months later another deck BG3 of the same bridge collapsed after concrete pouring. 
The two collapsed spans were supported by similar falsework scaffolds, though the 
second one was reinforced by additional timber struts. However, this second deck BG3 
collapsed due to a number of inherent causes which had been identified from the study of 
the first deck BG 1 failure. Had the parties learnt from the first failure and taken 
immediate preventive measures, the second collapse should have been avoided. 
6.3.6 Control system used for this project 
According to Mr. Tsang of China Engineering Consultants, who was the Consulting 
Engineer for the highway project, the contractor should provide the following for the 
Resident Engineer's (staff from the Department of Public Works) approval before 
commencement of the works: 
• material, machinery and plant to match the actual site conditions; 
• associated construction method; and 
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• design of the falsework including drawings and details. 
This control system is similar to the conventional one, i.e. the contractor is required to 
design and construct the temporary works including the falsework, whereas the Engineer 
will approve the design and construction of the temporary works but without 
responsibility. 
6.4 Case study 3 - July 1988, Chongqing, Sichuan Province, China 
(poon, 1989) 
6.4.1 The bridge 
The eight-span highway bridge was about 150m in length running from South to North. 
The maximum soffit clearance at mid-length was six metres and two rising ramps at the 
two ends accommodated the difference in level between the bridge deck and the existing 
ground. The span length varied between 16m and 20m and the deck comprised ten T-
shaped prestressed beams simply supported at their ends. 
Before the collapse, three spans each at both the South and the North end had been 
substantially completed. The beams were either cast in situ at their final positions, or 
those from the adjacent spans were elevated temporarily 2m above the bearings by 
tubular steel falsework. Steel shuttering was used for the soffit of the beam, whereas 
timber board was shaped to form the varying height of the web along the length of the 
beam. The difference in levels between beams of adjacent spans during such temporary 
arrangement enabled the prestressing operation to be performed at the beam ends. 
Thereafter, the elevated beams would be lowered to their ultimate position. 
In general the site was poorly managed and water ponding was found everywhere 
particularly near the pier foundation. The whole site had not been fenced, thus 
permitting people to obtain access right across and below the bridge deck under 
construction. 
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6.4.2 The falsework 
The falsework used for this bridge construction was tubular steel of 38mm external 
diameter and 3mm thick. The height of the scaffolding varied and many members were 
rusted, twisted or bent, signifying the prolonged absence of repairs and maintenance. 
The steel tubes were erected directly on the ground without a base, or on some hard 
material such as pieces of stone or timber. No adjustable V-heads were used at the top. 
The supporting level was adjusted by altering the fixing of the horizontal transom. The 
load carrying capacity of the falsework scaffold was thus based on the bending strength 
of the transom, the shear capacity of the couplers and the compressive strength of the 
uprights with respect to their effective height. 
The falsework should be designed to support the weight of the concrete beams not only 
before but also after prestressing, and until the beams were lowered to their final 
positions. After prestressing, the uprights at both ends would take up the weight of the 
beam as there would be an upward deflection at mid span after post-tensioning. 
6.4.3 The collapse 
Shortly after 5:00p.m. in one afternoon of July, 1989, the third span from the South end 
of the bridge collapsed. The concrete beams fell and rotated about their North ends 
which were still retained by the pier. About thirty workers were trapped below the 
falling beams. Fifteen were injured and three were reported dead. 
6.4.4 The causes 
Based on the field inspection, discussion with the site personnel and the analysis of the 
recommendation issued by the Authority concerned after the incident, the possible 
reasons for the collapse were shown as follows: 
• overloading the supporting falsework due to uneven load distribution; 
• instability of the falsework because of ground settlement, out of plumb of the 
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uprights and lack of bracing members to distribute the horizontal loads; and 
• removal of the props intentionally or accidentally by workers, who were 
inexperienced in prestressed concrete works, from the villages. 
Instructions issued by the Construction Planning Authority after the collapse of the 
bridge were as follows. 
• All leading parties must establish quality first, safety first concept. Any improper 
procedure and irrational behaviour for progress which do not take health and safety 
into consideration must be prohibited. All departments are to build up the 
responsibility for quality and safety, and leaders have to be appointed for checking 
the safety and quality of works. 
• For large span tunnels, precasting and cast in-situ work, specially appointed staff are 
required to control the construction. Working procedures without scrutiny by design 
professionals will not be allowed. 
• Exercise stringent control over construction workers. Subcontractors from the village 
are not permitted to construct large span beams and tunnel projects. 
6.4.5 Lessons learnt 
The falsework should be properly designed and constructed with adequate materials. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to lay down proper procedures so that staff will fmd it easier to 
cope with critical events such as prestressing and removal of falsework. 
6.4.6 Construction supervision 
The supervision system adopted in China is generally in line with the traditional "Design 
by Engineer and Construction by Contractor" method i.e. the design is done by the 
Engineer while the construction of the permanent and the temporary works is performed 
by the Contractor. However, there is no checking of the temporary works by any third 
party. 
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6.S Case study 4 - February 1995, Hong Kong (South China Morning 
Post 1995, Coroner's Court Hearing) 
There was a report released by the media that a 75-tonne concrete bridge segment 
crashed through a supporting scaffold during placing to the bridge pier at the Route 3 
Highway Bridge construction site. 
The collapse section was a part of the Route 3 of the Airport Core Program. The bridge 
deck was either a single cell section or a twin cell section. The sections were cast on a 
falsework scaffold and subsequently moved to the bridge piers. A number of such single 
cell units had been cast and placed successfully before standard procedures had been 
followed and checked where appropriate by the Independent Checking Engineer (ICE). 
The section collapsed was a twin cell unit which weighed about 80 tons. Initially, the 
launching beam method was proposed. However, due to the headroom restriction, partial 
lift method was then used, i.e. the section after casting and cured, would slide via two 
steel beams at the top of the scaffold towards the pier. The scaffold was 3.65 m high 
with bracing. The individual component was tested after the accident and it had a 6.5-ton 
safe load with a F.O.S. of two. The scaffold was erected on 20 February 1995. 
The method statements without detailed sliding mechanism and design calculation of 
temporary works were sent to the Engineer and, before commencement, to the ICE. As it 
was the first time to install the twin cell segment, the Resident Engineer had reminded 
the Contractor to submit the temporary works design. It was later found that the 
collapsed scaffold was erected in accordance with drawings for other scaffolds. The 
construction method had been changed but there was no revised method statement, and 
certainly without formal approval. 
The erection work and moving of the segment were undertaken by Thai workers. They 
did not understand English although it was claimed that they had undergone a three-hour 
introductory training course. The two technical managers of the Contractor, who had 
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overall planning and controlling responsibility, left Hong Kong after the accident. The 
Contractor's foreman and Thai foreman supervising the Thai workers were absent from 
site on the day before and on the day of accident. There was no inspection of the scaffold 
to ascertain whether it was suitable for use or not and there were no instructions given to 
Thai workers. While the workers were moving the segment towards the pier, the segment 
crashed through the supporting scaffold and injured the workers. 
The possible causes of the collapse were: 
• poor ground support; 
• eccentricity of load; 
• uneven distribution of load on the scaffold; and 
• the scaffold was not designed. 
The procedural causes included: 
• no approval by the ICE; 
• unconventional construction method; and 
• communication flaws such as workers proceeded construction work without 
approval. 
At the Coroner's Court, the Judge concluded: 
• the scaffold was not erected according to proper design drawings approved by the 
ICE; 
• during erection, there was no proper supervision; 
• after erection, there was no inspection or checking by the Engineer, the Resident 
Engineer or the ICE; and 
• there was no approval by any supervisor in moving the segment to the pier by Thai 
workers. 
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6.6 Case study 5 - January 1996, Hong Kong (poon 1997) 
6.6.1 The footbridge 
In January 1996, in Hong Kong, two precast and prestressed concrete beams collapsed 
during construction of a footbridge. The collapsed 34m span footbridge was designed to 
straddle Po Ning Toad, Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong. It was formed by first installing 
two concrete beams of rectangular cross section O.65m x 1.95m. Each beam was about 
110 tonnes by weight. The 3m wide deck and the roof were then built on the two beams. 
(Figure 6.6). 
6.6.2 Construction method 
The two beams could either be precast or cast in situ. Since the top of the beam was 
designed to be in line with that of the permanent piers that were first built at the two 
ends, it was impossible to prestress the beams if they were cast in situ at their final 
positions. 
The beams could be precast off site, and then delivered and lifted into· their positions. 
But this operation would involve closing of the road below the footbridge at mid-night. 
As the road was required to be kept open to traffic twenty-four hours a day because of the 
operation of a landfill site nearby, off-site casting was out of the question. 
The only option left was casting the concrete beams about 2m above their final positions 
using temporary supports. Prestressing operations would then be carried out and 
thereafter the beams were to be lowered to the bearings on the piers. 
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6.6.3 FaIsework 
Timber formwork was used for casting the beams. Steel transverse I-beams and channels 
were erected to spread the concrete load onto the longitudinal steel beams. The vertical 
supports were quadshores consisting of four tubular steel members which were 
connected to the temporary concrete footings by bolts (Figure 6.6). 
6.6.4 Lowering of the concrete beams 
After post-tensioning, the two concrete beams were supported by the falsework at both 
ends. Since the beams were cast at a height of 2m above the bearings, a method for their 
descending was required owing to the fact that there was no hydraulic jack with sufficient 
capacity available to lower the beams in one single operation. 
At both ends, a pair of steel I-beams was placed transversely underneath the concrete 
beams. Below, two sets of props, A and B, with sets of I-beams fixed at the top, were 
erected to support the concrete beams in turn. After prestressing, the two concrete beams 
were supported by the A props. Another set of props, B, was later erected. The plan 
layout would then consist of two rows of props of the pattern B-A-A-B-B-A-A-B. 
(Figure 6.7) 
Initially, eight hydraulic jacks were scheduled to be placed at B props at both ends. 
However, by placing the jacks above two A props, the number of jacks could be reduced 
to four. So there was a change in the construction method. When B props were 
providing the support, the hydraulic jacks would be placed on A props. By activating the 
hydraulic jacks, the intermediate I-beams on B props could subsequently be removed. 
Similarly, the intermediate I-beams on A props were removed when B props were in 
support. By repeating the processes, the two concrete beams would finally be lowered to 
the bearings without using the cranes and closing of the road below (Figure 6.7). 
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6.6.5 The collapse 
Having completed the erection of B props, the workers attempted to remove the 
intermediate I-beams on A props. While they were striking the last screw jack of the A 
props at the North end of the bridge, the two concrete beams fell, rotating about their 
longitudinal axis. Three workers on site were injured and a lorry driver was crushed to 
death by the falling beams. 
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6.3m 
6.6.6 Possible causes 
When concrete was being placed for the casting of the two beams, the I-beams on the 
props at the North end had shifted. Due to the post-tensioning of the beams, there was a 
re-distribution of loads on the I-beams and the props. Unfortunately, the loads were not 
evenly distributed. In addition, the I-beams on A props had been stiffened whereas those 
on the B props were unstiffened and could not be able to support the increased loads. 
The failure sequence was as follows: 
(1) short longitudinal I-beams failed in buckling; 
(2) transverse I-beams started to fall; 
(3) concrete beams fell; and 
(4) eccentric loading on quadshores at the other end led to failure and collapse of the 
falsework. 
6.6.7 Procedural inadequacies 
The following are the inadequacies of the procedures. 
• The steel I-beams were not properly checked for misalignment after concreting and 
their ability to support the concrete beam loads. 
• The main contractor failed to provide detailed drawings for the falsework 
construction. 
• The workers were removmg the A props without the ICE's approval on the 
construction of the B props to receive the loads from the concrete beams. 
• Consultant's site staff showed little concern about the work being carried out by 
workers prior to the collapse. 
6.6.8 Recommendation 
As for traditional construction contracts, the Resident Engineer claimed that they had no 
liability regarding the construction of the temporary works except receiving the approval 
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certificate submitted by the ICE and the Contractor. The Contractor and the consultant's 
site staff claimed that they did not know the workers employed by the subcontractor had 
started to remove the A props, but the consultant's works supervisor was on the deck 
prior to the collapse of the beams. However, the Contractor or the subcontractor had 
proceeded the construction work i.e. removing the A props while the beams were 
transferred to B props before inspection and approval by the Checking Engineer. 
The situation exposed the deficiency in the control of the temporary works during their 
construction. There was supervision but held no position of responsibility by the 
consultant's resident staff, and the Contractor left all the checking responsibility to the 
Checking Engineer. Furthermore, the Checking Engineer was not working full time on 
site. This implied that there was no control with responsibility by any competent 
professional when the workers were in operation. 
It is therefore recommended that the Checking Engineer should be appointed to check 
and supervise the construction of the temporary works, not just to certify that they have 
been erected in accordance with the design drawings. Also, the Contractor should 
appoint a member of his staff to be responsible for the co-ordination of the design and 
construction of temporary works. The consultant's site staff should also pay more 
attention to the temporary works construction although they contractually have no 
liability. 
6.6.9 Conclusion 
Control should be tightened with the appointment of the ICE who is responsible for 
checking and approving the design and construction of, and loading on the temporary 
works. However, as shown from the above mentioned collapse case, there was no 
control over the Contractor's work during the erection and loading of the falsework. To 
prevent future failures caused by unauthorised work being carried out by the Contractor 
or subcontractor, the Checking Engineer should be appointed to supervise the whole 
erection stage particularly those activities which would be immediately followed by 
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loading on the works. The Contractor should appoint staff to be responsible for the co-
ordination of the temporary works and the consultant's site staff should be more alert to 
the critical activities. 
6.7 Case studies 6 - December 1996, Ru Yuan, Guangdong, China 
(poon et al. 1998) 
6.7.1 Introduction 
A severe accident occurred at a bridge construction site during concrete pouring in 
December 1996, near Ru Yuan Town, Guangdong, China. It was a box arch bridge of 
reinforced concrete construction in a highway construction project. The beams forming 
the arch were twisted and collapsed totally to the bottom of the valley. Thirty-four 
workers died and twenty-seven severely wounded in the accident. 
It was one of the most severe construction failures in recent years in China. Initially, the 
press did not release any cause from detailed investigations. The original drawings and 
related information of the bridge were kept confidential by the authority. Even visiting 
the site within one month after the failure occurrence was strictly forbidden. The author 
made great efforts to visit the site twice. The first time was one week and the second one 
was three months after the accident. Information was collected by visiting the site and 
interviewing the workers. The possible causes for the failure were identified such as 
poor site management, lack of safety control and instability of falsework. 
6.7.2 Review of the information collected 
Among of all types of bridges built in China, the arch has been widely used for highway 
bridges because of its large spanning capacity. Around seventy per cent of highway 
bridges are arches which are especially suitable for long-span bridges. 
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This bridge was one of the two main arches in a highway joint-venture project which was 
scheduled to be completed by March 1997. The bridge was 12m wide and 163m long. 
The top part of the 110m centre span would be 74m above the valley. The height of the 
arch was about 17m which means the ratio of height to span was 116.5. Details of the 
bridge are shown in Figure 6.8. The bridge deck comprised nine arch beams to form eight 
boxes by the bottom slab, cover slab and diaphragms (Figure 6.9). The reinforced 
concrete arch beams were constructed in situ. The precast concrete diaphragms spaced at 
a certain distance were used to increase the stability and stiffuess of the arch. 
The procedures of the arch construction are shown in Figure 6.10. The failure happened 
during concrete pouring of the top part of the arch. The concrete abutments to both sides 
had been completed earlier and remained the same after the collapse. Falsework erection 
was the key activity in the arch bridge construction. Concrete was produced by three 
mixers nearby. A steel truss tower was erected near each abutment to support several 
steel cables which were attached with two trolleys and suspending hooks for the 
transportation of materials across the valley. 
Construction of abutments 
Falsework erection for the box arch 
Reinforcement fixing for the box arch 
Concrete placing for the arch 
Concrete curing and mould removal 
Concrete placing on the bridge deck 
Figure 6.10: Flow diagram oftbe bridge construction 
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Timber forms and lattice frames were supported by columns made up of steel tubes and 
small trusses when forming the arch. Concrete should be poured in a continuous process 
according to the design. Workers were divided in groups for the non-stop concreting 
work. A couple of days before the accident, displacement of the forms had been noticed. 
The problem was solved by simply raising and restoring the forms at their required 
positions with the suspending hooks. This operation might have loosened the falsework 
connections and buried the root of the tragedy. 
After several days' hard work in concreting, there was an area of less than 10m long at 
the top and near the centre of the arch yet to be concreted. On 20 December 1996, over 
one hundred labourers and technicians were scattered on the work surface of the bridge 
with the last efforts of concrete pouring in that morning. According to the press, at about 
9:10 a.m., a labourer standing at the west edge of the newly placed concrete heard a 
strange noise under his feet. He instantly threw himself to the opposite side and grasped 
the steel bars of the arch. The west part of the work surface suddenly twisted and then 
crashed with the whole arch to the bottom of the valley. 
6.7.3 Possible causes of the failure 
Falsework failures occur often at the end of concrete pouring due to the biggest loading 
during construction. The design of the arch bridge was adequate according to the official 
results released. Investigation confirmed that the main causes can be attributed to the 
following aspects during construction. 
(1) Falsework failure 
• The falsework consisted of a variety of components which were made of different 
materials and shapes. Any displacement, loosening, breaking in any part of the 
system would lead to the redistribution of stress and falsework failure. 
• Loosening of falsework and settlement of temporary foundations. 
It was observed that the natural surface of the valley was of highly weathered rocks. 
A few places were selected as the bases for falsework erection. The use of the 
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700mm x 700mm concrete blocks as temporary foundations appeared to be over-
simplified. 
• Joint failure of the falsework 
The falsework was supported by trusses (600mm x 600mm) which were made of 
angle steel (50mm x 50mm) and U-section (80mm x 40mm) and steel tubes 
(600mm diameter). The connections of the parts were not complicated. Steel 
tubes were placed on the base without sufficient connection. The trusses were 
linked by tubes and the connection between them was by welding four pieces of 
steel bars. Small steel tubes were also used as the supporting falsework. 
• Strength failure of the falsework 
Using the worn and insufficient materials was a popular means for contractors to 
reduce the cost in construction. As a result, use of inadequate materials may lead 
to a failure in falsework. 
• Instability of the falsework 
The ratios of length to section size of the supporting columns were large and this 
could easily affect the stability of the falsework. Horizontal forces during 
construction could trigger the collapse of the falsework. 
(2) Poor management on site 
It was reported that there had been a lack of concepts of quality assurance and 
safety control on site. The contractor had ignored the warning displacement of 
forms which happened a few days ago before the collapse. The resolution of the 
latent dangers was questionable. As it was close to the Chinese New Year, the 
contractor and the workers wanted to complete the work quickly so that they could 
go home before the festival. Taking chances and cutting corners could lead to 
failures. 
According to the official announcement on 1 November 1997 by China's Central TV 
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Station, the failure was due to inadequate design of the falsework. 
6.S Brief reports 
There were failure cases with no detailed investigation reports available. They are 
grouped and described in the following sections. 
6.8.1 Case study 7 - 1991, Singapore 
The falsework scaffold supporting the concrete slab of the first level of a car park 
collapsed during concreting. A visit was made to the site. However, there was no 
disclosure of information by anyone in connection with the accident. 
6.8.2 Case study 8 - June 1994, Macao 
A 20m x 10m bridge deck collapsed during concreting for the construction of a flyover 
linking to the new airport terminal building. The concrete deck was supported by 
falsework scaffolding. A visit was made to the site after the incident. No information 
was made known to the public and later it was released by the press media that the 
collapse was attributed to soil settlement. 
6.8.3 Case study 9 - 30 December 1997, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China 
The collapsed deck was a span connecting a highway and another bridge. Three were 
killed and over thirty workers were injured during concreting of the deck. 
There were over thirty workers involved in the concreting operation. Below the deck, 
five workers were inspecting the falsework. One worker responsible for falsework 
inspection recalled that, before the accident, he discovered a few timber falsework had 
cracked or broken. He then went to fmd four timber posts as reinforcement. Before he 
started the installation, he found more steel props and falsework supporting the bridge 
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deck had already buckled and twisted. He managed to run away from the deck, while the 
other four workers were buried by the collapsed deck. 
According to the news reports, the 800mm thick reinforced concrete deck should have 
been cast in two stages. The top 400mm would not be placed until the bottom 400mm 
slab had been cured sufficiently. The falsework would not be able to support the casting 
of the full thickness of the bridge deck in one pour. However, the deck was poured to 
800mm full depth in one go. 
As reported by the media, similar accidents happened in Guangzhou in 1993 and 1994 
with nine injuries in the former and seven dead plus eleven injuries in the latter case. 
6.8.4 Case study 10 - 12 November 1998, Tsing Vi, Hong Kong 
The collapsed bridge ramp, 6m wide and 10m span, was a part of a lOOm long vehicular 
bridge connecting a car park of a new development and the public road on Tsing Yi 
Island. The deck was about 5m above ground and was of reinforced concrete in situ 
construction. 
Apparently, the falsework used was of the heavy type system scaffolding. From the 
photographs, it can be clearly seen that there was a lack of bracing members for the 
remaining scaffolds. According to the news reports, concrete had been laid down as the 
first layer on that morning. 
Shortly after 12:00 noon, the workers resumed casting of the slab but found a movement 
and a strange sound when the first skip of concrete was loaded onto the deck. The deck 
then dropped to the ground with the loss of support from the falsework below. 
The existing legislation and requirement for building work do not require: 
• submission of temporary work design and construction information; and 
• independent checking on the design and construction of falsework. 
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Other inherent weakness as identified from the photographs include: 
• the ramp was sloping - significant horizontal forces could have been present; and 
• no bracing for other remaining scaffolds was seen from the photographs showing 
similar absence in fixings might have been the case for the collapsed portion. 
Official report by Buildings Department would remain confidential and normally would 
not be released to the public whatsoever. 
6.8.5 Case study 11- February 1999, Chai Wan, Hong Kong 
A 16m x 16m concave reinforced concrete canopy over a stage collapsed during 
concreting and killed a worker who was vibrating the concrete. 
The reinforced concrete canopy, Srn above ground, was supported by timber formwork 
and system scaffolding. Before the accident, five truck-loads of ready-mixed concrete, 
i.e. about 30 cubic metres had been laid. The worker, who was killed in the incident, was 
vibrating the concrete near the centre of the roof. Concrete was delivered by a skip 
suspended from a crane. 
One of the workers, who was at the roofiop, recalled that when he could feel the 
vibration of the roof, he quickly jumped off the roof. The roof was then found to 
collapse towards the centre in a V -shape. The workers vibrating the concrete were buried 
by the concrete. 
This project was part of the improvement scheme of a commercial complex nearby. The 
structure was designed by the Architect and the Engineering Consultant. It was believed 
that the conventional control had been adopted, i.e. the temporary works were designed 
and constructed by the Contractor, subject to checking by the Architect or Engineer who 
bore no responsibility. 
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6.9 Usefulness of the visits 
There had been difficulties in paying visits to sites where failure had occurred. The 
problem and experience gained from the trips are summarised as follows. 
• Time lag - As soon as the accident was reported in the press media, some hours 
might have passed if the collapse occurred locally. For accidents occurred in 
other cities, the delay could be a couple of days. 
• Transportation - Some cities could not be reached on the same day of accident 
announcement. Direct air flights might not be available within the shortest 
possible time. 
• Site closure - In most cases the site concerned was close to the public. Finding a 
suitable place to view the scene would depend on the site surrounding. 
• Information inaccessible - For a number of reasons, the personnel concerned 
would not be willing to disclose any information. Sometimes no report would be 
published or available to the public despite that there was an investigation 
undertaken by the authority. 
• Evidence lost - Quite often the evidence relating to the cause for the collapse 
could have been undermined or mingled due to the quick removal of the 
wreckage in order to rescue the entrapped workers. 
Despite the problems encountered, there are merits for visiting the site soon after the 
accidents occurred. They are listed as follows. 
• Acquaintance - It was much better to get the actual feeling of the construction by 
visiting the site. The construction method, the type of permanent structures and 
the completed works, the scale of works and any other related construction works 
on site could be better understood than interpreting the description solely from the 
reports. 
• Clue finding - Some of the causes for the collapse could still be traced or 
observed on site. For example, the existence of any similar works might provide 
valuable evidence. 
• Interview - Opinions regarding the stage and the cause of the failure could be 
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obtained from workers on site or people living nearby. These people might have 
noticed the happenings related to the incident and they would be willing to tell. 
After the accident, instructions given from the senior level could reveal the causes 
although no official announcement of the reasons was available. 
• Cross checking - Information collected in an informal way served to cross check 
the material collected from other sources. For example, the remedial works 
erected to the remaining falsework provided some sort of evidence to the 
announcement by the parties involved. 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter reveals the investigation of major falsework collapses occurred in Hong 
Kong and nearby cities since 1986. Most of the sites were visited with an aim offmding 
out the possible causes of the failure. There were lots of problems and difficulties while 
collecting the fact and information as an individual investigator. Certainly the 
information collected would be far from the complete picture without the assistance from 
the authorities concerned. However, the visits did provide valuable opportunities to 
understand the incidents and to pinpoint or confirm the possible causes of the falsework 
failure besides the available reports. 
Use of inadequate materials has been identified as one of the causes of falsework failure. 
The assessment of performance of falsework scaffolding will be detailed in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PERFORMANCE OF FALSEWORK SCAFFOLD SYSTEMS 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the reasons for falsework failure as identified from reports was using materials of 
lower strength than they should have been. In Hong Kong, falsework scaffolds are 
generally available from suppliers. The large contracting firms may be able to own and 
stock certain amount of components if they see there is a good chance of continuation of 
their uses. The suppliers may be simply trading companies only or equipped with an in-
house department to provide technical and engineering services. Scaffold systems 
available in Hong Kong are mostly imported. Due to variation in quality and origin of 
the scaffold systems, there is a need to ascertain their loadbearing capacity (poon 1994, 
Lee 1998). This chapter presents the findings on the performance assessment of common 
scaffold systems used in Hong Kong. 
7.2 Scaffold suppliers 
There are about twenty plus falsework scaffold suppliers in Hong Kong. Some of them 
are mainly traders dealing with import of the components and providing the materials 
hiring services in the construction industry. The others, besides acting as agents for some 
proprietary systems, have set up the in-house engineering departments to support the 
necessary technical and engineering services. A couple of subsidaries of well known 
proprietary systems suppliers such as Scaffolding Great Britain (SGB) has established the 
branch service in Hong Kong for quite some time. 
The products provided by the suppliers are varied. The SGB provides the well known 
Cuplock System besides other common components. These companies also receive vital 
backup support from their parent company or headquarters such as computerised analysis 
and design. If new systems are to be introduced they can be duly tested in a full scale 
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manner at their headquarters. Thus, the quality of their products is more reliable. 
Others, in particular the trading companies, provide mainly the most common system, i.e. 
the frame for use by the contracting firms. They purchase the products which are 
manufactured in the South East Asia, particularly the Southern China. Load test of these 
systems may have been performed at the place of their manufacturing when they are new. 
The other main sources of materials are used systems imported from Japan where a 
tighter control of used construction equipment has been implemented. 
7.3 Scaffold types and loadbearing capacity 
The most common type of falsework scaffold used in Hong Kong is the frame type. 
They are made of steel tubes welded together. The light duty systems are often used for 
building construction where loadings are always not excessive and overall height is 
limited. The heavy duty scaffolds are required for bridgeworks where the concrete 
weight to be supported is considerable. For high headroom situations, the shoring 
systems which combine three or four steel tubes together to provide a more concentrated 
and stronger support are used. 
The catalogues available from the suppliers regarding the common frame system are very 
similar in the content and layout. For the light duty scaffolds, the maximum failure load 
per frame is quoted as 100kN and the recommended working load is 50kN, i.e. 25kN per 
leg with a factor of safety of two. For the heavy duty frames, the recommended failure 
load per frame is 178kN with a factor of safety of three. 
One problem emerges when using these falsework scaffolds is whether the information 
provided by the suppliers is reliable or not. Studies about the resistance capacity of steel 
scaffolds were performed around the world. Wu (1991), Jan (1989) and Peng (1994) 
have done some research work on the theoretical model analysis in this field. Most of 
these studies were based on theoretical analysis, and the research in experiments were 
much less (Yen 1995). Theoretical analysis are complicated and one major problem is 
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how to detennine the boundary conditions of each member (Yen 1995). With this in 
mind it was the main reason of establishing the failure load of the scaffolds by load tests 
(Lee 1998). Furthennore, there is great uncertainty of the strength of the used materials 
which are not available from the suppliers' catalogues. There is one recommendation 
derived from the pennissible stresses of the used materials compared with the new 
condition in B85975. From Table 23 in B85975, it can be derived that the reduction 
factor is 0.85 when used steel scaffold tubes are used. But can this factor be verified, for 
example, from the actual load tests of scaffolds? 
7.4 Load test equipment 
The aim of perfonning the tests was to load the scaffolds until they failed to take on any 
further loads. The loading equipment was basically a hydraulic jack which was hung 
from a steel frame in the structural laboratory of Department of Civil Engineering, the 
University of Hong Kong. The loading from the jack was transferred to the frames 
through a loading platfonn, comprising 305x152x65.1 I-beams and 150x150x14 angles 
jointed by 22mm diameter high tension bolts, suspended from above and rested on top of 
the scaffold under testing (photo 7.1). 
Due to the limited headroom available in the laboratory, the scaffolds were erected in one 
lift and were regarded as the smallest unit in building up the whole scaffold on site. The 
scaffolds were braced in accordance with the supplier's catalogue. Twenty to thirty strain 
gauges were glued on the surface of the tubes of the frames. They were used in pairs and 
fixed in perpendicular directions to record the strains and deflections. Electronic devices 
were installed to measure the horizontal deflections of the four legs at their mid-height, 
and vertical deflection of the frame until collapse of the tower. Both strain gauges and 
electronic devices were connected to a central tenninal so that readings could be taken 
through the monitor during the test. To avoid damages to the electronic devices, they 
were removed before failure of the tower occurred or when the extension had reached 
their capacity. However, due to the time ~eeded to prepare the gauges, only horizontal 
deflections were measured from the seventh test and onwards. 
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Photo 7.1 Test equipment Photo 7.2 Failure of scaffold 
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A hydraulic jack of 500KN capacity was used to provide a vertical load to the platform 
which in turn transferred the load through the forkheads to the frames. Plywood pads 
were placed in the forkheads and underneath the base plates at the legs so as to produce a 
good contact and simulate the loading condition on site as far as possible. The load was 
increased continuously until the maximum attainable load was reached or until the 
deformation of the tower was such that no further load could be applied (photo 7.2). The 
test was performed as much as possible in accordance with the Draft British Standard 
DD 89: Methods for Testing and Assessing the Performance of Prefabricated Heavy Duty 
Support Towers (BSI DD89 1983). 
7.5 Tensile tests 
After the loading tests, specimens of 127mm x 13mm were cut from the frames during 
the flrst six tests. A total of twelve samples had been prepared for tensile tests. By the 
use of an extensometer with the MTS machine, the tensile load was applied until fracture 
of the specimen. A stress and elongation graph was automatically plotted and from the 
graph the direct stress and strain were determined. A mild steel specimen of 6mm cross 
section diameter was also tested for comparison. 
7.6 Test samples 
Altogether, thirty-three pairs of frames were tested. Materials in both the new and used 
condition, but ready to be used on site were obtained from six major suppliers. They 
were: 
• Modem (International) Plants & Machineries Ltd. 
• Canyon Engineering Works, the agent for Acrow products. 
• Scaffolding Engineering Co. 
• Joint Constructional Plants & Machineries Co. Ltd. and Joint Formwork Co. Ltd. 
• Vector Scaffolding Ltd. 
• Advance Equipment Service. 
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The frames were mostly originated from China and Japan. Several of them could not 
been identified for their origin but were believed to be imported from Singapore and 
South Korea. Most of them were painted frames except two pairs from Japan were 
galvanised. Tubes with bracings in two directions, but without transom members jointed 
in the usual case, were also erected and tested for four times. Only two tests were 
performed on the heavy duty systems. 
7.7 Discussion of test results 
According to the usage condition, the configuration of the frames, the suppliers and the 
origins, the test results were classified into eleven groups in which at least two tests were 
performed. In all groups, it was found that the minimum failure load was between 79 per 
cent and 98 per cent of the maximum failure load. The average failure load derived from 
the test results was compared with the supplier's failure load. Also, against the working 
load as recommended by the suppliers, the actual factor of safety (F.O.S.) was calculated. 
The results are tabulated in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Performance of falsework scaffolding 
Actual 
Actual Mean Supplier 
Group Origin Age Type of 
Failure Failure Failure Supplier Actual 
No. (Years) Frames Loads Loads Loads F.O.S. F.O.S. (kN) (kN) (kN) 
1 China (1) New L.O. 201 198 200 2 1.98 
196 
196 
2 China (2) New L.O. 176 195 200 2 1.95 
204 
204 
3 China 2 Yrs L.O. 179 179 200 2 1.79 
171 
186 
4 China Used Tubes 140 142 200 2 1.42 
Age Un- only 147 
known 133 
146 
5 Japan Used L.O. 142 226 200 2 2.26 
Age Un- 246 
known 206 
6 Japan Used L.O. 166 174 200 2 1.74 
9Yrs Galvan- 182 
ised 
7 Japan Used L.O. 129 142 200 2 1.42 
7Yrs 155 
8 Japan Used L.O. 172 182 200 2 1.82 
6Yrs 178 
181 
9 Japan Used L.O. 224 194 200 2 1.94 
5 Yrs 181 
176 
10 Cannot Used L.D. 185 177 200 2 1.77 
be iden- Age not 183 
tified known 155 
184 
11 China New H.D. 352 356 534 3 2.0 
359 
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Notes: 
• China (1) - Swatow, Guangdong Province 
• China (2) - Guanxi Province 
• L.D. - Light Duty 
• H.D. -Heavy Duty 
The performance of the frames are summarised according to their origins, whether they 
are of light or heavy duty type, and new or used condition. 
(1) Products from China 
Light duty frames of both new and used condition, and heavy duty frames of new 
condition were tested. 
• Light duty frames - For new frames the loadbearing capacity was very close to the 
quoted strength in the supplier's catalogue. The used frames of two years old had 
a strength of 0.9 of those of the new frames. Whereas, the untypical used tubes 
with bracings only achieved only 0.7 is obvious due to absence of the 
strengthening by transom members. 
• Heavy duty frames - They had a factor of safety of two only instead of three as 
stated in the supplier's catalogue. 
(2) Products from Japan 
Only light duty frames of used condition were available for testing as new frames from 
Japan were not available. The test results were mixed and varied. Apparently, the failure 
loads reduced with age of the frames. The galvanised frames with a F.O.S of 1.74 though 
not commonly available in Hong Kong had a high strength than expected despite the nine 
years old age. 
(3) Sources unidentifiable 
These samples were not able for identification of both the origin and age. They had on 
average a factor of safety of 1.77. 
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7.8 Correlation of loadbearing capacity of scaffold frames with age 
The actual factor of safety of the scaffold frames was plotted against their age in Figure 
7.1. The correlation was discussed with respect to their origin, i.e. either China or Japan. 
Actual F.O.S. 
2.5 
2.0 
1.72 
1.5 
1.42 
1.0 
Age 
Age 
1.98 
1.79 
2 years New 
Unknown 
China 
2.26 
2.0 
1.95 1.94 
New New Age 5 years 6 years 7years 
Unknown 
Japan 
Figure 7.1: Actual factor of safety vs age of scaffold frame 
Cl) Products from China 
1.82 
1.42 
9 years 
The new light duty frames from China achieved a failure load comparable to supplier's 
recommendation whereas the new heavy duty systems gave a surprisingly much lower 
factor of safety. The new light duty frames had achieved a factor of safety of 2 and the 
used frames of two years old had a reduction factor of 0.9. Both satisfied the 
requirement specified in Section 23.4 and the implication for used materials in Table 23 
ofBS5975 respectively. 
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(2) Products from Japan 
The used frames from Japan showed strong indication that the capacity would reduce 
with increase in age as depicted in the following table. 
Table 7.2: Age and reduction factor for loadbearing 
capacity of used frames from Japan 
Age in Years 5 6 7 
Reduction Factor 0.97 0.91 0.71 
Apparenty, for used frames of not older than six years old, the 0.85 reduction factor can 
be safely applied. However, the falsework designer must keep in mind when using the 
used frames, the 0.85 factor must be decided with known conditions of the scaffold 
materials. 
7.9 Summary 
This chapter presents the load test results of scaffold frames commonly available in Hong 
Kong. The results have shown that the new light duty frames from China generally 
achieved the performance as provided by the suppliers. The used materials from China 
and Japan should be reduced by 0.85 as recommended by BS5975. However, for 
materials of higher age the reduction factor must be decided with care. There was a big 
difference in assessing the performance of the new heavy duty systems from China as the 
supplier's F.O.S. could not be justified by the two tests undertaken. 
To summarise, the failure loads and F.O.S. quoted by the suppliers are not reliable 
although they can produce a certificate of the test performed at the place of their 
manufacturing. Therefore the loadbearing capacity of falsework must be carefully 
ascertained before use. For the second hand and used frames, the test certificate if 
available only refers to the new and unused condition. The thirty-three test results 
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provide a better understanding of the performance of the frames commonly used for 
falsework scaffolding in Hong Kong. In particular, when using the used frames, the 
designer must reduce the quoted loadbearing capacity of the frames with care. 
Inadequate design is a common cause of falsework failure. To ensure an adequate design, 
the strength and loadbearing capacity offalsework material must be established. For used 
materials, the minimum F.O.S. as recommended by relevant standard must be maintained 
by adopting a lower working load in design. 
There are many other reasons for falsework failures besides the inadequate materials 
used in construction. The failure needed to be analysed and causes are identified so as to 
prevent their recurrence. The next chapter will cover analysis, prevention and prediction 
of failures. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REVIEW OF FAILURE ANALYSIS, PREVENTION AND 
PREDICTION 
8.1 Introduction 
In the nineteen seventies, a large-scale study of falsework failures was undertaken in 
the UK by the Bragg's Committee (1975). Technical reasons and procedural 
inadequacies were identified as the two main causes. A study of 60 bridge collapses 
(po on 1996) revealed that over 50 per cent were falsework related failures and the 
most common causes were inadequate review of falsework design, inadequate control 
during construction and improper procedures in falsework removal. This chapter 
reviews extensively previous research work on analysis and prediction of failures, in 
particular falsework failures, and their recommendation for preventive measures. The 
first part will concentrate on failure analysis and precaution suggestion and the second 
part will cover failure prediction. 
8.2 Failure Analysis and Prevention 
A number of researchers have studied falsework failures since 1973. The following is 
an account, presented chronologically, of investigation of failures and 
recommendations for preventive measures. 
8.2.1 Elliot 1973 
Elliot (1973) described seven collapses occurred within two years in California and he 
recommended that, among the others, the contractor is required to have a licensed 
engineer's check on the design of the falsework. 
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8.2.2 Bragg 1975 
As technical reasons and procedural inadequacies were identified as the main causes, 
the Bragg's Final Report recommended that the Temporary Works Coordinator should 
be appointed to ensure at each stage of the design and construction of falsework, a 
check or an inspection would be perfonned. Such appointment was renamed as 
Falsework Coordinator in BS 5975 which was first published in 1982. 
8.2.3 Smith 1976 
Smith (1976) studied 143 bridge failures happened since 1877. Twenty-three of them 
happened during bridge construction and about 40 per cent of these were due to the 
failure of temporary supports. 
8.2.4 Fraczek, Hausers 1979 
Fraczek (1979) reported the American Concrete Institute's survey of 277 cases of 
concrete structure errors. The errors occurred during the design and construction 
phase were fifty-seven per cent and fifty per cent respectively of the total cases. In the 
same year, Hauser published his investigation of 800 European failures and concluded 
that only very few errors were unavoidable and a primary deficiency in structural 
safety was data checking. 
8.2.5 Hadipriono et al. 1985 
During the nineteen eighties, Hadipriono and his researchers did a lot of work in 
studying falsework failures. Hadipriono and Wang analysed 126 falsework failures in 
concrete structures happened during the previous twenty-three years. Forty-two per 
cent of them were related to bridge construction. Falsework collapses during 
construction stage were summarised and about half of these 85 cases occurred during 
concrete pouring. 
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According to Hadipriono, three types of causes, i.e. the enabling, triggering and 
procedural causes, were classified. The enabling causes are events that contribute to 
the deficiencies in the design and construction of falsework. The triggering causes are 
usually external events that can initiate a falsework collapse. Procedural causes are 
hidden events that lead to the enabling and, quite often, the triggering event as well. 
It was also revealed that most of the enabling and triggering causes were stemmed 
from inadequate procedural methods. Evaluation of these factors is generally only 
available in more detailed investigation reports. The most noticeable cause is lack of 
review of falsework design or construction, and a significant number of monitoring 
problems were found in connection with concreting procedures. It was also found that 
unqualified person was commonly employed to monitor the erection procedures. A 
lack of supervision in monitoring changes during construction was also identified as a 
significant factor for most collapses. 
Hadipriono concluded that the most often repeated enabling and triggering causes 
were generated from inadequacies in the procedures. In his paper "Analysis of events 
in recent structural failures", Hadipriono (1985) further identified external events and 
deficiencies in both the design and construction were the principal sources of 150 
major structural failures. From the events surveyed, he revealed that the enabling 
events, in particular, were caused by inadequacy in the institutional and procedural 
methods in the project phases. The inadequacies were reflected in the 
interrelationships between the parties involved in the operations such as confusion 
that occurred at interfaces between contractors, subcontractors, construction 
managers, design engineers, architects and the client's representatives. Consequently, 
they resulted in inadequate design review and improper construction monitoring. 
Many failures were stemmed from inadequate design review procedures. In some 
instances, design calculations subcontracted to a professional were not thoroughly 
checked. Others like detailing of important components or the design of a complex 
falsework were performed without fully verified (Bragg 1975). 
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Another trend being spotted in the study of failure was a lack of monitoring during 
construction phases. This trend seems to be more significant in developing countries. 
Frequently, inspection was performed in superficial ways and proper erection 
procedures were not adhered to. Also, lack of expertise and facilities in performing 
unconventional construction processes were very common. 
In summary, Hadipriono suggested three problems. 
• There is a need to analyse potential problems occurred in the past. When a 
potential problem for a typical structure is suspected, performance data of 
similar structures can be retrieved from these sources. Thus, preventive 
measures and effective quality control process may be implemented. Besides, 
appropriate safety measures would be undertaken. 
• In order to avoid confusions among parties involved, improvement in 
procedural considerations during design and construction processes such as 
proper delineation of each party's responsibility should be extended 
throughout the construction stage. The structural design and details should be 
reviewed by an independent party to reduce the possibility of a structural 
failure and to show evidence that the design is in compliance with the criteria. 
• There is also a need for adequate risk analysis for structures in services and 
during construction. Risk analysis of potential problems during construction 
can be employed to select methods and procedures that have lower 
probabilities of failure, to institute control in preventing initiation of failure, 
and to monitor the critical aspects during construction. 
8.2.6 ElIingwood 1987 
Ellingwood (1987) concluded that the majority of structural failures in ordinary 
construction occurred as a consequence of errors in planning, design, construction and 
utilisation. Only about ten per cent of failures were traceable to stochastic variability 
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in loads and capacities. The remaining ninety per cent were due to other causes, 
including design and construction errors, modeling and analysis uncertainties. 
8.2.7 HoIIoway 1990 
Holloway (1990) recognised the potentially serious effects of rule violations on plant 
safety, a methodology was therefore developed for the qualitative investigation of 
such violations. The method covers identification of violations and their effects on 
safety, and qualitative assessment of the incentive and disincentives for such 
violations, including the degree to which violations would be recorded. 
The method was intended to provide an approximate ranking of the importance of 
violations, but does not offer a numerical quantification of probabilities. Its use was 
limited to qualitative investigations intended to identify violation worthy of further 
analysis or to anticipate preventive measures. Violation of rules has been important 
contributors in major accidents. Had the rules not been violated, most if not all of the 
accidents would have been prevented. 
Holloway's "SURVIVE" methodology involves a survey of rules which constrain the 
human elements in plant safety, and an assessment of violations of those rules which 
could seriously degrade safety. The following are the stages in the overall process. 
(1) Identify those rules which, if violated, will allow a fairly immediate and 
significant degradation of safety to arise. The possible violations are given 
against each identified rule. 
(2) For each violation, the magnitude of the effect on safety is assessed. The effect 
may be assessed in terms of increased probabilities of accidents, and 
consequences of accidents or the combination. 
Effect = Probabilities x Consequence 
(3) For each violation, the incentives and disincentives for the violation are assessed. 
(4) The particular disincentives associated with recording of violations are assessed. 
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(5) The overall ratings of the Effects, Incentives and Disincentives are combined in a 
final assessment. 
Comment: The violation of rules on safety of a plant is thus very similar to inadequate 
procedures for construction of falsework. 
8.2.8 Lucas 1990 
Lucas (1990) suggested one outcome of investigating the failures is that we must learn 
from experience to prevent future crises from occurring. The fundamental concept is 
to find out the cause, to derive effective remedies and to prevent future accidents. 
He describes a stage model of accident investigation in which any casual analysis is 
used merely to apportion blame, and the learning process from the accident analysis is 
non-existent. An alternative process model of accident investigation is placing an 
emphasis on monitoring of remedial actions and hence on learning from the 
unfortunate experience of the incident. The conclusion is that it is better to be process 
rather than stage oriented. 
Comment: The process model of accident reporting would be a good reference for the 
model to be developed later and is quite relevant to the Event Sequence 
Diagram approach. 
8.2.9 Pidgeon et al. 1990 
Pidgeon et al. (1990) described the work in developing an intelligent knowledge based 
system for safety management in the construction industry. Case history material of 
past incidents is acquired by a process of knowledge elicitation, and the information 
derived is represented in a knowledge base using Event Sequence Diagram. 
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In the knowledge representation, the case histories can be conceived of as stories 
which need to be converted into a structured representation. The form chosen is the 
Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) which is similar to event tree technique. The 
diagram provides a powerful means of representing and accessing information about 
the sequences of events preceding a failure or near-miss incident. The ESD shows the 
temporal order and relationship of events leading to a particular outcome. 
Comment: In view of the identifiable procedures in falsework activities, the Event 
Sequence Diagram is probably the most suitable method to analyse 
falsework failures. 
8.2.10 Whittingham 1990 
Whittingham (1990) described a method of retrospective analysis of safety significant 
events to identify the root causes. An accident may in retrospect be considered as a 
sequence of interconnected events. It usually comprises equipment and human 
failures linked together by cause and effect relationships. Accident causes are 
classified as: 
• direct (immediate) causes; and 
• root (underlying) causes. 
Direct causes are usually trigger events or latent failures. Trigger events are 
occurrences which set off the accident sequence e.g. concreting in falsework failures. 
Latent failures are unrevealed failures of components of a system which remain 
undetected and uncorrected until a demand occurs on the failed component e.g. lower 
strength, inadequate design. 
The root cause of an accident can be defmed as the most basic reason for the accident 
which, if corrected, will prevent a future recurrence of the accident. 
Three methods of retrospective analysis are as follows. 
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(1) Hypothesis approach 
A number of alternative hypotheses are advanced to explain how the accident 
may have been caused. The objective is to ensure that the widest possible 
range of solutions to the problem are explored. 
(2) "What if' approach 
The probable cause of the accident is known with some certainty and the 
investigation will generate slightly divergent scenarios from the one originally 
selected and test the effect of fairly subtle changes in the circumstances of the 
accident. The objective of this approach is to allow an assessment to be made 
of the influence of the various components on the course of the accident. It 
can quickly determine whether the component concerned is a possible cause or 
not. 
(3) Change Analysis approach 
The principle of this approach is that a decline in a formerly acceptable 
standard of performance suggests that something has changed. The method 
sets out an effective means of sorting through numerous and diverse changes 
which might have occurred, some of which may have given rise to the problem 
which is required to solve. This approach provides a systematic basis for 
identifying and analysing the causes. 
Using the Change Analysis approach, the following areas require changes to be 
identified. 
• Design / Intent - The mode of operation of the system as designed or intended. 
• Normal practice - The normal operation mode of the system. 
• Actual practice - The mode of operation of the system just prior to the accident. 
The propositions in investigating the effects of change are as follows. 
• Design intent versus normal practice = Root causes. 
• Normal practice versus actual practice = Direct causes. 
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Comments: The root causes and direct causes are similar to the procedural and 
enabling plus triggering causes as classified by Hadipriono. However, the 
two propositions do not seem to be fit for assessment of falsework 
failures and are more suitable for plant failure only. The retrospective 
analysis for procedural causes certainly is a very useful tool to help 
reduce future risk levels of similar projects. 
8.2.11 Turner 1992 
Turner (1992), based on an initial study of disasters in Britain over an eleven-year 
period, identified a pattern which suggests that large scale accidents are caused by 
many sources rather than a single source and that their preconditions build up over a 
period of time, rather than springing into existence instantaneously. The model points 
to the way in which crises and disasters developed is a covert and unnoticed fashion 
during an incubation period. 
From an initial situation when the circumstances of the project in question are 
notionally normal, the incubation period starts to develop at the point at which 
circumstances start to deviate, covertly, from that which is believed to be the case. 
This state of affairs continues to develop until it is terminated by a trigger event which 
combines the predisposing factors into a single occurrence. Usually an unanticipated 
discharge of energy of some kind provokes the onset of a system failure. Events 
within the incubation can be reconstructed in retrospect as event sequence diagrams, a 
treelike structure of contributory incidents with the trigger event and the onset of the 
failure at its focus. Event sequence diagrams can be used to summarise the events 
associated with a failure and to relate inquiring fmdings and lessons learned. The 
sequence of system failure is: 
• situation notionally normal; 
• incubation period; 
• trigger event; 
• onset; 
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• rescue and salvage; and 
• full cultural readjustment. 
Comment: This system of investigating and analysing failures can be used for 
analysing falsework failure. 
8.2.12 Stewart and Fortune 1995 
Stewart and Fortune (1995) suggested all project lifecycles consist of a sequence of 
stages and activities and there is always a degree of risk associated with each stage. 
Blockley, Humphreys and Thomas (1991) commented that project managers should be 
sensitive to potential sources of risk. They should be able to anticipate their 
occurrence and appreciate their potential impacts on the project objectives and to 
reduce their future impact through appropriate risk action management strategies. 
Therefore, risk identification and development of implementation of risk management 
strategies must be carried out throughout the life of a project. 
Systems methods and techniques (such as the use of rich pictures, systems maps, 
influence diagrams, systems models in building up holistic pictures that emphasise 
interconnectedness) enable problem themes to be identified. Two areas require further 
investigation are listed below. 
• Interactions in particular those within the project team and between the team and 
its clients. 
• Human aspects such as conflicts of objectives, motivation problems and poor 
communication which may hinder the success of the project. 
The holistic techniques include the following. 
(1) Soft systems analysis is an approach which does not only deal with hard tangible 
information but also with soft complexity that arises because people are involved. 
It takes account of the feelings, attitudes, perceptions as well as potential conflict 
between people. 
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(2) Systems map is a diagram showing a snapshot of the structure of the area under 
consideration being conceptualized as a system. The structure is particularly 
emphasised. 
(3) Influence diagrams explore the important relationships between components 
within a system and between the system and its environment. They are concerned 
with relationships. 
(4) Formal system model (FSM) is a model of a robust system that is capable of 
purposeful activity without failure, and coordinates a number of key systems 
concepts within an organized framework. The formal system itself comprises a 
decision making subsystems and elements which carry out the tasks of the system 
and thus effect its transformations by converting inputs into outputs. 
(5) History files are a rich source of infonnation about which strategies were 
effective, what problems occurred and whether contingency plans were 
successful. 
(6) The systems failures method is a systemic method for the analysis of failures 
which can be used to look back at events, activities and situations with a view to 
identifying any significant failures that occurred and coming to an achieving 
understanding of those failures. It has two key features: 
• conceptualisation and modeling of the situation as a system; and 
• comparison of that system, first with FSM, and subsequently with other 
models based on typical failures. 
Information about failures in past projects can be used to identify potential risk areas 
for future projects. 
Stewart and Fortune further argued that by using systems approaches, it is possible to 
identify potential risks which would not otherwise be predicted. In addition, 
application of systems thinking at the end of a project can enable lessons from 
outcomes to be used to improve performance on future projects. 
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8.2.13 Dias and Blockley 1995 
Dias and Blocldey (1995) agreed that engineering students and practising engineers 
could upgrade their knowledge vastly by learning from case histories of design and 
construction, and of failure. Reflection on failures will result in improved design and 
construction. Event sequence diagrams can represent the essential preconditions to 
failure. 
8.3 Failure Prediction 
Similarly, an account of researchers' work on failure prediction is presented 
chronologically in the following sections. 
8.3.1 Pugsley 1973 
In 1973, Pugsleyoutlined an approach to the problem of assessing the proneness to 
structural accidents. It seeks to distill from experience of past structural failures a 
number of significant parameters, by the assessment of which for a new structure its 
proneness to accidents could be broadly judged. The parameters of significance in 
accident history are: 
• new or unusual materials; 
• new or unusual methods of construction; 
• new or unusual types of structure; 
• experience and organisation of design and construction team; 
• research and development background; 
• industrial climate; 
• financial climate; and 
• political climate. 
Pugsley's paper argues that a small group of engineers of rich experience would have 
a good chance of assessing in broad terms its accident proneness, as weakness in any 
123 
one of the parameters would suggest such proneness and merit more attention to 
reduce any proneness to accidents. 
8.3.2 Blockley 1975 
Blockley (1975) outlined a possible approach to the problem of predicting the 
likelihood of a structure failure due to causes other than stochastic variations in loads 
and strength. Fuzzy set analysis was used in the formulation of the method. A failure 
occurs because there is a major error and/or several smaller errors combine to 
eliminate the factor of safety. These factors or safety parameters are difficult to 
quantify. However, they may be measured using fuzzy linguistic variables. Six main 
parameters used include materials, type of structure, design experience, time, 
construction and externals. Each parameter is assigned the gravity and consequence 
rating. The overall effect is then related to a safety index. 
8.3.3 B10cldey 1977 
Blockley (1977) presented a classification of basic types of structural failure. The 
classification is expanded into a set of parameter statements which could be assessed 
subjectively in a prediction process. This process is intended to account for a 
structure failure due to causes other than stochastic variations in load and strength. 
The parameters are assessed for twenty-three major structural accidents and one 
existing structure, and are analysed using a simple numerical interpretation. The 
accidents are ranked in their order of inevitability. 
From the assessments, human errors were proved to be the dominant reasons for the 
failures. A simplified form of the proposed procedure for predicting the likelihood of 
structural accidents was also outlined in which concept of fuzzy set was used and 
applied to the twenty-four accident parameter assessments. Problems such as poor 
site control, errors of judgment, time and financial pressure which are difficult or 
impossible to be included into mathematical models were highlighted. From the 
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assessments, it was shown that the human errors were predominant in causing the 
failures. Human errors during the construction phase can be prevented by good 
communications between all parties concerned and by well-defined responsibilities 
under the contract (and well-defmed procedures). Fuzzy set analysis is used to assess 
the parameters, thus giving a better illustration of the inevitability to failure for the 
cases. 
Comments: The parameters are assessed in giving an overall score only. No account 
has been taken of the importance of various stages, and no warnings are 
to be given at appropriate stages so as precautions can then be taken to 
avoid the failures. 
8.3.4 Melchers 1978 
Melchers (1978) gave comments on the contents of various failure reports ranging 
from the formal government inquiry reports to professional magazines and noted that 
non-technical problems such as human errors were not always included in failure 
reports. The objective of his paper was to identify problems, which may interfere with 
successful project completion and operation, at an early stage in order to reduce them 
to a minimum. To illustrate that organisational matters can be influential in bringing 
about project failure, the following are problems identified from four well-known 
bridge failures. 
• Failure to appoint an experienced bridge engineer, reflecting that there is a loose 
and inefficient supervision. 
• Negligence in checking the falsework design and failure to submit to the Engineer 
the falsework drawings. 
• Failure of the consulting engineers in requiring the contractor to submit details of 
falsework for approval. 
• Routine design work is commonly done by inexperienced engineers although it is 
a usual practice for the more experienced personnel to supervise the work. 
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Melchers suggested a complementary approach on the in-depth study of the failed 
projects, i.e. a pathological approach so that projects would be studied from an 
organisation as well as a technical viewpoint. 
Comments: Normally the company concerned would not welcome study of their 
projects by an outside body unless it is required by law. Even this is the 
case, important but controversial information may not be easily 
released. Further, some information are not allowed to be made known 
because of the legal proceedings applied to recent failures. 
8.3.5 Yao 1981 
Yao (1981) summarised and examined the state of the art of damage identification of 
existing structures. The application of fuzzy set in assessing the damaged state of 
existing structures was explored. There was a gap between the calculated probability 
of failure (10-6) and Brown's perceived failure rate (10-3) for a certain type of 
structure. In his example, two SUbjective factors, namely, the design and construction 
factors were assessed for their gravity and consequence. The failure probability index 
was found to be of the order of 10-4, if the objective failure probability was 10-6, 
which was closer to Brown's perception. Collaboration of expert is required to 
establish the various membership functions. 
8.3.6 M~lchers et al. 1983 
Melchers et al. (1983) summarised the experience gained from the study of structural 
failures and satisfactory construction, and commented on the accuracy and 
completeness of reporting. Comparison of the findings on a number of investigations 
was made according to the type of failure mode, structural elements affected, time of 
failure, prime cause of failure, reasons for their occurrence and their consequential 
cost. Most failures could be attributed to human errors. The nature of these errors 
was discussed and the requirement for the evaluation of experience in the future was 
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considered. One important and additional requirement for future experience 
evaluation was, amongst the others, determination of appropriate procedures for 
analysing structural failures. Of the greatest importance was the need for a means of 
assessing the effectiveness in controlling the changes in both the design and 
construction process on the occurrence of gross human errors. 
8.3.7 Hadipriono 1985 
Hadipriono (1985) pointed out human based uncertainties are abundant in falsework 
construction but are seldom included in the assessment of falsework performance. A 
method based on fuzzy set concept has been developed to assess falsework adequacy. 
The concept interprets in mathematical terms the linguistic variables of subjective 
appraisals of falsework which include the enabling and triggering events, and their 
consequences. Graphical displays are constructed from the fmal assessment and 
presented as a guide to determine the overall falsework performance. The method 
developed can be used as a tool for quality control processes. Reduction of enabling 
and triggering events can be conducted to achieve a desired level of overall falsework 
performance. 
Comments: Procedural errors are not included in the assessment. 
8.3.8 Ellingwood 1987 
Ellingwood outlined a simple model of the effect of error on structural reliability 
developed from the event tree. This model contained the important notions of error 
consequence, detectability (and correction) and resulting consequence. The equations 
showed that structural safety could be managed by controlling the incidence of errors, 
the impact and consequences of the errors on structural performance. To include a 
human error multiplier on the classical limit state probability which varied from 4.4 to 
10 and this increase was consistent with available data comparing failure rates of 
buildings and bridges with those predicted by classical reliability analysis. One 
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important strategy for mitigation and control was to consider technical measures 
which included independent reviews of fundamental design concept and assumption. 
Identification and formulation of hazard scenarios could be helpful in planning quality 
assurance programs. Fault and event trees could serve as useful analytical tools. 
Independent control stops should be instituted at key decision points in the project, 
especially where responsibility for project phases changes hands. 
8.3.9 Blocldey 1992 
Blockley (1992) commented on Turner's model which describes that most system 
failures are not caused by a single factor and that conditions for failure do not develop 
instantaneously. Multiple casual factors accumulate, unnoticed or not fully 
understood over a considerable period of time which is called the incubation period. 
The following are types of conditions that can be found within the incubation period. 
• Events unnoticed or misunderstood because of wrong assumptions about their 
significance. 
• Dangerous preconditions unnoticed because of poor communications. 
• Uncertainty about how to deal with formal violations of outdated safety 
regulations. 
• When things started to go wrong, the outcomes are worse because people tend 
to minimise danger or believe that the failure would not happen. 
The incubation period is brought to a conclusion either by taking preventive measures 
to remove the dangerous conditions or by a trigger event to release the harmful 
energy. The previously hidden factors are then reviewed for assessment of the reasons 
for failure. There would be adjustment of precaution to avoid recurrence of similar 
incidents in the future. 
Blockley made an analogy of development of a failure to the inflation of a balloon. 
The start of the process is when air is first blown into the balloon while the first 
128 
precondition for the accident is established. The pressure of air inside the balloon is 
similar to the proneness to failure of the project. Events accumulate to increase the 
predisposition to failure. The size of the balloon can be reduced by lowering the 
pressure and letting the air out, and this parallels the effects of management decisions 
that remove some predisposing events and thus reduce the proneness to failure. If the 
pressure of such events build up until the balloon is very stretched then only a small 
trigger event is needed to release the energy confmed in the system. The trigger may 
not be the most important factor. The over stretched balloon represents an accident is 
about to occur. When it comes to accident prevention, it is important to recognise the 
preconditions, i.e. the development of the pressures in the balloon. The symptoms 
that characterize the incubation of an accident need to be identified and checked. 
8.3.10 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 
(1) Introduction 
The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations in the UK. place new 
duties upon clients, client's agents, designers and Contractors to re-think their 
approach to health and safety so that health and safety is taken into account, and 
then coordinates and manages effectively throughout all stages of a construction 
project. They are needed because of the unacceptably high rate of death and 
injury associated with all types of project. The Regulations have an impact on all 
stages of the planning and management of health and safety of a project, and 
place duties on clients, designers and construction organisations. 
(2) How can designers contribute to health and safety? 
• Accidents are resulted from a combination of circumstances, some of which are 
related to design. An analysis on falsework failures indicated over fifty per 
cent were design faults (poon 1996). 
• Few designers have carried out systematic and routine reviews of the safety 
aspects of their designs. Opportunities to reduce risks at the design stage have 
not been generally acknowledged. Nonnal practice is to leave the issues· to 
contractors, but the chances to reduce risks at the design stage cannot be 
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guaranteed. The first step designers can take is to recognise the risks involved 
in construction work. 
• Design defmes the work to be done. Designers may be the only people who are 
able to make the decision that will eliminate a foreseeable risk. Designers 
should be aware of the hierarchy of risk control which underlies the modern 
approach to health and safety management. It is best to prevent the hazard and 
alter the design to avoid the risk. If the design cannot be changed at once, the 
risk should be combated at source. Priority should be given to controls that 
will protect all workers. 
• The designers should look for ways of reducing and controlling the risks. To 
make judgments in a systematic way, designers need to carry out risk 
assessment. 
(3) Designer's duties 
The designer includes engineers or architects for the permanent works design and 
temporary works engineer designing the formwork and falsework. 
The following are items that should be given adequate resources: 
• familiarity with construction process; 
• knowledge of the impact of design on health and safety; 
• awareness of health and safety legislation and appropriate risk assessment 
methods; 
• suitable practices and procedures which take account of health and safety in 
design and communicate information to the planning supervisor; 
• train staff and provide access to advice; 
• adequate time and other resources allowed for the work; 
• support facilities such as access to current health and safety information; and 
• clear method of dealing with design changes and suitable methods of 
communicating revised information. 
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(4) Hazards and risks in construction work 
Hazard is the potential to cause harm, and risk is the likelihood that hann will occur. 
A precise estimate of risk is not required because of the limitation of time and lack of 
data. The simplest method for assessing risk arising from a hazard depends on two 
elements: 
• the likely severity ofhann caused (consequence); and 
• the likelihood that hann will occur (frequency). 
The likely severity of hann caused by the hazard can be assessed by Low, Medium or 
High. 
• High - Fatal, long term disability. 
• Medium - Injury, short term disability. 
• Low - Others. 
The crude qualitative judgment on the likelihood that hann will occur is as follows. 
• High - Certain or near certain to occur. 
• Medium - Reasonably likely to occur. 
• Low - Very seldom or never occurs. 
In assessing both severity and likelihood, the product of the two elements will give 
some measures of the assessed risk which, in turn, can be seen as exerting a pressure 
on designers to alter the design. Clearly, a "high" x "high" risk exerts a very high 
degree of pressure, "low" x "low" virtually none. 
Designers may conclude that design alteration is not practicable, but they should be 
prepared to justify their choice in the light of the particular risk assessment. This 
regulation does emphasise the important roles of the designer, not just for the 
permanent works but also for the temporary works. 
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(5) Role of CD M in Hong Kong 
At present, the provisions of CDM are not effective in Hong Kong although the 
regulation is known to many professionals for some years. 
In 2001 the report of the Construction Industry Review Committee chaired by Henry 
Tang has emphasised the importance and use of the CDM. The Hong Kong 
government is setting up committees to explore the probabilities of implementing the 
CDM in Hong Kong and a number of government projects have been selected for the 
trial run of the application of the CDM regulations. 
8.3.11 Site Supervision Plan System 1997 
In Hong Kong, the Buildings Department has implemented the Site Supervision Plan 
System (SSPS) since end of year 1997. The aim is to improve safety of building 
works and to minimise safety hazards on building sites. 
The objectives of the SSPS are: 
• to improve safety on, or adjacent to, private building construction sites in Hong 
Kong; 
• to ensure building works carried out are complied with Buildings Ordinance and 
allied regulations; and 
• to control hazards from building works so as to mitigate the risk to the workers on 
site, all persons around the sites, and adjoining buildings, structures and land. 
The supervision plan is defined as a plan setting out the safety management of 
building works or street works, which will be lodged by an Authorised Person with 
the Building Authority. The salient features of a supervision plan (Lau 1998) include 
the following. 
• Classes of supervision as appropriate to the specific type of building works or 
street works to be carried out, at various stages and sequences. 
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• The manpower and level of supervision required for the classes of supervision to 
be provided. 
• The management structure, the quantity and quality of personnel involved and 
specific task assignments associated in each element of the management structure. 
• Method statements of various operations at various stages of the building works or 
street works, and types of precautionary and protective measures to be undertaken 
for the safety of the site, the workers and the public. 
The Authorised Person, i.e. the Architect, Registered Structural Engineer and 
Registered Contractor who work together in a typical building contract have overall 
responsibility and accountability for their respective functional streams. They are 
required to prepare a site supervision plan together right before the commencement of 
works. The lodging of the plan by the Authorised Person becomes one of the pre-
requisites for the issue of the consent for commencement for works, by the Building 
Authority. 
The supervision plan system is somehow different from other safety stipulation 
produced by the Labour Department, such as the Factory and Industrial Undertakings 
Ordinance and its subsidiary regulations. The latter concerns mainly the occupational 
safety and health of workers, i.e. they aim to enhance the safety awareness of the 
workers through the power of legislation. On the contrary, the Site Supervision Plan 
System does not touch the worker side. Instead, it intends to get the parties to the 
project involved in the safety issues from very beginning of the project. However, the 
supervision plans submitted do not require the formal approval from the Building 
Authority. These plans would be selected randomly for audit checks to ensure that 
they are properly prepared and that the management structures as documented are 
provided on sites. 
Under the Ordinance, a Technical Memorandum for Supervision Plans was 
introduced. Enacted on 12 December 1997, it can be regarded as a guideline that 
provides an administration framework for putting the site safety management system 
133 
in place and stating the principles, requirements and operation of site supervision 
plans. The principles are as follows. 
• The framework and purpose of the site safety management system. 
• The roles and responsibilities of the parties concerned. 
• The two types of safety supervision: engineering safety supervision and routine 
safety supervision. 
• The deployment of technically competent persons. 
• The preparation of supervision plans. 
The Code of Practice for Site Safety Supervision was also issued to incorporate the 
detailed requirements and guidance on the preparation of supervision plans. It 
describes the principles and important safety related activities that require special 
attention and monitoring. It explains: 
• how to deal with special features; 
• how to establish the degree of complexity of various types of works; 
• how to approach method statements, precautionary and protective measures; 
• how to establish the class of supervision; 
• how Technically Competent Persons (TCPs) may best be deployed and how their 
duties may be combined; 
• the management structure within each functional stream and the responsibilities 
for communication; and 
• the specific tasks ofTCPs in carrying out safety supervision. 
The Supervision Plan is a plan for safety management of building works or street 
works. According to the Technical Memorandum, safety management comprises the 
traditional quality supervision and the new site safety supervision. Quality supervision 
means that the practitioners have to ensure that the building works or street works are 
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Building Ordinances and 
Regulations. Site safety supervision, on the contrary, is not a common practice in the 
Hong Kong construction industry. It requires the three parties' supervision in a 
building project. 
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Site safety supervision can be further classified into two types of supervision, the 
engineering safety supervision and routine safety supervision. 
(I) Engineering safety supervision requires judgement and includes: 
• considering the suitability of the principles of working methods being used 
on site; 
• examining the compliance of specified aspects of work with the design 
requirements where these are related to site safety; 
• checking that site works are in conformity with the supervision plan, 
including the method statements and the precautionary and protective 
measures; 
• verifying the validity of the provisions of method statements and 
precautionary and protective methods on site; 
• notifying the designer of method statements and precautionary and protective 
measures when site conditions are inconsistent with assumptions made in the 
designer's design; and 
• ensuring the proper execution of the safety supervision. 
(2) Routine safety supervision involves: 
• the monitoring of site operations and working methods so as to meet the 
safety standards in the Buildings Ordinance and relevant Codes of Practice; 
• the inspection of the safety aspects of the works is properly carried out; and 
• the checking of the compliance of the works with the approved method 
statements and the precautionary and protective means. 
There are five different grades of TCPs, termed TI to T5 accordingly, for each 
functional stream. Their respective responsibilities are defined in the Technical 
Memorandum and are further amplified in the Code of Practice. They should exercise 
all reasonable skill, care and diligence in carrying out the duties and specific tasks, 
and undertake the responsibilities which are set down in the two documents. Different 
grades reflect the differences in qualification and experience between TCPs. TI to T3 
are the technical grade in which the TI and T2 are the operative-supervisory layer 
while the T3 is the managerial layer. They are required to carry out the routine safety 
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supervision. Tl would supervise routine and general building works such as 
superstructure works whereas T2 would supervise the demolition and piling works. 
The T4 and T5 are the professional grade in which they belong to the decision-making 
levels and responsible for the engineering safety supervision. TCPs of lower grades 
are not able to carry out such supervision responsibility. The general responsibilities 
of the five grades of TCPs are listed in Table 8.1. 
Table S.l: General Responsibilities ofthe Technically Competent Persons 
TCP Grade General Responsibilities 
T1 Check on a routine basis that the work on site complies with general site 
safety requirements and that the minor site safety aspects of building 
works are properly carried out. 
T2 Check that identified specialist aspects of site work comply with safety 
requirements. 
T3 Monitor the activities of subordinate TCPs to ensure that routine checks 
are being carried out at the frequency set out in the Code of Practice and 
that reports are properly prepared and filed. 
T4 Check that specified aspects of site work comply with the design 
requirements where these are related to site safety and with the 
supervision plan including method statements, precautionary and 
protective measures. Check that systems are in place and followed to 
record that site safety supervision has been properly executed. 
T5 Check that site operations and installations meet safety requirements. 
Where the design of temporary and / or permanent works relies for 
safety on assumed conditions being present on site, validate those 
assumptions by checking the actual site conditions and taking necessary 
follow up action. Direct subordinate TCPs in priorities and identify 
aspects of works, which require special care and supervision. 
Source: The Buildings Department, Hong Kong (1997) 
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The Code of Practice on Site Supervision Plan specifies the division of responsibility 
between Registered Structural Engineer (RSE) and Contractor for temporary work as 
below. 
• When the prescribed plans stipulate temporary works and the sequence of 
construction or method statements are also shown on prescribed plans, the RSE 
has the responsibility of supervising the carrying out of the works in accordance 
with the approved plans. 
• When the temporary works, the sequence of construction or method statements are 
not required to be shown on prescribed plans and in cases when these have no 
effect on the permanent structure, the contractor has the sole responsibility of 
ensuring the integrity of temporary works and that the carrying out of temporary 
works should be safe and should not endanger the workers on site, the public and 
adjoining buildings. 
• In cases when the temporary works or the sequence of construction or method 
statements are not required to be shown on the prescribed plans but have a 
potential effect on the integrity or serviceability of the permanent structure 
whether during construction or· completed, the demarcation of responsibilities 
between the RSE and the Contractor on supervision of carrying out of the 
temporary works and the sequences of construction are as shown in the flow chart 
attached in Appendix A. 
Comment: To a certain extent, this system is quite similar to the Checking 
Engineer system. However, it also possesses the weakness that there is 
no continuous supervision by the third party during the temporary 
works construction. 
8.4 Summary 
A number of researchers have undertaken studies on failure analysis and proposed 
prediction methods. The shortcomings of falsework failure analysis and prediction 
models are: 
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• procedural inadequacy has not been considered and assessed, particularly at the 
interface of operations and activities in view of different parties involved with 
different roles and responsibilities; and 
• most of the models can only be used to assess the likelihood of an eventual failure 
without evaluating aggregates of the (safety) condition at various stages of the 
falsework construction. 
After taking into account the recommendations made by researchers on failure 
analysis and from private investigations, the characteristics of a procedural framework 
for falsework failure analysis and failure prediction should include the following. 
• The key and critical activities of falsework are grouped under the five essential 
stages i.e. the design, erection, loading, taking down and anew stages, and 
presented by event sequence diagram. 
• Different sub-models are derived and used in accordance with the type of control 
or contract used, e.g. the conventional, independent checking engineer and 
falsework coordinator system. 
• Controls regarding the following common critical activities are included in the 
model. 
(1) Construction method of the permanent works and its relevance or 
relationship with the risk of falsework collapse. 
(2) Changes in falsework design concept and construction method. 
• The activity or procedure performance can include the effect of personnel's 
characteristics such as experience and qualification. 
• Communications between parties are shown in the flow diagram e.g. duly 
inspection, receiving an approval certificate etc. 
Based on the above, falsework failures will be studied for the development of a 
procedural framework in analysing and predicting falsework failures in the following 
chapter. 
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139 
CHAPTER NINE 
FALSEWORK FAILURE ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the shortcomings of many falsework failure analysis and 
prediction models have been discussed. It was found that there was an absence of 
assessment on procedural inadequacies. In this chapter, procedure will be defmed and 
procedural inadequacy will be retrieved from a study of fifty falsework failures using 
event sequence diagram and content analysis. 
Flow charts showing the essential procedures will be developed for the three control 
systems. The analysis of the failures will provide data for the procedural framework in 
monitoring the safety of falsework at various stages. 
9.2 Falsework failure analysis 
Many researchers have developed models to analyse and predict falsework failures. 
However, no model has included the assessment of procedural inadequacy although 
errors in procedure accumulate and lead to the failure of the falsework (Bragg 1975, 
Hadipriono 1985, Blockley 1975 & 1992). In the following sections, the essential 
procedures will be defmed for the design and construction of falsework, and 
procedural inadequacy will be extracted from literature review and failure cases. Flow 
charts based on event sequence diagram will be developed for analysis of falsework 
failures. 
9.2.1 Procedures 
Defmition: 
Procedures will detail the purpose and scope of an activity, and will also identify how, 
when, where and by whom the activity is to be carried out (Stebbing 1989). In this 
research, a procedure is taken as an activity or a series of activities at the end of which 
an intended task is to be completed. 
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A procedure will consist of enabling events and triggering events leading to failures 
(Hadipriono 1985). Deviation during the course of a procedure due to inadequacy or 
inadequate fulfillment of specific task requirements will result in the lowering of 
factor of safety of the falsework. The following are examples. 
• Checking and reviewing of falsework design. 
• Application and receiving of approvals for certain key operations. 
• Supervision during erection and removal of falsework. 
• Supervision during loading the falsework. 
If procedures are properly carried out, it will minimise the errors to be made so that 
the intended factor of safety in the design will not be reduced undesirably and 
unexpectedly by procedural inadequacy. 
9.2.2 Essential procedures in the five stages 
Table 9.1 shows the essential procedures in the five critical stages based on the 
practice of falsework scaffolding in Hong Kong (Chapter 3), review of the falsework 
failure reports (Chapter 4) and falsework guidelines (Chapter 5). The inadequate 
procedures which have been identified from failure reports are also included. 
The five stages are listed below. 
• D-Design. 
• E - Erection. 
• L-Load. 
• T - Taking down. 
• A-Anew. 
141 
Table 9.1: Essential operations and procedural inadequacies 
Essential Operations 
D - Design Stage 
....... ..... .... ... .. ". '. . ...... . 
Analysis, design and detailing of 
falsework to suit the permanent works and 
the construction method. 
Need: 
• proper analysis; 
• adequate design incorporating a 
sufficient Factor of Safety; 
• experienced designers or design 
being carried out under competent 
supervision; and 
• proper checking of the design. 
E;;' EfectionStage .... 
... .... ....... .... ,.... 
..... 
Procedural In~dequacies (po on 1996,. ..' 
Hadipriono 1986) 
'.' 
.. 
'. '.. .......... . .. 
• Inadequate falsework design 
(including foundation) -
underestimate the loads. 
• Inexperienced designer without 
competent supervision. 
." 
• Inadequate checking by a competent 
engmeer. 
• Ignore lateral forces due to out of 
plumb. 
..> .... ,", '.', 
.. .•. , •. ,.,., ...... , ........ ,. '" .e, 
Use of suitable and adequate materials for • Use of unsuitable or inferior 
falsework erection. 
Need: 
• proper construction method; 
appropriate materials and components; 
and 
• proper erection procedure. 
L~ Loading Stage 
...... 
Apply load to the falsework due to: 
• formwork and steel bars; 
• concrete placing; and 
• post-tensioning. 
Need: 
• proper loading method (construction 
materials. 
• Inadequate falsework construction 
including foundation, bracing and 
falsework components. 
• Lack of supervision during erection. 
• Not in accordance with the drawings. 
'." ," '. 
...... ".",'.' ... ' ..... .. ..' 
Improper loading procedures due to: 
• improper concrete placing method; 
and 
• uneven or unexpected load 
distribution arising from post-
tensioning. 
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method); and 
• even load distribution as assumed in 
the design. 
T~ Taking Down Stage 
Improper dismantling procedures due to: 
permanent work is self-supporting. • premature removal of falsework 
Need to: without approval; 
• check the permanent work has • improper dismantling procedures; and 
matured; and • lack of competent supervision. 
• follow proper dismantling procedures 
with proper supervision. 
A-Ane.wStage· 
Repair and maintain the materials! 
components for re-use. 
Need to: 
• check or inspect; and 
• repair or replace. 
Improper or inadequate maintenance of 
falsework materials and components will 
result in a lower Factor of Safety than 
assumed in the design. 
9.2.3 Graphical illustration of procedural inadequacy in the five stages of failures 
In the last section, it has been shown that errors occur at different stages of the 
falsework activities. The effect of the errors would accumulate and carry over to 
another stage. Failure can occur at certain stages depending on the magnitude of the 
error accumulation. The following figures illustrate the procedural inadequacy in 
different stages. The failure line represents the maximum stress that the falsework can 
resist, i.e. two (factor of safety) times the allowable stress. 
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(1) The design error can singly lead to failure during error or loading stage. 
The errors in designs can accumulate and can lead to failure under normal load or 
no failure, depending on the magnitude of the design error. Figure 9.1 shows the 
accumulated errors exceed the ultimate capacity of the falsework and resulting in a 
failure. It is assumed that the erection error is small and normal load is acting. 
ILoad/ Error 
~ 
-.-._.-._._._._._.-.-._._._.- ._._.-._._._._._._._._._.-._. Failure 
Normal load 
1 Erection error (small or negligible) 
D 
I 
T 
E 
I 
I 
L 
Design error 
I 
I 
T 
I 
I 
A 
Figure 9.1 Design error 
(2) The erection error can also singly lead to failure during erection or 
loading stage. 
Stage 
In figure 9.2, it is assumed that the design error is small or negligible and the 
erection errors can lead to failure or no failure, when normal load is acting. 
ILoad/ Error 
• -·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·~·-·-·-·-·-·~·-·-t·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-._._.-i Normal load 
~ 
! 
~~--~ 
I 
I 
D 
(1) I ! (2) 
! 
I 
. 
E 
I 
T 
L 
I 
I 
T 
Figure 9.2 Erection error 
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I 
I 
A 
Failure 
Stage 
(3) The loading error alone can also contribute to a failure. 
Figure 9.3 shows the accumulation of the small errors in the design and the erection 
stage. The normal load and the loading error can trigger the failure, or there will be no 
failure, depending on their magnitude. 
LLoadlError 
Failure 
Normal No failure 
Load and 
Error 
Stage 
D E L T A 
Figure 9.3 Loading error 
(4) Accumulation of the design, erection and loading error leading to failure. 
As shown in Figure 9.4, the combination of the design, erection and loading error can 
lead to collapse at the loading stage - result of accumulation of errors which 
individually can or cannot lead to failure, depending on their magnitude. 
LLoadlError 
LL 
LD+LE+LL 
~ = AccwnuIation 
Failure 
._._._.-._._._._._._._._.-._._.- -~-.- -.-.-. 
LD 
D E L T 
No 
failure 
Normal load 
A 
Figure 9.4 Combination of design, erection and loading error 
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Stage 
(5) Improper taking down procedures can also lead to collapse of the falsework. 
In Figure 9.5, the error during taking down procedures can trigger the failure and 
cause the collapse. 
ILoadlError 
D E L T 
Figure 9.5 Improper taking down 
e.g. due to improper 
procedures 
Failure 
No 
failure 
Normal load 
A 
Stage 
(6) The inadequate repair and maintenance of falsework materials will lower the 
F.O.S. and move down the failure line. 
As shown in Figure 9.6, the failure line will move up or down depending on the 
condition and quality of the falsework scaffolding material. Normally for new 
materials a F.O.S. of two is assumed. For used and improper maintained materials, the. 
F.O.S. is less than two and the failure line will move down. 
ILoadlError 
F.O.S.=2 
0_ 0 _0 - 0 _0- 0- 0 - 0 - 0- 0 _0 - 0 _0 - 0 - 0 - 0 _0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 _0 New material 
0_ 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0- 0 - 0 - 0_0_0- 0- 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 _0 - 0 - 0 - 0 Used material 
0_0_0_0_0_0_0-0-0_0-0_0-0_0_0-0_0_0_0_0_0_0_0_0_0 Improper maintained 
materials 
D E L T A 
Stage 
Figure 9.6 Inadequate repair and maintenance 
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The plotting of error accumulation at various stages can be shown in the following 
graph. 
ILoadiError 
1 2 
Design Erection 
3 
Load 
4 
Taking 
Down 
Figure 9.7 Errors at different stages 
Note: Xt. ...... XIF Shows the line of failure 
5 
Anew 
Failure 
No Failure 
Stage 
---
Assessment of successful project conditions by Engineers 
Any score lies between the failure and successful envelope would indicate the 
proneness to failure or not. 
The score would have an inverse relationship with the Factor of Safety (F.O.S.) 
of the falsework construction. The higher the scores, the lower will be the F.O.S. 
(safety margin). 
9.3 Development of flow chart of essential procedures for three control systems 
In Chapter 3, the three control systems for falsework design and construction have 
been explained in detail. For the conventional system, the Engineer or Resident 
Engineer (R.E.) will not formally approve the Contractor's falsework design. They 
may check and approve but without accountability. The Independent Checking 
Engineer will check the design and construction of the falsework. However, this 
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Checking Engineer will not work full time on site and immediate control on 
contractor's activity cannot be guaranteed. The Falsework Coordinator, as an 
employer of the contractor, will be responsible for all activities related to falsework. 
Such appointment is not wholly independent of the Contractor's organisation. 
Taking into account of characteristics of the three systems, the essential procedures in 
the form of flow charts under three control systems are developed and illustrated in 
the following Figures 9.8 to 9.10. 
(1) Conventional Control System (Figure 9.8) 
The contractor will be responsible for the design of the falsework whereas the 
Engineer! RE. will check the design but bears no accountability as specified in the 
contract. Also the contractor will be wholly responsible for the safety of the falsework 
during erection, loading and dismantling. The Engineer! RE. will only carry out the 
routine supervision at every stage of the falsework construction. 
(2) Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) System (Figure 9.9) 
The ICE is employed by the Contractor for checking and approving the design of the 
falsework. After checking, the ICE will sign jointly with the Contractor a certificate 
for submission to the RE. Falsework erection will not be allowed to proceed on site 
without receiving the certificate by the Engineer. 
After the erection, the ICE is required to check the falsework in accordance with the 
design drawings. The approval certificate signed by the ICE will be received by the 
Engineer before the Contractor applies the load to the falsework. Similarly 
dismantling should not proceed without checking and approval by the ICE and 
certification received by the RE. 
This system has the merit of ensuring the design, erection, loading and dismantling of 
the falsework to be checked and approved by the ICE, who is independent of the 
contractor and whose role will cover the passive and inadequate involvement of the 
Engineer! RE. in the supervision of temporary works. 
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(3) Falsework Coordinator System (Figure 9.10) 
The Falsework Coordinator carries out the checking and approving activities as 
undertaken by the ICE. The difference is that the Coordinator is the direct employee 
of the Contractor and no approval certificate is required to be submitted to the R.E. by 
the Coordinator. 
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Stage 
Design 
Erect 
Load 
Take Down 
Anew 
Involve 
Construction 
Method 
EngineerlR.E. 
P.W. design 
Falsework. only 
y 
CheckF.W. 
design 
Supervise 
Check + Approve * 
Supervise 
Check + Approve * 
Supervise 
Contractor/Subcontractor 
N 
y 
~~-
~.~ 
Decide 
construction 
method 
Falsework 
design 
Supervise 
Approve • Falsework is designed and constructed by the Contractor and 
the Engineer / R.E. will approve but without accountability 
[J Critical Stages 
Figure 9.8: Conventional Control System 
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Supplier 
Stage Engineer I R.E. Contractor I Subcontractor 
Design P.W.design 
......-____________ ~ Construction 
method Involve 
Construction 
Method 
FaIsework only 
Erect 
Load 
Take Down 
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IJ Critical stages 
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Supervise 
Receive Certificate 
Supervise 
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y 
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Falsework 
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I.C.E. 
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and 
Approve 
Figure 9.9: Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) System 
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Supplier 
Stage Engineer I R.E. Contractor I Subcontractor Falsework coordinator Supplier 
Design P.W.design 
Erect 
Load 
Take Down 
Anew 
Involve 
Construction 
Method 
Falsework onl 
y 
Construction 
' __ -I~ method 
Supervise 
Check • 
Supervise 
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Supervise 
~ 
Falsework 
design 
~-
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[J Critical stages 
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and 
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Check 
and 
Approve 
Check 
and 
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Figure 9.10: Falsework Coordinator System (BS 5975) 
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9.4 The f"rl'ty falsework failures 
Between 1958 and 2000, a total of 50 falsework failures have been recorded in 
various forms. The description of the failures is abstracted from the reports. 
Visit to some of these sites have been made as described in Chapter 6. 
Table 9.2: Fifty falsework failures 
Failure Date '.'"Bddge,' I';" •.•. ' ,';' · ••••,i Type; of Failure:·· ... , ... , Casualty. 
30m wide x 50m long bridge section 
1 11100 Shenzhen collapsed during concreting due to 60 injured China * inadequate transverse bracing 
Castle Peak A section of 4m x 10m podium 2 3/99 Hong Kong collapsed during concrete pumping 5 injured 
A canopy of 96m": collapsed while 
3 2/99 Siu Sai Wan vibrating the concrete due to extensive 1 killed Hong Kong * extension of foreheads 
Sai Wan Ho A platform of 10ft x 25ft collapsed 4 12/98 Hong Kong during concreting 3 injured 
An 8m R.C. section of a ramp 
5 11/98 Tsing Yi Island supported by tubular steels collapsed 7 injured Hong Kong during concreting 
A highway bridge deck supported by 
6 12/97 Guangzhou timber falsework collapsed during 3 killed China concreting 3 injured 
RuYuan A lOOm span R.C. arch bridge 34 killed 7 12/96 Guangdong collapsed during concreting 27 injured China * 
KwaiChung A ramp leading to a carpark collapsed 8 9/96 Hong Kong during concreting 3 injured 
A 30m long simply supported in-situ 
9 3/96 Jakarta concrete span collapsed due to 3 killed Indonesia premature removal of falsework 18 injured 
A 34m long footbridge formed by two 
Tseung Kwan 0 precast and prestressed concrete 1 killed 10 1196 Hong Kong *# beams collapsed as a result of a 4 injured 
change in the construction procedures 
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A 75-ton concrete bridge segment 
crashed through the supporting 
11 2/95 Route 3 scaffold which had not been designed 2 killed Hong Kong # and checked during placing to the 4 injured 
bridge pier 
20m x 10m bridge deck collapsed 
12 6/94 Airport Flyover during concreting owing to soil 16 injured Macao * settlement under the falsework 
The falsework supporting the lOO-ton 
13 3/94 Telaviv precast concrete beam collapsed due 3 killed Israel to uneven load distribution 
st. Paul Bridge Concrete arch bridge collapsed after 
14 4/90 Minn. concrete pumping due to buckling of 1 killed 
USA an under-designed steel beam 
Post-tensioned concrete highway 
Route 198 bridge collapsed during concreting 
15 8/89 Maryland owing to the use of screw jacks below 14 injured 
USA the capacity specified 
Jiang Pei Flyover Post-tensioned concrete beams 
collapsed as a result of premature 3 killed 16 7/88 Chongqing, 
Sichuan, China * removal of suporting falsework 15 injured 
Post-tensioned concrete bridge 
4/88 Hsinhai Road collapsed during concrete pumping 
17 & 18 & Flyover, Taipei due to under-design of the falsework Nil 
12/87 Taiwan * scaffolding 
North Tsing Yi Square-prop falsework collapsed 1 killed 19 5/86 Bridge during rectification after wind 1 injured Hong Kong * 
Post tensioned concrete beams 
20 1186 Taiwan collapsed due to removal of formwork 1 killed / falsework before pre-stressing 2 injured 
Heidelbery Falsework failed during lowering of 21 12/85 West Germany the steel girder Nil 
Viaduct across Concrete girders collapsed during 
Interstate 25, placing onto a partially completed pier 1 killed 22 10/85 Denver, Colo. table because of misunderstanding in 4 injured 
USA construction sequence 
23 10/84 Taiwan Bridge collapsed during concreting 1 killed due to insufficient formwork support 1 injured 
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lOOm launch truss buckled during 
Sunshine Skyway installation of a 216-ton precast 
24 8/84 Bridge, Florida concrete pier top due to inadequate 4 injured 
USA structural analysis of the temporary 
support 
Bridge pier working platform 
25 2/83 Taiwan collapsed as a result of overload from 3 injured 
construction plant and formwork 
Overbridge on R.C. slab overbridge collapsed during 
26 11182 Route 36, Kansas concreting by pumping and skips 1 killed 
USA when timber falsework collapsed 8 injured 
East Chicago Box girder road deck swing during 
Expressway, concreting by skips due to collapse of 13 killed 27 4/82 Indiana the shoring towers on inadequate pad 15 injured 
USA foundations 
TuenMun The pier head collapsed during 
28 3/82 Highway concrete pumping due to under-design 1 killed 
Hong Kong of the falsework scaffolding 
43m post tensioned concrete deck 
Riyadh Outer buckled and collapsed 8 days after 
29 1182 Ring Road, concreting due to compression force Not stated in the cut-outs in the deck section Saudi Arabia during post tensioning 
Cast T-beams but not yet prestressed 
Bombay fell due to inadequate trestle support 30 9/80 India made up of steel cribs and timber Nil 
sleepers 
65m long post tensioned concrete 
lalanEunos flyover collapsed as a result of 
31 2179 Flyover inadequate design to accommodate the Nil 
Singapore boxout and premature removal of falsework 
212 ft span prestressed concrete 
32 5175 Auckland bridge collapsed after prestressing due Not stated New Zealand to changed weight distribution on the 
falsework 
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42 ft long cantilever of post tensioned 
33 6174 Meuse River concrete girder bridge failed during Not stated Belgium curing because of the failure of the 
tubular steel falsework 
72 ft long center post tensioned 
Leubas Bridge concrete span collapsed during 
34 4174 Kernpten concreting owing to ignorance of 9 killed lateral forces induced by the cross-fall 13 injured West Germany 
on the falsework 
131 ft center span of a reinforced 
Sao Paulo concrete girder collapsed during 35 5173 Brazil concreting because of shifting of 6 injured 
wooden falsework after rain 
110ft post tensioned concrete bridge 
River Lodden span collapsed during concrete 
36 10172 Berkshire pumping as a result of inadequate 3 killed 
UK design and construction of the 10 injured falsework 
Arroyo Seco 150 ft expressway bridge collapsed 
Bridge, Pasadena during concrete placing with a 6 killed 37 10172 Calif. conveyor because of inadequate 6 injured 
USA fonnwork and falsework design 
A section of elevated prestressed 
concrete bridge collapsed during 
38 9172 Koblenz concrete pumping due to insufficient 6 killed West Germany reinforcing of a crossbeam in the steel 15 injured 
falsework 
Route 50, Steel falsework collapsed during Sacramento, 39 8172 Calif. dismantling 10 injured 
USA 
An elevated highway deck slab 
Dallas, Texas collapsed during casting due to 40 7172 USA movement of the formwork / 2 injured falsework 
A small concrete arch bridge 
41 12171 Elgin, Ill. collapsed during construction as a Not stated USA result of stress reversal when the 
forms were stri1?~ed 
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15 precast prestressed concrete T-
San Bruno, Calif. beams fell during placing because of 42 4171 USA buckling or lateral movement of the 2 injured 
steel scaffolding 
138 ft long center span ofa post-
Biding Road tensioned concrete highway overpass 
43 3171 Overbridge, Kent collapsed during concrete pumping 1 killed 
UK due to the collapse of the tubular 17 injured 
scaffolding 
Kazerne Viaduct, The post-tensioned concrete span 
44 9170 Johannesburg collapsed as a result of inadequate A few injured 
S.Africa anchorage of the temporary stays 
76m concrete span collapsed due to 
45 8/67 Calder, Y orks low strength and inadequate bracing 4 killed UK of steel beams in temporary supports 
The concrete bridge collapsed during 
Heron Road concreting because of buckling failure 
46 8/66 Bridge, Ontario of inadequately braced timber Not stated 
Canada falsework 
Welshpool Road Prestressed concrete bridge collapsed during concreting as a result of the 47 8/66 Overpass, buckling of falsework Not stated West Australia 
Superstructure of road overbridge 
Fife collapsed due to buckling of 48 6/62 UK temporary support after concrete they 3 killed 
were supporting had set 
Barton, Lancs Steel girders fell owing to buckling of 49 2/59 UK temporary supports 4 killed 
Second Narrows, Steel truss spans collapsed due to 
50 6/58 Vancouver inadequate base of temporary column 18 killed 
Canada 
Notes: 
* -with site visit 
# - with court hearings 
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9.4.1 Analysis of iIfty failures using Event Sequence Diagram and Content 
Analysis from reports 
The falsework activities of the fifty failure cases under three control systems are 
presented by event sequence analysis shown in Figure C.l to Figure C.50 in 
Appendix C. By applying the· event sequence diagram and content analysis to 
fifty failure reports, the major procedural causes are identified. The procedural 
causes of the fifty cases together with other relevant information are summarised 
in Table 9.3. Details of application of event sequence diagram and content 
analysis have been discussed in section 2.3 and section 8.2.9 respectively. 
The event sequence diagram (pidgeon et al. 1990) is applied in presenting the 
information in the temporal order of the events. The content analysis technique 
(Berelson 1952, Holsti 1969) is used to extract information from the falsework 
failure reports to fit the format of causes preceding the event and the 
consequence. 
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Table 9.3 Procedural causes of fifty falsework failures 
Case No. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Site Visit ./ ./ ./ ./ ,f ./ ./ ,f ./ 
Type of report 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O/C BID BID 0 CIA C/B CIB OIB OIB OIB OIB C C C/B C CIB C 
DESIGN - Inadequate design 15 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
- Inadequate supervision 2 • 
- Inadequate checking 9 • • • • • • 
ERECTION - Inadequate construction 20 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Lack of supervision 3 • • • 
Inadequate foundation 5 • • • • 
Inadequate bracing 10 • • • • • • 
Inadequate components connection 8 • • • • 
Lack of stage communication 2 • • 
Rectification 1 • 
LOADING - Failure occurs! improper loading 43 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Segment! concrete placing 37 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Pre-stressing 2 
Jacking method 2 • • 
Excessive construction load 1 • 
Stage communication 2 • • 
TAKING DOWN 6 ./ ./ ./ 
Premature removal 4 • • • 
Imorooer removal procedures 2 • 
OTHERS - Communication across stages! parties 6 • • • • 
EXACT REASON UNKNOWN 16 • • • • 
Failure of permanent works 3 
Warning given 9 • • • • • 
-0'\ 
o 
Case No. No. 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Type of report C B/C B/C C B/C C C 
DESIGN - Inadequate design 15 ./ ./ 
- Inadequate supervision 2 • 
- Inadequate checking 9 • 
ERECTION - Inadequate construction 20 ./ ./ ./ 
Lack of supervision 3 
Inadequate foundation 5 • • 
Inadequate bracing 10 • • 
Inadequate components connection 8 • • 
Lack of stage communication 2 
Rectification 1 
LOADING - Failure occurs! improper loading 431 • • • • • • 
Segment! concrete placing 37 • • • • 
Pre-stressing 2 • • 
Jacking method 2 
Excessive construction load 1 
Stage communication 2 
TAKING DOWN 6 ./ 
Premature removal 4 • 
Improper removal procedures 2 
OTHERS - Communication across stages! 6 • 
EXACT REASON UNKNOWN 16 • • 
Failure of permanent works 3 • • 
Warning given 9 • 
./ 
A 
C 
Gross errors • Procedural inadequate * Failure stage 
FormalenquUy B Court hearings, accident reports, Professional reports 
Engineering journals D Newspapers 
33 
C 
• 
• 
• 
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
B/C B/C B/C C B/C C C C C C B C B/C B/C C C B/C 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
• • 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
• 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
./ ./ 
• 
• 
• • • • • • • • • 
• 
• • • 
9.4.2 Summary of procedural causes of fifty falsework failures 
The analysis of procedural causes are as follows. 
(1) Type of reports 
As shown in Table 9.4, forty per cent of the failures were in the form of the 
professional reports, accident reports and court hearings which require a longer time 
to prepare and are not always available to the public, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Another forty per cent of failures were obtained from engineering journals. The more 
recent failures were mostly reported by the media (18 per cent). 
Table 9.4 Type of reports 
Type Report description Number Percent 
A Formal enquiry 1 2 
B Court hearings, accident reports, 20 40 
professional reports 
C Engineering journals 20 40 
D Media: newspapers 9 18 
Total 50 100 
(2) Type of collapsed falsework 
The common materials used in the collapsed falsework were metal scaffolding (54%) 
and steel frame (20%) with the latter more appropriate for heavier loads and longer 
spans (Table 9.5). Four cases involved the use of timber which has a lower load-
bearing capacity yet timber was still used in many developing countries. 
Table 9.5 Type of collapsed falsework 
Principal type of material Number Per cent 
Tubular steel/metal scaffolding 27 54 
Steel frame 10 20 
Timber 4 8 
Not stated 9 18 
Total 50 100 
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(3) Type offailed permanent works 
Table 9.6 shows that in situ concrete construction with post tensioning was the most 
frequent type (38%) in falsework failures. Bridges are often of long span supporting 
heavy vehicle loads, thus post tensioning concrete is very suitable for bridge deck 
construction. Thirty per cent of the failures were of in situ reinforced concrete 
construction which is more appropriate for medium and short span bridges. 
Falseworks are also required to support the precast elements requiring post tensioning. 
The uneven stress distribution during placing of the elements and as a result of post 
tensioning could easily lead to overstress of the falsework. 
Table 9.6 Type of failed permanent works 
Permanent works construction Number Percent 
In situ reinforced concrete 15 30 
In situ concrete with post tensioning 19 38 
Precast and post tensioned elements 8 16 
Steel 3 6 
Not stated 5 10 
Total 50 100 
(4) Failure stages 
From Table 9.7, the majority of failures (74%) occurred during concrete casting 
particularly towards the end of concrete pouring and placing of precast concrete 
segment. At these instances the falsework would subject to the full design load. The 
erosion of factor of safety of the falsework due to procedural inadequacies would lead 
to a collapse. It should be noted that twelve per cent of failures occurred during 
removal or dismantling of formwork and falsework. The distribution of the causes 
correlates well with the findings by Hadipriono in 1986. 
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Table 9.7 Failure stages 
Construction stage Number Percent Percent * 
During erection 1 2 4 
Before concrete pouring 1 2 9 
During concrete pouring 24 48 49 
Post concrete pouring (No post tensioning) 2 4 12 
Post concrete pouring (prior to post 2 4 7 
tensioning) 
Post concrete pouring (after post tensioning) 3 6 4 
During formworklfalsework removal 6 12 12 
During precast concrete/segment placing 9 18 1 
Unspecified 2 4 0 
Total 50 100 100 
Note: * Data from Hadipriono's analysis of causes of falsework failures in concrete 
structures (1986). 
(5) Stage inadequacy 
Out of the fifty cases, thirty-five cases have been provided with reasons of failure. 
Some cases have more than one stage inadequacies. Most of the errors (45%) occurred 
in the erection stage because of the inadequate bracing and inadequate components for 
the falsework. About one third of the failures were due' to the errors in design where 
inadequate design and checking have been very common. 
Table 9.8 Stage inadequacy 
Stage Number Per cent 
Design 15 33.3 
Erection 20 44.5 
Loading 4 8.9 
Taking down 6 13.3 
Total 45 100 
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9.5 Three case studies 
The flow charts can be used to identify the procedural inadequacies in falsework 
failures. Three cases of different control systems are used to illustrate the application 
of the flow charts. 
Case Study 1: Minnesota, USA (1990) 
Information: 
• Main Contractor - McCrossan. 
• Main Consultant - Rehder-wenzel designed the falsework. 
• Client - MDOT - had a copy of falsework design for information only. 
• It was common not to check the falsework design by the client. The contract 
required a Registered Engineer (not the Contractor) to carry out the temporary 
works design. Design was performed by the Contractor's consultant but without 
checking by any third party. 
• Cause of failure - Web-bucking of an I -beam falsework. 
• Control/Prevention - no independent third party checking of the design which 
was carried out by the Contractor's Consultant. 
• Triggering event - concrete pouring. 
164 
• Event sequence diagram of procedural causes is shown below. 
Falsework design carried out by 
Contractor's Consultant. 
Under-designed - F.O.S. 
much reduced. 
Falsework failed when the 
web ofl-beam buckled 
due to the concrete load. 
Falsework failure. 
No independent checking by the 
client or Resident Engineer. 
Documents were submitted for 
information only. 
Falsework was under-designed. 
Much reduced F.O.S. 
Figure 9.11 Case study 1- Event sequence diagram 
• This was a typical case that the design was inadequate and there was no 
independent checking. 
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Stage Engineer I 
R.E. 
Contractor I Subcontractor Supplier 
Design 
No 3rd party 
checking 
Erect 
Load 
Take Down 
Anew 
Involve 
Construction 
Method 
F.W.only 
y 
P.W. design 
y 
Constructio 
nmethod 
Falsework design 
by Contractors 
Consultant 
L..-__ su_p_e_rv_is_e __ ....II-· Supervise 
Check + Approve * 
L..-__ su_p_e_rv_is_e __ ....I~ Sup.mse 
Check + Approve * 
L.....-__ s_u_p_e_rv_is_e __ .JI- Supervise Dismantle 
* Approve without accountability 
Ix: ,I Not being carried out 
=> Actual route 
Figure 9.12: Case Study 1: Minnesota, USA (1990)-
Conventional Control System 
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Remark 
Erect 
UselLoad .. -~ - Collapse 
Scrap 
Case Study 2: Israel (1994) 
Information: 
• Construction: A precast beam of lOO-ton was resting on the falsework before 
tensioning and making connection to permanent supports. 
• Client: Public Works Department. 
• Contractor: Sollel Boneh. 
• Client's responsibility - designed the bridge and supervised the construction 
work. 
• Contractor's responsibility -the construction. 
• The failure investigation report quoted "The load was not evenly distributed as 
assumed in the design." 
• Cause - Falsework was overloaded due to uneven load distribution contrary to 
the assumption in the design. 
• Procedural- No third party verification of the falsework design. 
• Construction method - Concrete beam to be post tensioned. 
• Triggering event - Load of the beam supported by the falsework. 
• Event sequence of diagram of Procedural causes: 
Falsework design - under-designed 
and with wrong assumptions made 
Low and inadequate F.O.S. 
Erection 
The beam under load 
The beam's F.O.S. 
reduced to failure 
Figure 9.13: Case study 2 - Event sequence diagram 
• This was a typical case of no checking of falsework design. 
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1",,1 Not being carried out 
=> Actual 
Figure 9.14: Case Study 2: Israel (1994) - Conventional Control System 
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Case Study 3: Tseung Kwan 0 Hong Kong (1996) 
IIIIIIIII 
B A A B 
< 
Initially jacks were supported 
by "B props" and moved later 
to "A props" 
Figure 9.15: Props A and B, Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong 
Information: 
• Initially hydraulic jacks were placed at "B Props" in supporting and lowering the 
post-tensioning beams. A change in construction method required fixing of jacks 
at "A Props" but this had not been independently checked and certified. The 
loading certification had not been completed when failure occurred. 
• Supports by "A Props" were almost totally removed while the revised construction 
method statement was still being verified by the Independent Checking Engineer. 
• No supervision by Resident Engineer's staff during the loading of the beams onto 
the props. 
• Sketches for falsework erection were inadequate. 
• Enabling causes: 
Shifting of I-beams after post-tensioning has led to uneven load distribution on the 
props. 
• Triggering ~auses: 
Remove top part of A Props and transfer load to B Props. 
• Procedural causes: 
(1) High potential risk in the new construction method -required stringent 
supervision. 
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(2) Inadequate inspection of falsework after post tensioning by ICE, Resident 
Engineer and Contractor. 
(3) Proceed erection and loading without Resident Engineer's and Independent 
Checking Engineer's inspection and approval. 
(4) Inadequate review / checking / approval of falsework due to a change in 
construction method. 
• Event sequence diagram of procedural causes is shown in Figure 9.16. 
Construction method: Post tensioning 
High risk in using the caused uneven 
precast and lowering load distribution 
method because it Reduced F.O.S. 
involved use of jack ;i \ Not checked by R.E./ICE 
First proposal (Normal 
Construction Method) 
approved by ICE 
Second proposal with 
changes in 
construction method 
~ 
R.E.'s Main Sub- Request for checking: 
staff was contractor contract LC.E. received the amended 
unaware denied or proposal. Checking was underway 
of the approval erected -J where no inspection/supervision was 
operation on BProps properly undertaken 
I-~ proceeding 
of works Allowed erection and loading 
/ to proceed 
Striking of A I-beam buckled As Props and --.,... due to uneven load 
above initiated load 
onB Props ~ 
Failure 
Figure 9.16: Case study 3 - Event sequence diagram 
• This was a failure case involving the employment of Independent Checking 
Engineer. The construction method changed and proceeded without approval 
of the Independent Checking Engineer. 
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Stage Engineer I Contractor I Subcontractor I.C.E. Supplier 
Design 
Erect 
Load 
Take Down 
Anew 
[] Critical stages 
1~;s:.~:1 Not being carried 
~ Actual 
Involve 
Construction 
Method 
F.W.only 
Receive 
Falsework 
design 
Certificate ~--I------tl!:;;.;;:::~;!Zl!i;ll 
Y 
Receive Certificate 
Supervise 
Figure 9.17: Case Study 3: Hong Kong (1996) -
Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) System 
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Remark 
Falsework 
design and 
new 
construction 
method under 
checking by 
ICE 
Collapse 
Yes 
9.6 Summary 
After the review of the practices of falsework scaffolding in Hong Kong and the 
relevant codes of practice and guidelines, the essential procedures in the five critical 
stages of falsework construction have been established. The inadequate procedures 
commonly found in the failure reports are also listed. A flow chart based on event 
sequence diagram. in listing the key activities and roles of parties who take part in 
falsework construction was developed. Modifications have been made to cater for the 
differences in the three control systems, namely the conventional, falsework 
coordinator and independent checking engineer systems. The charts have been used in 
analysing the three failures in detail. 
Based on the content analysis and event sequence diagram, fifty falsework failure 
reports have been analysed. Forty per cent of the reports were from engineering 
journals and another forty per cent from accident reports, professional reports and 
court hearings. Eighteen per cent of the reports were of more recent cases and were 
available only from the media. 
The principal types of material for failed falsework were tubular steel or metal 
scaffolding (54%) and steel frames (20%). Thirty-eight per cent of the failures were in 
situ concrete construction with post tensioning, which is a typical choice for long span 
bridge construction. Thirty per cent of the failures were in situ reinforced 
construction, mainly for medium and short span bridges. Another twenty-two per cent 
were for the falsework supporting precast elements followed by post tensioning or 
steel members. 
Most of the failures (82%) occurred during concrete casting particularly near the end 
of pouring and placing ofprecast segments at which the falsework would be subject to 
the full design load. Ten per cent of the failures occurred during dismantling or 
removal of the falsework. 
Regarding the procedural inadequacies, forty-five per cent of the substantial errors 
occurred in the erection stage, thirty-three per cent occurred in the design stage, 
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thirteen per cent in the taking down stage and nine per cent in the loading stage. A 
tighter control in the design and erection stage is thus necessary in preventing the 
falsework failures. 
In the next chapter, the procedural framework for analysing and predicting falsework 
failure will be developed. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING AND 
PREDICTING FALSEWORK FAILURE 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 9, flow charts were developed and the fifty failure cases were analysed 
based on content analysis and event sequence diagram. It was revealed that the 
majority of falsework failures occurred during concreting or loading stage. The 
identification of causes is essential in developing a procedural framework for 
analysing and predicting the falsework failures. A procedural framework for assessing 
the procedural inadequacy based on the event sequence diagram and the Balloon 
theory will be discussed. This chapter presents the development and validation of the 
procedural framework. 
10.2 Accumulation of errors leading to failures 
The two main approaches to increase the proneness (i.e. the pressure) of falsework 
failures by procedural errors are as follows. 
(1) Lowering the loadbearing capacity offalsework 
Procedural errors often lower the loadbearing capacity of the falsework and cause the 
failure. Examples of failure extracted from fifty cases and the relevant inadequate 
procedures are shown in Table 10.1. 
(2) Increasing the stress (instability) of falsework 
Improper procedures can increase the stress or instability of the falsework and lead to 
ultimate collapse. The failures taken from the falsework failure cases and the 
corresponding procedural inadequacy are illustrated in Table 10.2. 
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Table 10.1: Lowering loadbearing capacity 
, (:> 'Failure '.. '. . , ..... , ~ ,Procedural inadequacy, 
Buckling stress dominates due to lack of Inadequacy in construction / design. 
bracing as a result of an increased 
effective length. 
Reduction in loadbearing capacity of Inadequate control in maintenance and 
falsework materials due to inadequate inadequate consideration of the used 
maintenance of the aged / used material. material in design. 
BS 5975 recommends 15% reduction in 
bearing capacity for used materials. 
The web of the I-beam has not been Inadequate design or review. 
stiffened and has not been properly 
checked for buckling failure. 
Falsework foundation design and 
construction are inadequate. 
Lateral instability due to wind. 
Inadequate design / construction of 
foundation. 
Inadequate bracing in design! 
construction. 
Table 10.2: Increasing the stress I instability 
·.;<'·;i,::,,""·'~ E'ail~fe" ,.. .. ,; .. ' .. "'.';' .. ' ............ : . ..; .... , .. '., ....... : ................ ,.' '" .. ' "', -,'Procedural inadequacy·.···'.· ~'" ." "~ -'-
Under-estimate the loads acting on the Inadequate design I analysis or 
falsework due to uneven load inadequate review of construction 
distribution. method. 
Erection of falsework is not in Inadequate checking in erection with 
accordance with the drawing or respect to drawings. 
supplier's recommendation causing 
uneven or unexpected load distribution. 
Unexpected construction load acting on Inadequate control of changes in 
falsework. construction method on site or 
inadequate inspection. 
Premature or improper removal of Inadequate control for falsework 
falsework. dismantling. 
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In the above cases, the factor of safety of the falsework has been lowered by a 
reduction in loadbearing capacity and/or the increase in load. 
Capacity 
Factor of Safety = 
Stress I Load 
Effect of procedural inadequacy in eroding the factor of safety is aggregated upon the 
end of a particular stage (assuming failure has not occurred yet). The five stages for 
falsework activities are design, erection, loading, taking down and anew. If at any 
point of time the total effect of the inadequacy exceeds the bearing capacity, the 
falsework would fail. The extent of inadequacies which increase the stress or 
instability of the falsework (with a decrease in the Factor of Safety) is carried forward 
to the next stage depending on the effectiveness of control at the critical points 
(Figure 10.1). The more effective the control, the less additional stress or instability 
will be carried forward to the next procedure. This approach is also matching with the 
emphasis of appreciating the accumulative effect the risk would have on other 
packages in the project put forward by Wirba et al. (1996). 
Sequence of procedures 
Carried forward of procedural 
inadequacy effect after 
modification at the control point 
--~.---..----~.~--~.~--~;]. [;--~.----~.---..~ 
STAGEN 6 STAGEN+l 
Figure 10.1: Accumulation of procedural inadequacy and control point 
activity 
end or beginning of a stage 
Note: 
The range of control factor = 0 - 1 
very effective = 0 (no carry forward of procedural inadequacy) 
no control = 1 (full carry forward of all procedural inadequacy) 
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As quoted by Bragg's Report (1975), a falsework failure is often due to the 
aggregation of numerous minor errors. This is similar to accumulation of pressure 
inside a balloon. The occurrence of a failure when the bearing capacity of falsework is 
reduced and overwhelmed by the accumulation of the load or stress is equivalent to 
the bursting of a balloon. The Balloon Theory is thus appropriate to illustrate the 
falsework failure. 
Balloon Theory (Blockley 1992) 
Air pressure inside a balloon increases until the balloon bursts. The maximum 
stretching of the balloon is pre-determined based on the strength of the material. 
Likewise, the strength of the falsework scaffolding is normally taken as two (factor of 
safety) x allowable stress. The whole process of accumulating the procedural 
inadequacies until falsework collapse is similar to the increase of air pressure inside 
the balloon until the balloon bursts. 
Chaos Theory 
Chaos Theory is concerned with those instances when doing the obvious thing does 
not produce the obvious desired outcome. It is concerned with behavior that varies in 
such a complicated way that one cannot predict exactly what will happen in the future 
(Cutright 2001). Chaos Theory examines natural systems that are governed by simple 
laws yet can evolve into extremely complex and volatile behaviour. While both 
natural and human systems or organisations appear to have stable or consistent 
patterns which allow some degree of accurate prediction, these systems are in fact 
unpredictable because they are unstable: "make a slight change to the way a system is 
by a small amount at one time, and the later behaviour of the system may soon 
become completely different (Hawking 1994, Cutright 2001)". The theory also 
highlights that the future will not be simply a linear extrapolation of the past and that 
the small events happening today will cause unexpected new patterns to develop 
downstream. 
There are similarity and difference between the Balloon Theory and Chaos Theory. 
(l) Similarity 
Small events happening today will cause failure in future. At certain points small 
changes within the system will produce great and unpredictable results. Both theories 
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can be applied to predict falsework failure based on accumulation of small errors. 
(2) Difference 
Using Balloon Theory, the same errors if repeated can lead to another falsework 
failure. Based on the Chaos Theory, the failure outcome would have no resemblance 
to the past. 
10.3 Graphical presentation of errors accumulation 
The following illustrates graphically the accumulation of pressure/ errors leading to 
failures at different stages of falsework design and construction. 
Errors / 
Stress / 
pressure 
/ 
(1) Actual and design stress of falsework 
t 
J 
I 
~ 
i ; 
; 
- extra loads due to inadequacy in load stage, 
e.g. uneven load distribution, special 
construction method etc. not being properly 
considered in design 
- normal load as expected ~.-!----.l I lack of in.spection / checking of falsework 
•.... __ . __ ....... __ .......• constructIon 
l 
D E L T A Stage 
Inadequacy in design / checking 
increases stress level 
Figure 10.2: Accumulation of stress applied to falsework at different stages 
During the taking down stage, improper procedures, depending on the degree of 
completion and self-supporting of permanent works, can cause a failure. In the 
anew stage, the degree of maintenance and repair applied to falsework material 
influences the maximum allowable stress and hence the actual factor of safety. 
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Errors I Stress I 
Pressure 
D 
(2) Typical failure at erection (4% by stage) 
E 
Failure occurs during 
erection if greater than 
/' maximnm allowahle 
Erection inadequacy 
L T A 
Figure 10.3: Typical failure at erection 
Stage 
During and or after erection, but before loading, failure will occur if the 
summation of stresses from the design and erection exceeds the load bearing 
capacity. This is the case of failure occurred in Shenzhen, China in November 
2000. 
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(3) Typical failure at load / use (82% by stage) 
Errors / Stress / 
Pressure 
• 
I 
I Safe if< 2 x 
to be minimized if 
not prevented 
--r------
Normal load should 
be ~ allowable load 
-
Allowable load i. Load / use inadequacy Increased 
(undesrrable) 
! i (9%) 
t -----.1 I -~E--re-c~ti-on-i-n-adequacy 
1 ; (45%) 
r--·---·--,-------------! Design inadequacy i ,r···-"-··--··-··--- , (33 % ) 
I I I I I 
D E L T A 
-----e With good / effective control 
• 
Without effective control 
( % ) Failure frequency based on failure reports 
Figure 10.4: Typical failure at load / use 
L stresses due to 
procedural errors 
Stage 
Effective control at various stages can reduce the errors. In Figure lOA, the two 
summations indicate the difference if effective control has been implemented or not. 
Falsework is often designed with a Factor of Safety of two. Normally the load applied 
to the falsework will be about equal to one allowable load. For failures to occur, the 
summation of the unexpected loads should be at least one allowable load. 
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(4) Typical failure at Taking down (12% by stage, 13% by reason) 
Falsework collapsed due to improper or premature 
Errors / Stress / 
Pressure 
,,\mOVal procedures 
i I ~cre~~ in stress or ....... ---_ .... -_ ... _-----_._---_ ...... _---............ _-_. __ . __ .-
capacity r-1 m~dl~ 
i Permanent works supports itself + ~ +-_~ :: procedure in taking down 7 No 
! 
.-___ .. __ .. ___ -..1 
; 
I 
D E L T A Stage 
Figure 10.5: 1)rpical failure at Taking down stage 
Failure at Taking Down stage depends on: 
• whether the permanent works is properly constructed and is 
self-supporting; and 
• a proper dismantling procedure for falsework has been followed. 
Premature dismantling or improper procedures will lower the bearing capacity, or 
increase stress or instability of falsework. 
182 
10.4 Assessment of pressure I risk based on Balloon Theory 
Risk can be assessed as the product of Consequence and Frequency. Inadequacy in 
each activity of any stage in falsework construction would and could contribute to 
higher risk of falsework collapse. 
Risk of falsework collapse = Consequence x Frequency Equation 10.1 
In the case of a cause with high impact and high frequency, the risk will be very high. 
i.e.Risk = High impact x High frequency 
= Veryhigh 
If a cause of very low impact and with a very low frequency of occurrence, the risk 
would be very low. 
i.e. Risk = Low impact x Low frequency 
= Very low 
The product of two risk factors is shown in Table 10.3. 
Risk factor 
H 
M 
L 
Note: 
L-Low 
M-Medium 
H-High 
Table 10.3 Product of two risk factors 
M H VH 
L M H 
VL L M 
L M H Risk factor 
VL-VeryLow 
VH - Very High 
Consequence can be regarded as degree of severity of the impact with respect to a 
specific cause, which will increase the pressure or risk. The risk can be modified by 
the effectiveness in controlling the operations. The more effective the control, the 
lower will be the risk. 
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The procedural framework illustrates the development of a failure as an analogy to the 
inflation of a balloon. The accumulation of procedural errors is the pressure of the air. 
If the pressure or errors of the events build up until the balloon is very stretched then a 
triggering event would cause the balloon to burst. The pressure (or risk) from the 
event or cause = Consequence x Frequency. 
In the case of an actual failure due to one particular cause, both consequence and 
frequency are of very high value and should be equal to 1, i.e. risk = 1 x 1=1. 
Similarly, for low impact and of low frequency, risk = O. 
In other words, the range for risk lies within 0 and 1. For existing projects, subjective 
assessment for consequence and frequency is required. Reference can and should be 
made to the analysis of failure reports and the characteristics of the activity concerned 
for appropriate values of consequence and frequency. 
The following are cases illustrating the severe conditions that have led to failure of 
falsework including the permanent works under construction. The principle is that if 
there is no effective checking for a particular procedure and its frequency and 
consequence towards failure of falsework is very high, the assessment score would be 
1 x 1 x 1= 1.0 (no checking x frequency x consequence). A very careless but 
important design without checking (factor = 1) can easily lead to collapse of 
falsework if occurrence of such happening is very frequent. So the likely severity of 
harm (i.e. the consequence) is collapse i.e. 1, and frequency is 1, therefore 1 (no 
control) x 1 (severity of harm) x 1 (very frequent) = 1.0 (risk is very high) 
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Failure due to dominant factors at different stages: 
Case 1: Gross error at design stage with falsework failure at load / use 
If the procedure inadequacy occurs substantially at the design stage, 
then the overall aggregate of ~D = 1.0 (minimum) implies that a 
failure would occur in later stages even only normal load as allowed in 
the design will be acting on the falsework later, and the falsework 
would be erected according to the drawings. (Assume the error is small 
at erection stage). 
Pressure 
Failure 
/ 
+ -"T"'""---Maximum Allowable 
Stress I 
.. ___ ... _ .... ___ .. __ .. ~ ..... __ L __ :Ormal ~ad = (1 Allowable Stress) 
1 
r----.. --.~ 
.--........ -.... ---.• ----.-.. -... l ..... ----J 
i 
J 
I 
I 
D 
I 
E 
I 
L 
~ Error in erection (assume small) 
Inadequate design ~D = 1 Allowable Stress 
I 
T 
I 
A Stage 
Figure 10.6: Gross error at design stage 
Reference cases: 
No. 11 Israel (1994) 
No. 7 Guangdong, China (1996) 
~D = 1 Allowable Stress 
~D = 1 Allowable Stress 
No. 28 Tuen Mun Highway, Hong Kong (1992) ~D = 1 Allowable Stress 
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Case 2: Gross error at erection stage with falsework failure at 
erection stage (1) or at loading stage (2) 
If failure occurs because crucial errors occur at the erection stage i.e. 
~E = 2.0 which guarantees an instant failure at this stage e.g. the 
falsework for Tsing Yi - North Bridge, collapsed during rectification of 
falsework, not necessarily including any errors that might have been 
brought forward from the design stage. The failure could occur later 
during the loading stage. Similarly the falsework collapsed in 
Shenzhen, China after erection but before loading. 
Pressure 
Failure (2) 
at loading 
Failure (1) 
at erection 
• 
Failure I Normal load only = 1 Allowable Stress 
(2)'/ \ (1) I 
___ ==-=t-----··~ Triggered by ~oading/ erection 
-----------------1-----·---··------·· ····Gmss··error at erection stage, 
I ~E = 2 Allowable Stress, with 
! triggering effect at erection 
•. _____ .. ____ i 
Design errors (assume smallL 
I 
D 
I 
E 
I 
L 
I I 
T A 
Figure 10.7: Gross error at erection stage 
Reference cases: 
Stage 
No. 1 
No. 19 
Shenzhen, China (2000) ~E = 2 x Allowable stress 
North Tsing Yi Bridge, Hong Kong (1986) ~E = 2 x Allowable stress 
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Case 3: Gross error at loading I use stage leading to falsework failure 
Pressure 
If failure occurs at the loading stage and because there is insufficient 
consideration of the loads acting on the falsework, the score ~L = 1.0 
irrespective of the errors that may have been brought forward from the 
design and erection stage. 
t 
~ i Normal load 
Failure = 2 Allowable Stress l as designed = 1 Allowable Stress 
"---------.. "--"---"--------i.-""- "---------~ 
I 
.... _--" .... _ ............. ! 
............... -....... _ ..... l 
I 
D 
I 
E 
I 
L 
, 
Load I use Inadequacy ~L =1 Allowable Stress 
Assume small 
I 
T 
I 
A Stage 
Figure 10.8: Gross error at loading stage 
Reference cases: 
No. to 
No. 6 
No. 13 
Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong (1996) 
Guangzhou, China (1997) 
Telaviv, Israel (1994) 
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~L = 1 Allowable Stress 
~L = 1 Allowable Stress 
~L = 1 Allowable Stress 
Case 4: Accumulation of errors from various stages 
For cases where individual stage error is less than 1 but the aggregate 
of errors from previous stages can lead to collapse if ~D + ~E + ~L > 1. 
This has been suggested by the Bragg's Report (1975). 
Pressure 
~ ; 
~ Failure : Normal load = 1 Allowable Stress 
___ .. _ .. __ .... ____ ... _. _____ .. ___ ...... _ .... __ .. _ .... ___ .L,_0_'_''''_", ..... ___ .................. .. 
; 
~ 
I 
+----------1 
... -.. ------l 
~ 
I 
D 
I 
E 
I 
L 
Load I use Inadequacy 
Erection inadequacy 
Design inadequacy 
r T 
T A 
> 1 Allowable 
Stress 
Stage 
Figure 10.9: Accumulation of errors 
Reference cases: 
No. 36 Route 3, Hong Kong (1995) ~ (D+E+ L) = 1 Allowable Stress 
This is the case when individual error from the design, erection or loading stage 
would not be able to cause the failure. However, the aggregation of the errors would 
be in excess of one Allowable Stress. 
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Case 5: Gross error at taking down stage 
Failure occurs during taking down stages. 
Pressure 
----_ .. _-_ .. _ ... _------_ ... _------_ ... _---_ .. _-----_ .. _---.... _---_. __ .. _----- . __ .-
Failure I 
i 
I ~ T = 1 Allowable Stress 
.. ---.. ----.. ----~ 
I 
! 
t·-······----··-··-·--·~ 
.. __ .... _-_ .... __ ._ ....• 
~ 
D E L T A 
* 1 Allowable Stress as 
allowed in the design 
Stage 
Figure 10.10: Gross error at taking down stage 
Reference cases: 
No.9 Jakarta, Indonesia (1996) 
No. 16 Chongqing, China (1988) 
L T = 1 Allowable Stress 
L T = 1 Allowable Stress 
The falsework before taking down should have been supporting a load of one 
Allowable Stress. The error caused by this stage would be equal to at least one 
Allowable Stress. 
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For a particular procedure, the risk (pressure or Degree of Inadequacy) is to be 
assessed in two aspects: 
(1) The consequence of such inadequacy towards collapse 
Score (Range between zero and one) 
Ranking - very important 1 
- important 0.5 
- not important 0.2 
(2) Frequency of collapse due to such reason 
Score (Range between zero and one) 
Ranking - very high 1 
- average 0.5 
- very low 0.2 
Risk of collapse = (1) x (2) 
= pressure (in the Balloon) 
From simple failure reports, usually only one or two reasons would be given as the 
major causes. The minor causes are always hidden as they are difficult to identify or 
quantify. In detailed reports / investigations, there may be elaboration of more causes, 
i.e. with major and minor causes included after a thorough study of the failure. 
The overall score of a procedure or a stage would be modified by the degree of 
effectiveness of control. For example, when the effective third party checking and 
approval is employed, then the factor will be 0 or close to O. For conventional R.E. 
checking, it varies between 0 to 1.0 (Le. from very effective to not effective). 
10.5 Back analysis of failure using the procedural framework 
From each failure report, the following factors are identified: 
1. Causes 
2. Weight (risk) 
3. Frequency = 1 for actual case 
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The explanation of the assignment of Weight / Risk / Score is as follows. 
(1) If there is only one substantial cause, the weight should be minimum 1.0 (one 
allowable stress in Hong Kong). 
(2) If there are 2 causes (described as major and if there is no difference made 
between them), the major weight should be 0.5 - 0.7 = 0.6, say 0.6 x 2 > 1. 
(3) Other suspected or minor causes, the weight should be 0.2 - 0.4, say = 0.3 
(4) Very minor causes, the weight should be 0.05 - 0.1, say = 0.1. 
Categorisation of the causes will depend on content analysis and subjective 
interpretation. For the failure cases in Hong Kong, all summation of the scores will be 
greater than one allowable stress or two depending on the collapse stage. This can be 
a back checking method to assure that there are sufficient substantial, major or minor 
causes identified from the failure reports for a failure to occur. A scale factor, i.e. the 
degree of reliability of various types of reports might be applied to the results and 
check their degree of sensitivity. 
Based on the above principle, the assignment of procedural inadequacies for five 
failures in Hong Kong is shown in the following table. 
Table 10.4: Procedural errors 
Case No. 'J'", :'," ,': ' , " " '",: " -',' , ",,1:::::" Design, ,Erect> Load Take , Anew '" Failure 
" " 
" " ",' Dowit" ',: " stage ,:' 
5 Substantial Loading 1 
10 Major Major Major Loading 1 
11 Substantial Minor Major Loading 1 
19 Substantial Erection 2 
28 Substantial Minor Loading 1 
Case No. 5 
This involved the construction of a cast in-situ ramp and was a typical inadequate 
erection without proper checking and failed during concreting. The conventional 
control system was adopted. 
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Case No. 10 
The falsework was used to support two long bridge beams at a height of 2m above 
their final support. A change in construction method with inadequate design and 
construction supervision led to failure during loading. Independent Checking 
Engineer's approval of the design changes should be required. 
Case No. 11 
This is a case of providing support to a precast concrete bridge segment. The 
falsework failed due to the absence of checking the design and no supervision during 
loading, although Independent Checking Engineer system was used. 
Case No.19 
This was an improper rectification of falsework without supervision during erection, 
which caused the failure. 
Case No. 28 
The conventional control system was adopted. There was inadequate design without 
proper checking and site supervision. The falsework collapsed towards the end of 
concreting operation. 
Hence, the five cases in Hong Kong is a fairly good representation of different failure 
cases in the design, erection and loading stages. The flow charts for the above cases 
are shown in the following pages. 
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Procedural framework 1: Conventional Control System 
Stage Engineer I R.E. Contractor I Subcontractor 
Design P.W.design 
Design 
r-------------------------~ ronstruroon Involve 
Construction ~t--------I method 
Method 
F.W.only 
/------.t Falsework 
design 
CheckF.W. 
design 
Erect - Substantial error ~~. Inclining slab Supervise Supervise No bracing, upside down 
erection 
Check + Approve * 
Load 
Supervise ~~. Supervise 
Check + Approve * 
Take Down 
Supervise ~~-. Supervise 
Anew 
• 
IJ 
Falsework is designed and constructed by the Contractor and 
the Engineer I R.E. will approve but without accountability 
Critical stages 
N 
Erect 
UseIl..oad 
Dismantle 
Figure 10.11: Case No. 5, Tsing Yi, Hong Kong 
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Supplier 
~ Collapse 
Procedural framework 2: Independent Checking Engineer System aCE) 
Stage 
Design 
- Major error 
Erect 
- MaJor error 
Load 
- Major error 
No approval! 
inspection befure 
loading 
Take Down 
Anew 
Involve 
Construction 
Method 
F.W.only 
[] Critical stages 
Engineer! R.E. 
P.W.design 
Receive 
certificate 
Supervise 
Receive Certificate 
Supervise 
Receive Certificate 
Contractor! Subcontractor I.C.E. 
Design 
construction 
method 
Falsework 
design Check 
and 
Approve 
N 
Y 
Y 
Supervise 
Supervise Dismantle 
Figure 10.12: Case No. 10, Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong 
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Supplier 
Not done 
yet 
Yes 
No 
supervision 
No checking 
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Figure 10.13: Case No. 11, Route 3, Hong Kong 
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Figure 10.14: Case No. 19, Tsing Vi, Hong Kong 
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To assess the magnitude of errors, the method of equating the errors to the allowable 
stress is adopted. 
From case No. 5 in Table 10.5, a substantial error should be at least equivalent to one 
allowable stress. From case No. 10, the value of the major error should be 0.4 
allowable stress. The minor error cannot be established due to a lack of sufficient data. 
The values of the errors are shown in Table 10.6. 
Table 10.5: Summation of the causes 
... ., ... . ... . ..: . ~ ... : . .:.. . .... : .......... 
: Allowable stress . Case No. ... . .. ASSIgnment of causes .. . ..... ..: .. 
5/19 I Substantial ~ 112 
10 I Major I Major 1 Major ~ 1 
11 1 Substantial 1 Minor 1 Major ~ 1 
28 1 Substantial 1 Minor ~ 1 
Table 10.6: Assessment of errors in procedures 
.Over~lI.Procedure. 
Analysis 
Content Analysis 
of failure reports 
Substantial 
Major 
Minor 
Minimum 1.0· 
Minimum 0.4 
Cannot establish 
For actual failures: 
Frequency = 1 
Control = 1 
Correlation between degree of error and erosion of allowable stress can be confirmed 
by back analysis of failures with L errors> 1 in the loading stage or 2 in the erection 
stage. 
For failure prediction purpose, the conditions of an existing project at all stages are 
checked against the corresponding condition of failure cases as shown in Table 10.7, 
10.8 and 10.9: 
198 
Table 10.7: Content analysis for design errors (Hong Kong cases) 
'. Case No. Design Stage Degree of Error 
.. 
10 Checking of design not completed by ICE. Major to 
substantial 
11 No design for this falsework. Substantial 
28 Design not checked with buckling effect ignored. 
Note: Inexperienced designer and without proper Substantial 
supervision. 
Table 10.8: Content analysis for erection errors (Hong Kong cases) 
.. ... 
CaseNo~ L· Erection Stage ., .. Degree of Error 
5 No bracing and poor foundation construction. Substantial 
10 No supervision, no checking and no approval of the 
erection. Major 
No R.E. supervision. 
11 Inadequate communication with workers (who did 
Minor 
not speak English). 
19 Inadequate bracing and no supervision during 
Substantial L=2 
Rectification. 
28 Lack of bracing. Minor - Major 
Table 10.9 Content analysis for loading errors (Hong Kong cases) 
.c:. . ... .... ., . 
Case No. Loading Stage Degree of Error 
10 No approval/inspection before loading. Major 
11 No approval of design and construction method 
before loading. Major 
No supervision by foreman. 
Similar categorisation of causes derived from failures can be used as a reference when 
prediction of proneness of failure is required. Relevant design errors are extracted 
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from all failure cases and are shown in Table 10.10. 
Table 10.10: Content analysis for design errors (from all cases) 
< ' ' 
, ' 
, Degree of error I , Control by 
Case No., Design Error Degre'e of 
, Erosion ofF.O~S. R.E. I.C.E. 
7 Inadequate design Substantial No 
10 
Design not checked / Major- Yes, but 
approved Substantial not on time. 
11 
Used previous design but 
Substantial 
Yes, but by-
for different work pass Le.E. 
12 Inadequate foundation Substantial No 
13 
Wrong assumption of 
Substantial No 
even load distribution 
14 
Inadequate design for 
Substantial No 
I-beam buckling failure 
17 Design inadequacies Substantial No 
Other categorisation may include: 
• types of construction e.g. post-tensioning, cast in-situ, precast segments; 
• places of construction; 
• conventional separate design and construction contract or Le.E. system; and 
• failure causes 'at different stages such as design, erection, loading and taking 
down. 
For prediction purposes, each procedure is assessed with reference to the content 
analysis of failures and the degree of error, thus the anticipated eroded allowable 
stress is assigned. Accumulation of l: errors is then plotted to indicate the proneness 
of failure. 
For frequency calculation, refer to the analysis of failure reports plus subjective 
judgment. The following is recommended by Blockley (1975). 
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Frequency: Very High = 1.0 
High =0.8 
Moderate =0.6 
Low =0.4 
Very Low =0.2 
The overall assessment of risk of any procedure = C x F x E 
Notes: C = Consequence 
F = Frequency 
E = Effectiveness in control 
Equation 10.2 
Values for C and F are based on the content analysis of all failures and E is 
detennined from analysis of failure reports or SUbjective judgement. 
The assessment of existing projects compared with failures can be shown in Figure 
10.16. 
Errors 
Assessment on Existing Project 
.... ,·x /., . ..--
...-.' ,/ , .... / 
X·,··,,·" .... ..-·, .... ··x /". ~ ......... . ............ .......... .... .. . 
_v.-.... ,_ ... , ... ..- .... ,............... ... .. X"· 
~ .... _ .. _ .... --- '" _ .....-X ...... " )(_._-_ .. _,._- , ... , ...... '., 
~-.------.--. X'" 
, ... -.........-: 
X-_···_··_··········_--X-_···_' 
• 
• 
• • 
D E L T A 
Typical failures from 
case base 
Engineer I R.E. 
Assessment on existing 
project 
Figure 10.16: Comparison between successful projects and failures 
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This method can be used to assess and compare the effectiveness of different control 
systems, i.e. the conventional, Independent Checking Engineer and Falsework 
Coordinator System, if sufficient data is available. Professionals of a project involving 
falsework construction can assess in accordance with the principles established and 
check against the previous failure cases. The graph is useful in gauging the safety 
conditions at various stages of an existing or a future project (Wirba et al. 1996), and 
to give warnings of the likelihood of a failure well before it occurs. 
One condition for the above to realize is to gather sufficient related failure reports. 
Sufficient data about description of the project, characteristics of construction works, 
construction method, control mechanism and effectiveness in control will be required 
and stored in a case base. The development of the procedural framework is 
represented in the following chart. 
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Chart 10.1: Development ofthe procedural framework 
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10.6 Summary of the procedural framework 
The structure of the procedural framework consists of the following components. 
(1) Graphs of error accumulation 
These illustrate the accumulation of procedural errors at various stages and also the 
stages at which failure occurs. 
(2) Flow charts 
These charts present the essential activities and roles of personnel involved in 
falsework design and construction. Different charts are developed for the 
Conventional Control System, Falsework Coordinator and Independent Checking 
Engineer system. 
(3) Summation of procedural errors from falsework failure reports 
Procedural errors are assigned to failure causes and are summed to equal to a failure. 
(4) Assessment of possible causes 
Based on failure causes and professional judgement the severity of procedural errors 
is assessed to analyse the failure or predict the proneness to failure. 
Literature findings incorporated in the procedural framework include the following. 
• Essential activities of falsework design and construction. 
• Grouping of activities into five stages. 
• Role of personnel involved in falsework activities. 
• Causes of falsework failures and their severity. 
• Analysis and prediction methods for failures. 
A checklist can be attached to the flow chart for use by relevant parties partiCUlarly 
the Contractor in falsework selection. The checklist should include the following: 
• construction method for the permanent works; 
• type and loadbearing capacity of falsework required and available; 
• new or used materials; and 
• particular requirements in erection and dismantling. 
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10.7 Validation of the procedural framework developed 
The analysis and prediction procedural framework for falsework failure needs to be 
validated in order to justify its usefulness and application. Construction professionals 
were interviewed and were presented the flow charts and the procedural framework. 
They were asked to: 
• confirm the flow of activities and the role of various parties; 
• comment on the use of the flowchart; and 
• comment on the problems of the existing control system. 
A total of eleven interviews with fifteen professionals were conducted. Each interview 
lasted on average one hour. The following is the summary of the interview findings: 
(1) Dr. A is a professional engineer who has extensive experience in temporary works 
design and construction. He has involved in over 100 jobs and, since 1992, has 
been employed as ICE for falsework construction. He has also investigated 
collapse cases and undertaken remedial works. He commented many contractors 
in the industry has attempts to lower the F.O.S. in the design, thus control of 
falsework design is very important and essential. He agreed fully with the flow 
charts developed for the three control systems. Based on his experience and 
knowledge, he commented that the F.O.S. of falsework generally would drop from 
1.6 - 1.7 in the design stage to about 1.2 in loading stage. He also commented that 
only if R.E. insists, the approval certificate will be prepared by the ICE, otherwise 
no professional engineer's checking would be required. He also predicted that 
twenty to thirty percent of falsework would have failed if without third party 
checking. 
(2) Mr. B and Mr. C are Principal and Assistant Engineer respectively of a Consulting 
Firm performing as an Independent Checking Engineer for about fifteen years. Mr. 
B has involved in over thirty-five cases of falsework design checking and Mr. C 
has experience of twenty falsework jobs. They commented they very often the 
young graduates of the contractor designed the falsework and there are often 
inconsistency between the design and the erected falsework. They both agreed that 
falsework is often designed with a factor of safety of two. The loadbearing 
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capacity indicated in the falsework product brochure is often used in the design 
unless the ICE specifically requires the scaffold materials to be tested. They 
shared the view that errors mostly occur in the erecting stage with the failures 
mainly happened in the loading stage. Based on their professional judgement, 
most falsework could only have a F.O.S. of 1.2 after loading if without proper 
checking by the ICE. 
(3) Mr. D, Mr. E and Dr. F were staff of a major scaffolding material supplier in Hong 
Kong. Mr. D was the general manager who set up the company and has 
twenty-seven years of falsework construction related experience. Mr. E is project 
engineer with twelve years experience and Dr. F has two years experience in 
falsework design. 
During the interview with the captioned professionals, they endorsed the flow 
charts of the Conventional Control and the ICE system and have the following 
comments. 
• Very often the ICE only certifies the falsework design and not the 
construction, and checking of the falsework erection will be left to the 
contractor's staffwho are most likely foremen and not engineers. 
• There is a lack of a monitoring system or a checklist for site staff to assess 
the safety of the falsework. 
(4) Mr. G is a senior structural engineer now working in a government department. 
He has over twenty-three years design and construction experience, particularly in 
the investigation of structural failures during the recent years. He has been 
involved in the drafting of the Code of Practice for Metal Scaffolding Safety. 
While being presented the graphical illustration of the procedural errors leading to 
collapse of falsework, he agreed very much on the principle of error accumulation 
leading to failures. 
He had particularly emphasised the common inadequacy during falsework 
erection. Based on his experiences of investigating the collapses, he suggested the 
common causes are as follows. 
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• Design stage - No calculation. 
- Horizontal load was not considered. 
- No checking of calculation. 
- No drawings. 
• Erection stage - No manual for erection. 
- Wrong material was used. 
- Wrong erection method. 
Also, he regarded the factor of safety, usually specified as two in the catalogues is 
unreliable and should be reduced for used materials. 
To conclude, he considered safety management of the falsework design and 
construction is very important and the present views of the construction 
professional towards falsework as a kind of unimportant temporary works would 
substantially reduce the factor of safety of falsework. 
(5) Mr. H has thirty-five years experience in construction safety since he started his 
career in the Labour Department. He was the Founder President of the Society of 
Registered Safety Officer in Hong Kong in 1991 and established his consulting 
firm three years ago. He has taken part in investigating construction accidents 
including falsework failures. His experience was largely related to implementing 
and complying with the safety regulations. He held the view that the preparation 
of a checklist based on the failure causes would be useful for site staff in order to 
avoid failures. He also agreed that pro active assessment of risk and safety 
condition on site has become a trend and should apply to falsework construction 
in view of so many collapses in recent years. 
(6) Mr. I is a recently qualified professional engineer who is presently working as an 
Assistant Resident Engineer on a civil engineering construction site. He has eight 
years experience including two falsework designs and six jobs of falsework 
construction. He agreed the activities shown in the flow chart presented to him. 
He opined that the R.E. should have professional conduct in supervising the site 
works, although they had no responsibility in checking the temporary works. 
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However, there was not a checklist available for site staff to follow in checking 
the falsework. The works supervisor normally checks according to the drawings or 
sketches available. 
He considered the loophole of the ICE system was that the ICE had no knowledge 
of the erection process and could only check the "as constructed" falsework. He 
agreed that the accumulation of errors at different stages would lead to collapse 
and errors during erection were the major concern particularly when there was a 
lack of site supervision. 
(7) Mr. J is a professional engineer with 20 years construction experience. He has 
been a Project Manager for 15 years. He has come across five to six falsework 
collapses. The major reasons of the failure were communication problem and no 
checking by professional engineer. Most of the failures occurred during concreting. 
Other common weaknesses were no design checking by the third party and 
removal of bracing member without replacement. He agreed that the flow chart is 
useful in delineating the responsibility of various parties and he commented that in 
general falsework construction would only have a F.O.S. of 1.5 after loading. 
(8)Messrs. K and L are now working as Project Manager (15 years experience) and 
site agent (6 years experience) respectively. They have come across minor defects in 
falsework construction but not actual collapses. They both agreed with the flow 
charts and proposed that falsework would have a F.O.S. of about 1.5 after loading 
due to accumulation errors in procedures. 
(9)Ms. M is procurement manager of a large construction firm and has 20 years 
experience in construction. She has involved in falsework construction during the 
last six years. She commented "no design", "no checking" and "no ICE checking" 
were common errors. The design and stability of falsework are very important but 
are frequently ignored. She commented that the procedural framework is very useful 
in predicting and warning the possible failures, and is a good indication of concern 
of safety. She estimated that the F.O.S. of falsework would have been reduced by 20 
per cent after erection. 
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(10)Mr. N is the director and general manager of a building construction firm. He has 
over 17 years experience of falsework construction. He has witnessed falsework 
failures and undertaken urgent remedial measures. He agreed that collapse normally 
occurred during concrete casting or near completion of the concreting operation. He 
suggested the F.o.S. of falsework would be reduced by 20 per cent after erection 
and stressed that the design is very important but is often not properly checked. 
(11) Mr. 0 is a Senior Engineer ofShenzhen Construction Safety Supervision Station 
in China. He has over twenty years experience in construction. He briefed that the 
employment of the safety supervision engineer in China is similar to the Resident 
Engineer in Hong Kong in ensuring the works are constructed in accordance with 
the design drawings and in a safely manner. He quoted the collapse of falsework in 
Shenzhen in 2000 was because of the lack of lateral bracing members. In that 
project, the supervision engineer was not independent because the client, the design 
engineer, the construction firm as well as the supervision engineer were all belong 
to the same government enterprise. He commented that the design of the temporary 
works prepared by the design engineer should have been checked by the 
government department and on site by the safety supervision engineer. He agreed 
that the flowchart of the "Conventional Control Type" is currently adopted for 
projects in Shenzhen and assessment of safety of falsework at various stages would 
prevent the falsework collapse. 
The qualification and experience of the interviewees are listed in Table 10.11. 
Table 10.11 Qualification and experience of interviewees 
No. Name Qualificati()I1/Present Title. Experience 
1 Dr. A Independent Checking Engineer 100 falseworkjobs 
2 Mr.B Independent Checking Engineer 30 years construction experience 
15 years with falsework design checking 
35 falseworkjobs 
3 Mr.C Independent Checking Engineer 4 years ICE experience 
20 falseworkjobs 
4 Mr.D Scaffolding Material Supplier 27 years experience 
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5 Mr.E Project Engineer 12 years offalsework design and 
construction experience 
6 Dr.F Project Engineer 2 years design experience 
7 Mr.G Senior Structural Engineer 23 years experience particularly in 
falsework failures in recent years 
8 Mr.H Safety Officer and Safety 35 years in implementing safety 
Consultant regulations and accident investigation 
9 Mr. I Assistant Resident Engineer 6 years falsework construction 
2 designs of falsework 
10 Mr.] Project Manager 20 years 
11 Mr.K Project Manager 15 years 
12 Mr.L Site Agent 6 years 
13 Ms. M Procurement Manager 20 years (6 years falsework experience) 
14 Mr.N Director and General Manager 17 years of falsework construction 
15 Mr. 0 Senior Safety Supervision 20 years of construction 
Engineer 
The interviewees can be classified as different key parties involved in falsework 
construction and are categorised in Table 10.12. 
Table 10.12 Categorisation of interviewees 
Party 
" 
, Number 
Independent Checking Engineer 3 
Falsework Supplier and Project Engineer 3 
Government Structural Engineer 1 
Safety Officer and Consultant 1 
R.E.! Safety Supervision Engineer 2 
Contractor - Project Engineer or above 5 
Total 15 
The fifteen professional interviewed generally agreed with the followings: 
• the flow charts to indicate the activities and the roles of various parties 
involved in falsework construction; 
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• the usefulness of the flow chart in analysing the failures; 
• the erosion of factor of safety at different stages of falsework 
construction would eventually lead to failure; and 
• the usefulness of the procedural framework in providing warning about 
proneness to failures. 
Some of the certified findings and the full name of the interviewees are included in 
AppendixD. 
10.8 Summary 
The two approaches to increase the proneness of falsework failures include lowering 
the loadbearing capacity of the falsework and increasing the stress (or instability) of 
falsework. Inadequacy in procedures will lead to either way and reduce the factor of 
safety of the falsework designed. Such effect can be aggregated in a particular stage 
and be carried forward to the next stage in the absence of an effective control system. 
The accumulation of the stress or pressure would eventually lead to failures when the 
loadbearing capacity of the falsework is exceeded. 
Taking the similarity of bursting a balloon when pressure inside it is increased, the 
Balloon Theory is adopted to illustrate the falsework failure due to accumulation of 
pressure or errors because of the procedural inadequacies. 
Pressure or Risk = Consequence x Frequency x Effectiveness in Control 
(R) (C) (F) (E) 
Using the score method, the range of scores for R, C, F and E is between zero and one. 
The risk can be modified by effectiveness of the control system adopted. For actual 
failures with only one principal cause, C=l, F=l, E=l, and R=1. 
Falsework failures due to gross errors at different stages are illustrated graphically. 
They include the following. 
• Gross error at design stage with failure at loading stage. 
• Gross error at erection stage with failure at erection or loading stage. 
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• Gross error at loading stage causing the failure. 
• Accumulation of errors for failure at loading stage. 
• Gross error at taking down stage. 
In practice, the scaffolding material is often designated with a factor of safety of two 
and is often designed to resist the allowable stress. The minimum stress or pressure 
for a failure to occur due to procedural inadequacy would be at least equal to one 
allowable stress in loading and two during erection stage. 
For each failure, the causes, weight or consequence of the cause and the frequency 
(equal to one for actual cases) are identified or extracted from available reports. 
Assignment of scores to causes can be classified as substantial, major, minor or very 
minor. They are classified according to their description in the reports. From the 
analysis of the five typical failure cases in Hong Kong, the substantial and major 
causes would erode one and 0.4 of allowable stress respectively. The recommended 
values for minor causes, however, cannot be established because of the lack of data. 
For prediction purposes, each project is checked against the causes in the case base 
with respect to relevant conditions. The case base should contain all failure analysis 
using the flow charts developed in Chapter 9. All procedures as far as possible are 
checked against the similar known conditions and assigned the appropriate impact. 
Their relevant scores are then aggregated to indicate the proneness of failure at 
various stages of the falsework construction. The frequency would be established 
from the failure cases analysis or assigned subjectively from experience. 
Interviews with fifteen construction personnel who have involved in falsework 
construction were conducted. They were asked to comment on the usefulness and 
application of the procedural framework. They endorsed the usefulness of the flow 
charts in illustrating the activities and responsibility of various parties involved and 
the approach in assessing the erosion of allowable stress of falsework as developed in 
the procedural framework. One interviewee in Shenzhen of China, indicated that the 
control system currently used in Shenzhen was similar to the conventional control 
system. Thus the procedural framework developed could be applied in assessing the 
safety of falsework construction in Southern China. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
11.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the assessment of procedural errors which would lead 
to failures in falsework construction. The errors can be identified by the developed 
flow chart which illustrates the key activities and roles of different parties. The 
analysis of five major falsework failures in Hong Kong has established the assignment 
of causes to erode the allowable stress and initiate the failure. The procedural 
framework was validated by fifteen construction professionals who regarded it a very 
useful tool in assessing the safety condition of falsework which is commonly required 
in concrete construction in Hong Kong. 
During the last six years, a total of eight major falsework collapses occurred in Hong 
Kong with five people killed and twenty-six injured. Within the same period in 
Guangdong, the province in China next to Hong Kong, three severe collapses had 
resulted in forty deaths and ninety-five injuries. Because of the absence of research on 
falsework failures in Hong Kong, the aim of this research was to develop a procedural 
framework that will assess the safety condition and the proneness to failure at 
different stages of designing and constructing the falsework with the following 
objectives: 
• to review the practices of falsework scaffolding in Hong Kong; 
• to detennine the impact on safety of the falsework by adopting different 
control systems on the design and construction of the falsework; 
• to analyse the causes of falsework failures; and 
• to devise a procedural framework to assess the safety condition for the 
falsework at different stages. 
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The aim and objectives of this research study were achieved by: 
• an extensive literature review of the topic and interviews with professionals to 
determine the essential activities and the scope of professional's responsibility; 
• conducting thirty-three tests on the falsework scaffolding systems commonly 
available in Hong Kong; 
• collecting data by visiting nine sites in Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and 
Singapore when failures had occurred; 
• extracting and analysing the failure causes from fifty failure reports; 
• developing a procedural framework for assessing the safety condition of the 
falsework at different stages; and 
• interviewing fifteen construction professionals for their VIews on the 
application of the procedural framework developed. 
The conclusions drawn from the research are presented below. 
11.2 Conclusions 
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 5, an extensive literature review on falsework design and 
construction and unstructured interviews with professionals were undertaken to 
establish the essential activities for falsework construction, taking into consideration 
the differences of the three different control systems. Chapter 6 presented the 
experience in visiting and collecting data from sites where falsework failures had 
occurred. Discussion and recommendation on the performance of scaffolding systems 
were presented in Chapter 7. Identification of causes from other research work 
together with characteristics of a procedural framework was discussed in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 presented the analysis of procedural errors from fifty failure cases and 
Chapter 10 developed the procedural framework for analysing and predicting 
falsework failures. The following are conclusions drawn from above chapters. 
11.2.1 Review of practices 
A comprehensive study on falsework was first undertaken in the nineteen seventies in 
the UK. In 1998, the Labour Department of Hong Kong published its first falsework 
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Guidance Notes: Safety at Work (Falsework - Prevention of Collapse). The Notes 
highlights the good practices frequently overlooked by contractors on site but it does 
not include the important issues learnt from falsework failures. In 2001, a Code of 
Practice of Metal Scaffolding Safety was published by the same department. This 
document includes a section on consideration for falsework construction and 
emphases the importance of falsework monitoring. However, two important aspects 
have not been included. They are: 
• the effectiveness of the control system for falsework; and 
• the approval requirement at various critical stages of falsework activities. 
In construction, the conventional 'Design by Contractor and Check by Engineer" 
control system has been widely adopted. In view of contractor's deficiency in 
fulfilling the role of designing and constructing the temporary works, the 
"Independent Checking Engineer" (ICE) system has been adopted during the last 
decade, notably for large projects. However, the ICE is not resident full time on site to 
supervise and control the construction particularly when changes in construction 
method are implemented. The falsework collapse in Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong, in 
1996 has exposed the loophole of this system. 
A more proactive approach to prevent failures on site has been adopted in both the 
UK and Hong Kong since the mid-nineties. The Construction (Design and 
Management) Regulations and Site Supervision Plan System require the designer 
during the design stage to take up responsibility in health and safety throughout the 
project, and to assess and minimise if necessary the risk of the construction work. 
Such approach is in line with the aim of this research in the development of a 
procedural framework for assessing the safety condition of falsework at various stages 
of the construction. 
One uncertainty arises from the use of scaffolding material for falsework construction. 
These materials, largely imported from near by places, are varied in quality. The only 
source of their loadbearing capacity is the quotation in the supplier's catalogue. Thus 
there is a need to investigate their ,performance under load. 
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Altogether thirty-three tests of different scaffolding systems were performed in the 
structures laboratory to determine their loadbearing capacity. Most materials have a 
factor of safety of two when they are new, as recommended in the catalogues. The 
used material should be reduced by a factor of 0.85, as suggested in the British 
Standard BS5975. 
In practice, new scaffolding materials are designed to resist the allowable stress with a 
factor of safety of two, as confirmed by tests. It implies that the procedural errors 
would erode at least one allowable stress in initiating a failure. In other words, the 
effect of the procedural inadequacies is at least equivalent to the effect of the design 
load acting on to the falsework. 
11.2.2 Falsework failure analysis 
Many researchers have studied construction failures including falsework collapse. 
Some models have also been devised for failure prediction. Taking into account of the 
characteristics of falsework construction activities, these models do not consider or 
assess the procedural adequacies, particularly at the interface of operations where 
different parties with different roles are involved. Also these models are only used to 
assess the likelihood of an eventual failure without evaluating the safety conditions at 
various stages of the construction. 
A procedural framework for failure analysis and prediction, thus, should include the 
following characteristics. 
• Safety of the falsework at different stages, i.e. the design, erection, load, 
taking down and anew stages are assessed. 
• The different roles played by the professionals under different control systems 
are considered. 
• The common critical activities as identified from failure reports are being 
appraised. 
• Personnel's experience and qualification can be included in the assessment. 
• Effectiveness of critical communication and control activity are checked in the 
procedural framework. 
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Incorporating these characteristics together with the practices of falsework scaffolding, 
and the identification of critical procedural causes from other research studies, a flow 
chart based on event sequence diagram was developed. Modifications are made in the 
flow charts for different control systems. 
Based on the content analysis and the use of the flow chart, fifty falsework failures 
were analysed. These are derived mainly from professional reports, accident reports, 
court hearings and reports in the engineering journals. They are of medium level of 
reliability. The recent failures are only available from newspapers which considered 
to be of low reliability due to a lack of investigation by professionals. On the other 
hand the formal enquiry, bearing the highest level of trustworthy, would be set up 
only for disastrous cases. 
The analysis reveals that tubular steel and metal scaffolding were the most common 
materials used in these failures. Steel frames had also been used for supporting long 
spans and heavier loads. One third of the failures were cast in situ concrete 
construction with post tensioning, presumably used for long span bridges. A little 
fewer than the former cases were cast in situ reinforced concrete construction 
typically used for medium and short span bridges. Failures involving timber as the 
falsework was infrequent because timber was not popular due to its relatively low 
strength. 
About eighty per cent of the failures occurred when concreting operation was near 
completion or upon placing of the precast segment on to the falsework. About ten per 
cent of failures arose from dismantling of the falsework. Although the gross errors 
arising from these two stages were around ten per cent each, the loading and 
dismantling stages would require proper supervision as these are the instances when 
the falsework would be supporting the full design load. 
Forty-five per cent of the failures have gross errors stemmed from the erection stage 
and one third was rooted in the design stage. Also ten per cent were in connection 
with the dismantling operation. Thus, the Independent Checking Engineer should be 
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employed to prevent the accumulation of procedural errors, particularly in the design 
and erection stage, which could be brought forward to the loading stage. 
In spite of the frequent occurrence of falsework failures, detailed failure reports are 
difficult to obtain largely for the reason of confidentiality during legal proceedings or 
submission of claims for compensation. Similar obstacles were experienced in visiting 
sites where falsework failures had occurred. However, the visits did provide valuable 
opportunities to understand the incidents, to appreciate the scale and organisation of 
the construction site, and to confirm the possible causes of the failure whenever 
possible. 
11.2.3 Procedural framework for analysing and predicting falsework failures 
Procedural errors can reduce the loadbearing capacity of falsework or increase the 
undesirable stresses leading to the reduction of factor of safety of the falsework. Only 
an effective control system can prevent the accumulation of errors. The failure of the 
falsework due to accumulation of procedural errors is similar to the bursting of the 
balloon when pressure inside the balloon increases. 
The Pressure or Risk is the product of Consequence, Frequency and Effectiveness in 
Control. Using the score method, these factors lie between zero and one. For an actual 
failure with only one principal cause, the impact of the cause, the frequency and the 
poor control are all equal to one. The Pressure or Risk is then one. 
Failures occurring at different stages have been illustrated graphically. Gross errors 
can start at the design, erection, loading or taking down stage whereas a failure can 
happen during erection, loading or dismantling. Accumulation of minor errors from 
various stages can cause the failure at a later stage such as during loading. 
From the failure reports, the causes, the impact or the degree of error of the cause can 
be identified and then stored in a case base. The degree of the error can be classified 
as substantial, major, minor or very minor, depending on the description in the reports. 
From the analysis of five major failures in Hong Kong, the substantial and major 
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causes will be equivalent to at least one and 0.4 of the allowable stress respectively. 
The magnitude for the minor or very minor causes cannot be established due to a lack 
of sufficient data. 
For failure prediction purposes, each project is assessed with its known or assumed 
condition against the procedural causes in the case base with respect to the relevant 
conditions. All appropriate procedures are checked against the similar known 
conditions or decided subjectively by experience. The scores are aggregated to give 
the indication of proneness of failure at various stages. 
The developed procedural framework has been validated through interviews with 
fifteen construction professionals who have substantial experience in falsework 
construction and failure investigation. They have endorsed the flow chart as a very 
useful tool in illustrating the activities and roles of the parties. They also endorsed the 
approach of assessing the erosion of allowable stress by procedural errors in analysing 
a failure or predicting the proneness of a collapse. 
11.3 Recommendations 
This research analysed the fifty falsework failure reports and developed a procedural 
framework that professionals can use for assessing the safety conditions of the 
falsework construction. The procedural framework can be used for analysing the 
failures in identifying the procedural errors and predicting the likelihood of a failure. 
It has been scrutinised by fifteen professionals experienced in falsework construction. 
They endorsed the flow chart as correct and simple to use. They also agreed on the 
approach of assessing the procedural errors in determining the likelihood of a failure. 
It is recommended that the Contractor, the Engineer and their site staff, and the 
Independent Checking Engineer, if applicable, use the flow chart for monitoring the 
safety of the falsework construction. This is one of the recommendations in the Code 
of Practice for Metal Scaffolding Safety. 
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Regarding the control system to be used, the Independent Checking Engineer (ICE) 
should be adopted as far as possible. The additional consideration is to employ the 
ICE on site shortly before and during the loading stage of the falsework. This will 
assure no cut-corners by other parties that would lead to failures. 
To ensure sufficient cases available for assessment of procedural errors, the 
government departments should set up a central pool of failure cases collected locally 
and from abroad. 
In view of the frequent and severe occurrence of falsework failures and the wide use 
of the conventional control system in China, it is recommended to introduce the 
procedural framework to the professionals in China for monitoring the falsework 
safety. 
11.4 Recommendations for further research 
The development of the procedural framework in this research was based on the 
analysis of fifty falsework failures. The information gathered is insufficient to 
produce a sophisticated procedural framework with a higher degree of reliability in 
analysing and predicting failures. To set up a case base for assessing the procedural 
inadequacy, more detailed failure reports are required though they are difficult to 
obtain due to a variety of reasons. Also more professional views and judgement on the 
adequacy of procedures with respect to erosion of the allowable stress is needed in 
order to differentiate the successful and failed falsework construction. Further, fuzzy 
set approach can be applied in assessing the erosion of the allowable stress instead of 
the score method. 
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APPENDIX A 
Division of Responsibilities Between Registered Structural Engineers and 
Constructors for Temporary Works or Working Procedurals That are Not Required to 
Be Shown on Prescribed Plans But That May Affect Permanent Works (Site 
Supervision Plan System - Hong Kong Government Buildings Department) 
242 
Table 5.4· Division of Responsibillty Between RSE and Contractor for 
Temporary Works or Working Procedures That Are Not Required 
To Be Shown On Prescn"bed Plans IDlt That May Affect Permanent 
r 
Part of the permanent 
structure temporarily 
overstressed due to stress 
redistribution In the partially 
constructed permanent 
structure e.g. Refuse chute 
opening 
21 days before the 
commencement of the 
temporary works, Contractor 
will lodge with the RSe the 
plans of temporary works and 
I or method statement 
certified by a person who Is 
Included in the register of 
RSe and submit the design 
Information to the Profect RSE 
I 
The Project RSE will check 
the. effect of the temporary 
works I working procedures 
on the Integrity of the 
permanent works. If the 
Project RSE Is satisfied with 
the integrity of the structure, 
he will give a reply to allow 
the Contractor to proceed with 
• the- temporary works I working 
procedures and copy the 
reply to AP 
T 
Within 14 days of the 
completion of the temporary 
works, the contractor's person 
who is Included In the list of 
RSE will submit a certificate to 
RSE for the pr9ject will certify 
that the carrying out of the 
temporary works has been In 
accordance with the plans 
that lodged with the RSE 
Temporary works I working 
procedures that may affect 
permanent works temporarily 
I 
1 
Affect by way of imposing 
loading on the permanent 
structure 
e.g. Temporary working 
platform, bending yard or 
storage 
RSE at the request of the 
Contractor release the 
relevant part of design 
Information to the Contractor 
. 
I 
21 days before the 
commencement of the 
temporary works. contractor 
will appoint a person with 
qualification & experience not 
Inferior to that required for a 
T5 In engineering discipline 
who wm carry out all 
necessary checking and 
submit a certificate to certify 
that the permanent structure 
.will not be overloaded. RSE 
may require the Contractor to 
submit calculation for his 
checking and may. disagree 
with the contractor's proposal 
I 
Within 14 days-of the 
completion of the temporary 
works, the contractor's will 
appoint a person with 
qualification & experience not 
Inferior to that required for a 
T5 In engineering discipline 
who will submit another 
certificate to RSE to certify 
that the works have been 
carried out to his satisfaction 
Note:· The contractor has the sole responsibility to ensure the Integrity of the 
temporary structure Itself and the associated fixing methods. 
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'. NOVEMBER 29. 2000 HONG KONGfGUANGOONG CHINA DAILY HONG KONG EDITION 
Probeas30",,~illbricl9~cQIlc:lp$e 
Project part of US$240m highway 
to spur Shenzhen economy, tourism 
By XU XIAODAN 
China Daily .!an· 
SBENZllEN: Thirty Work· 
i!rs were injured, five senoruly, 
wh~n a bridge collapsed as 
part; orcon~trllction of the 
YMUon·BogangExpressway. 
An investigstion into the 
ellU8& ofth. accident on Mon· 
day evening began yesterday, 
said Shanth~n municipal gOY' 
eTnrnM't, which is· taking 
charge of th6 ill\"estigation. 
The expressway is one of 
the key construction projects 
in Shcnzhen. Guanll'dong 
Province, South China. 
The collapoe was suspected 
to ha,'. b..,n caused by dam-
oged CRst iron in the south of 
the brid~ but it has not been 
c<mfirmed .... hether bad work-
manship or n mishap i.'l dosip 
won to blame. 
The bridgll wM designed by 
tb6 De$ign Institute iO( 
Sbenthcn undor the Ministry 
of Rai.iwoys ,and was tOn-
strutted l,y a company of the 
China· Railway .Construc'.ion 
Group.. 
The brid;;e, whic." "'lIS still 
under: t.on!1.tructicn n"ear 
Ynntilll1 port, Ianticln DL~L--idf 
caved in at 9:45 pm on Monday. 
Witnesses said a 30~in.tre­
... ~de arid 50-metre.-Iong aedirin 
of the bridge broke into aV-
.bape. 
Sixty work"", on the bridge 
fell to the ground where Bome 
were pinned under fallen iron 
beams. . 
The Injured were rescued 
immediately and traat,ld in lo-
cal hospital,. . ,. 
Tan Gun"i""g; a Sh.n.h<m 
government official, .aid the 
reneue operation was swilbmd 
efficient, 
More t1,an 10 ambulanet., 
police arid transportatimi offic-
ers arrived to help \\;th the res· 
cue. 
The bridg~ was located at 
the beginning of the expreSs· 
y,ray, which Giros to impnwe 
tra.-lsport C<lnditiorl~ in eastern 
Shenzhenwhen iti fin<t phase· 
is complet.ed before the end of 
the year. 
The 28.9·kilometre express' 
way Iinlta the port ofYantinn 
and the city of Hcithou. 
The nearly 2.billion'!,uan 
(US$240Il1il!iorlJ projed.is ex; 
I"'ded to brMt tourimt hod the 
econmllY in Shr:;nzhen1stastern 
areas. 
F~~····~ .ii 
Toppled structure: A bridoe un~erconstructlOr. near Yanlian portinShenzhen ooUapsed on Monday night. injurln(l30 wOrMr$. 5 
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Case Ref. No.2 Castle Peak Road, HK. 
Source: 11th March, 1999, Ming Pao Newspaper 
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Case Ref. No. 3 Siu Sai Wan, HK 
Source: 13th February 1999, South Chllla Morning Post 
Construction man buried in concrete 
Collapsing 
eanopykil1s 
site wo·rKeJ{ 
STEtLA tEE and 
. CHOW CHUNG-YAN. 
lapsed iron ba·rs.thecol~ 
1.lpsed canopy is .96 square 
metres in size. .. ...... • ... . 
~\ \:onstruction worker~as A police officer· saidtl1c 
killed yesterday whena cano-cementrovering<the victim 
py on Siu Sill Wan Estate col- . had dried; . •. ;:. ... . 
lapsed, burying him in ce,· Another Thai worker suf~ 
. menC . . . . fered ollly sljght injuries ashe 
The.canopyover 3.stnge. said he had fled in timenfier 
which. had been undei'eon- hearing strangen()ises~ 
st ruction since. November, . "I jumped from the foofto 
co!lilpsed a13:20plO after si)!. thegroulld and sJightly hurt 
w()rkers began to lay cement. lily righrlt'g ..... hesaid.· .. 
Workers at the site said The Housing andl.<1boui: 
the Th:li victim; surnanlt:d departlnents said (hey would· 
Wacharaphllng.40, wuuld carry out an investigatioii 
have escapedtheaccidenl int" the accident in which a 
had he joined four local work~ Hong Kong worker alsO suf· 
crs fora tea break at3.l5pm. fered slight· injuries. 
Firemeri worked forhours A colleague oflhe trappeu 
to rescue the tnippedman. workersaldtheaccidellt hap" 
whose hody wascovcred with nenecl as. the local workers 
cement :lIld enlangled in col. started leaving Ihecannpy I()r 
. .. . . 
Firemell search the wreckage of the collapsed canopy, 
247 
a tea break. "The· iwoThai 
workersconlinllcd to work 
on the cement ;~.wekept 
shouting for our colleague 
aller·wefourid·out he had 
gon~missing;But there was 
no response,"" be said.. . 
. Resident Ho Tiat, who 
saw Ihe collapSe~ said: "1 was 
snloking· by Ihe side of the 
window; The callopy sudden-
ly fell Insedjnds," . 
Another resident said: "I 
heard a big noise like a bomb 
exploding:~ .. 
. The Labour Department's 
chief occupational safetyoffi-
eer. PailS Kwok;lam. said it 
was suspected that the sup-
porting frames were not 
SI TOllg enough to hold the ce· 
ment. J 
' The Housing Deparl-
"lent's chief manager. Ho 
Chi-shing, sail! theC4lnoPY I 
wa~p;trt of Ihe SiuSai Wan . 
sl'ioppingmall impruvemenl 
project which has necn c(m~ 
tr.II.:leJ nut III acon~ultant; . 
.. W:ichllraph()JlR is ri.:pnrl-
\'d llihave heen in H,m!: 
Kong fur .. Imlll I\V(1 year.;. Hc 
c:irncd $500:1 day ;lIIdlivl'd 
\vilh hi~ wile in Tucn Mun~ 
. "l~)\:crnl1lcllt Sr(lkC~l1mll 
~ajd ili:;r alllctlit:allc:wl from 
t hc.llllspital" lit hilrilY hi •• i 
,'~rI in~.~d hc was dead al· 
IlhlUgh 111,,;;r .. frhe hody was 
still I!lllhcddcti.illl"lllll:TctC. 
Case Ref. No.4 Sai Wan Ho, HK 
Source: 22nd December 1998, Apple Daily Newspaper 
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Case Ref. No. 5 Tsing Yi, HK 
Source: 13th November 1998, Ming Pao Newspaper 
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CH~ 
Pouring cement,calJsed<tr9-gedy,' says,hurt'worker 
Eightstilil)lissi~g' 
in bridge' collapse 
,' .. ,". .': :: .... -:.... . ".' . 
.. chuanworker, travelled 10 . hospitals in Shaoguari~ a ma~ Authorities planned to aI-
Guangdong in search of Ii job: dor city innorthem Guarig~ leviate the poverty problems 
. One oflheworkers badiyin~ this·year..< ,:'. dong~:., .. ..•. .. .in Ruyuanby directing more 
jured inlheGulIngdong He has 'severe injuries to OneSiChuiln worker treat" . traffic througb the town aner 
bridge collapse that killed 29 Ihe upper bady and is unlike" ed atYuebei Hospital said he scheduled completion of the 
people yesterday saidlhe ac- IYlo recover totally, . would go. back toSichuan. 'highway befoie· the Lunar. 
cidenl was caused by cement . Some of his close friends once he recovered and never' . New Year, . 
being poured into a mould 10 died in the accident,' >return 10 Guangdong; ..' To meet lheschedule. 
form the bridgesurface..Mf Tan said S iChu an The less seriously injuredwotkers" mainly from Si .. 
Tan Monglin ( ":f'.f'I:) workers went to GiJangdong. were taken to 'hospitalS in 'chuali with others fromHu-
said the bridge cQllapsed be- as pay for rnigrant workers in. Ruyuan.. bei,. Henariartd Guangdong; 
cause the iron scaffolding Ihepfovincewas much high~ .... More than 100 workers were required to work at-
failed to supporttheweight o[ er.thanat home.. . were. on the' bridge, .which . night. •. ". ~ 
the cement. . , ... '. 'He and five other badly in-spans al OO-nletn~-deepval~ The SlulOquan Daily re-
Eight w()rkers. were still jured workers were still being Jey •. ManyJelljnto the valley .ported Friday's accident rtext 
missingyeslerday afler the treated'llt the First Shaoguanwhen ifcollapsed.. ' .... 'day withouHeporting the 
. " collapse near Shaoguan· in.·. People;s Hospital last night; ' ........ Nohodywas' available. to . death toIL or the number of . 
. whichmordhall 6Opeopfe .. Anothei'six worke"rswilhcomment on Iheerigi.neering ,wounded~. ..../.. ,. 
were injured: .' ..' similarinjuries.were being.'5vork yesterday,' .,. • ... > '. Several"eopte;iaidl6 be 
The accident happened in treated at ¥,iebeiHospitalin '.:.' The work formed plutof a ,relatives; burned incense and 
a gorge between Pinshiarid Shnoguan. .:....: 'highway linking Ruyuan; a' papermoliey near the scene 
Ruvuan counties; Twelvenlore serioljslyin~ ... poverty-stricken countyiand aner receiving telexes about 
MrTan. a 26-year-old Si- jured workers were sent to .'. Pinshi. . . .. the tragedy; 
IViUNNTAMin Shaoguan 
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Case Ref. No. 7 Ru Yuan Guangdong, China 
Source: 23 December 1996, South China Morning Post 
Bridge . collapse toll almost certain lo rise 
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Case Ref. No. 8 Kwai Chung, HK 
Source: 30 September 1996,Ming Pao Newspaper 
m~A.(Le.mT'9Jt.R • ~m!t: '~411;lfiHf;f.tm6IJJe. • .x.~o" (~it+~) (*_*1l!. J ~lfnU6Ht!-MltmUII'I'8"f ' ~fflimlVi~~~~Jt8~5f-' iJ!-F;P~If.J.1I trQ~I.~~~ .. lMiI.).J1!fjjl.Itmrdl' , ~+*~rn+*'i1!1:af-J:-*~ 0 ~oo!iJ1~Jt* 
*~r~~itJZ,11'Jm~:r.r.sl~*ltlG'l~*~ ,;~t;:gIA ,~tHi~IAIUlEI' j\JttE~1ti, 
Jar '1il~=;j;IAf]!m.;" ' ,,' b!.*i1Bi't:JIAJltl~·=+1iA ';Ei3I1'F.ftJ\lJ~.te· 
i~l~7Tgtl~~~~· .=+1\»1- J1!!§ftI ,m IA3'lfilfllP .. t*i1e '~11u~mrBZfi;fj*i't:1*i1B' 
iliUm .. ;fi w.1 ' tc !¥mtl ' mJi!il~a~ ; ~~, fiSlitllittP).-mt o ' : " ',~' , , ' ",' 
fN~fI:t~:S~IA • ;}jJIJ~1i+=~~~~., ,~I!9ItJ*~:ti·tEj{gfil¥.J=tJf{].=tlrJJ!l{J~", .&5!H~~' ~IH&8k!JW:l~o' ' . ~i3li!1.tretllt' lEjf!f1lfU'!Ifi <> jt!rf1¥JIA~~l! .•. 
JJ!tJi:fB~ffli~jld~~fl·I~rpJCi~AIIt¥:JU ,; ~J:S~~"fi't:J.ff; g:JJUiU~ -tlm<::: ilrdll'f.Jif} 
I.fi8j!HJ-~ifl1It;i=.¥=-.'rili~D!lai't:J$;} .. D1f/lafl9~~:.fMfi\ ~ ••. ~~NUmi~ftd * ~1~1I'J'~i};. . 
'I.Aep.H!=*~i't:JO' :rJSHiPJ.*t1i&MAA ~&*t5i:iJ!r' <:::~IAP.J~~:;P&!Ut*~m 
,m~iI~:n8ZjS1i*(j(}*~ • fJ " . .. . 
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Falsework blamed I 
for road span Jail" I 
'PRf:AL\'l'UllE F:\L.<;EWOIIK removal MOllday when t1itl last two bodj~S,1 
!g being bl:lnled r"r the colla»sc or were u·Dcuvered. The remains oC the 
ollesl>atlofatul\roada<iteSIJrnmjlin oiJOl ,lab' hllVd now been cut llll!, i 
Jakw, Indonesia, IllSt Fridi\Y. SC'1m pje(:c~,and li/let! away. I 
'lil!ee wurkers died and IS WttO! TII': 25Um long act'c.'-'S ramp was !,' 
l'liurt-d wl,en the SOm long shnl;ly. being 'con3tnlcted In Grogul, W,'~t 
su~porled InsIlu concrete SIJall Jakarta, M pan of th~ Groglll-I'luit 
crll!!hed d()wn ilt Barn.: SUMvon tvU ntJd projet't which i$ desil(uw 10 I 
claimed they 'had been told to "lnipro"e at<,es.~ til Socbrno.lIaua ! 
remove lhe falS(lWt,rk fOllr dayS early i1iLernatiot1tll lI!rpotl' " ' ! 
}JY their ~uPCl\isor !film main cim· lIan Bo is 'Iu Joint velltUrtl, w:m , 
':tracUJrl\orean-bASCd lIan 110, lot::il confr.1Ctor PT Bum! KnrnYl1.\ 
" ,l'irst rC\><lrU said. wotkcl'$ w~rb and lead stnletllt:ll r:onsultanl w, 'lIS, I 
struggling toJatk the ~gging span said io beTokyll-ba.s.!d PCI & Yec. 
back tip agaln when the collapse Work on th~ proJ~ct beg;m Jalli ; 
oct'urred. One sunivur is said to M'IXhrul!l, was due (u b~ t'om- . 
haycattriliuted his es~ape tu ha~in!l 1,Iewd at the end ~r lIext mvnlb .. 
rrIused lo WO!!: beneath thl! slat.. OIticlal$ or the Indonesillll Ministry 
after. cracks developed ill 1Ile con· uf Public WurkS Iaun"hcd an 
, crete: following me earlier rcmw.il Df illunediale Investigation, an,l, a 
part oC t1,efal~work. prelinilruuy repori IV,IS prolHlsed 
A rescue o1!>6r.illon end~d on Itilhit\ 10 days. 
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Case Ref. No. 9 Jakarta, Indonesia 
Source: 23rd March 1990, South China Morning Post 
FOllr (;onStruction workers died a~d three more wer~'bl.l~edand feared dead whenan~ilfinlshed()verPass collapsed 1n 
western Jakarta. At least 18 were Injured when the roed fell on workers after iron scaffolding was removed ahead of sche<tule. 
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Tuesday January 21 1997 
RON.G· 
F· '1' ·b······d· ". ..... '1"1"'" . . .... ····.ata: •...... >rl~;g.e:co •• ···apse:;· 
as .·p'().pS unscrewed 
MICHELlECHIN . Medical reports said cateendorsedbyanotheren-.' folding since;November 
Cheung had died immedi- gineer had been received to .. 1995, said he did not consid-
Contractors hadbeguIl un- iuely;'" .' 'approve the works. ,ertneproceduretobeunsafe. 
authorised procedures to re- Chow' Po-kit a; site engi- "Wan Hin didn'tgive us a . He suffered internal bleed.;. 
move props supporting a neer employed by Maunsell detailed.proposal about low- ing irithe accident and.bas 
Tseurig Kwan 0 footbridge ,Consultants to monitodhe ering th~ beams. It had men- ,been unable to work since. ' 
last January - the day it col· project, said main contractor. tioned the procedureduriIig WanHin and its manager 
lapsed and killed a driver, im Wan Hin started to remove a meetingbutdidn't. hand : each face'two summonses of. 
inquest heard yesterday. four positioning jacks on overdetailedplaris," he said. , failing to ensure safety at a ' 
A sect i on of the 200- temporary scaffolding that; UungSai-ch'eong,41 ,an: ' workplace and failing to en-
tonne footbridge in Po Ning. day without, the. task being on-site'construction worker, sure workers' wellb<Hng. ' 
Road, outside Hau Tak Es- approved by anindependenL said he was taking out thepo-; ,Their trial has been fixed for 
tate, collapsed on January engineer: ',. . sitioning jacks when the . May 5." '.' " 
26, crushing a lorry. The TheCoroner~s Court bridge 'collapsed: , Yesterday Ch~ng's wife,· 
driverwas killed and four .. heard that after the position- "Therewas J'lowariling: ,:, Tong Ling-yuk, 39, an Indo-
othersiteworkersinjured.' ingjacks'hadbeenun~ ,It shook a Httle bit and feU: nesian-Chinese, Iistenedto 
.", The body of Cheung;screwed~tw();precastcon.; .. down 'all ()fasudden;Jt was\'thehearingaidedbyanintet-
Kwok-fai, 46,W3S recovered crete beams could then, be like an earthquake,'~ he said. ' . .' preter.The inquest contin- ' 
five hours later-after heavy . lowered to the bridge's deck;, '. Mr:Leung.>.who·. had: ·ues before Coronei Richard 
cranes Iiftedthefootbridge. Mr Chow saidno certifi- • workedonthebridge'~ scar-, Day today. 
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Case Ref. No. 10 Tseung Kwan 0, HK 
Source: 21 5t January 1997, South China Morning Post 
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Case Ref. No. 10 Tseung Kwan 0, HK 
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Twowo:rkerskilledas flyover ... collapses 
. "- --.--.-~-----. ..:.~ .. ~ .- ···-, _______ ..... _v. . . 
.. " ....,: . . .•.... ... .. .. .··.·---:-----I:"t~· 
Brldg. 01 death ••• inspector. ""amine the collapsed concrete netion that killed two Th.1 workers at the troubled Kwa' Chung viaduct piol&ct.. 
. . . .",",' .' . . 
By KEITU WAll.IS oo".hour emefgtnrytru·.- Camptnot Uernard{.. Is rar loo fOdy .to.1:Utss what Ch una coilt.lner port.· 1'<1r 
ment, And anoth.r unldenll- . Frankl Contnrlori (CDF) caused it,ft he.said.·· WOlla ,.Id thesellment Ihat 
T\VO Thai workers died lnd, ned worker ".i~ round tu be IIrojectmlnlller Rohan . . CDI" sUety. manager f.U, •• 1S for Iherail""y pur; 
four .. -ere lnlured: l'eslef,hlY Madal t1.esCtne; ,::: . Shorlanit, said the workm' , .. Wong Yiln-yinsald the scaf. tlon of the ptOjtcf.' . ... 
when a 75·tolln. (linti'd. .,T.he injur.d "nThrs, families irould be rontane" roldlngshould bate beell COF.won ib $2.3 billion 
bridge·:sertloft crashed·· lII.mu,n Gkun~ 2l,.Vthat: and no ..... froiaTh.UIIIIl' able\osupportlh.wtighlof ton.rad III May 19'13. but 
through _frl)ldinll4Uton-: Ko.mtaa;,41; Bum.om .. "They.all..orked for Ill. ·thtse&mcotwblcb"ubting the project tan InlO mlous 
slrurtioinile In Kwai Chillll/. K n.\on;34; and PhiDiI.Czk joint nnture. ~m~ of thtm moved by specialrquipment. trouble last ytllrafter dosiaft 
... Thucrld.nt happentd at, N 311, 36 SUfreffd· broken . hId irorked r", os fot. years C:BF and th, Labour De- .. difficultiH. 
3.40 pm onlh~ trciubl~d handit mitES. IlnThallahd on similar paltment h ... el'Q.ch~d5ep- AJ a result,ID D«rmber 
Kwat Chunll .Iilduct .(on. Thty .... on • onf·ye.r projetlsl," Mr ... Shorlsnd ant. inl'estiptions.'·· . last rur joint nilture part. 
trart. . ·contrac:,.:d.repald about said. . . The·colbpsed stiotion Is net Fr •• ll COlltrarton said 
Thi'. d~ad and injured S \1),000. month. Aboul 100. "Therds atechnical ill.· part or. COIl,.kilomctre .1 ••. it expected tomalte I $645 
... ere tlkcn to PrinceSs Mlr- Thi cOll$trurtloli ."orhr. quirf.The seanenlls on the· nted ";dod ·for airport- million .Iou by the time the 
gUtt Hospiial. Srithaiuat haftb.en·lmporttd ror Ih~ groUlld. liurrounlrd.by sraC, bound road aDd rail traffic rontrartlialshed al the end 
• Somphon&,:36. died .n.r. p'''ject; .. . (oldlng.nd OIhe m.leria!.lt bei!!!l. bu!!t .. ntxt to the K .... i of nexl ~~ •••.. 
. -- --'~;"""----'------'---~-'--
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Case Ref. No. 12 Macao 
June 1994 
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Case Ref. No. 13 Israel 
Source: April 1994, Construction Today, p.l O. 
IsraelifCilseworkfall.brings 
callfor.tigh~er·checks 
.. ThIrrl.partyv~~l~n off~~rk. 
design has been recommen eu m. 
-Israel arw i6rldg. "ideiiliig 
coll&p.., ill mlHlatch, Des!", and. 
eonstructi<>ll iiiors c~ 
collapse wh!cll rought a lom 
prccast bridge ",idenillg beam 
crashlng on to. motorway, Idlllltg 
~epeople.. ' .•. ". '. 
In • report, published a week 
a1tu the Incident, the public inquiry 
committee said. "The coUapse of the 
tempoill)' $UppOr!S for the bridge 
ns due to • combination of faults In 
the design aM eltttUtlon oftho 
construction of the support I4weri 
on which the preca..t be3J1lS ~re 
resting," .. : ... 
The committee recotnmendlld 
tato;ewnrk designed to supportluch 
hea" loads be chteked by an 
lndt'pt'.ndent expert and for 
fallework where supports annot be 
spread across the load to be buUt or 
tQ!lt(tlt Of lar&e 4Wutter s1tI:l 
tubing. . . <... . " 
C<lmmlttee IMm~r ProfeSSllf 
Ben Tu~\\'ho '" h~d .Uhe IsrilelI 
~.donal Building Resurch ;. 
Institute, said the design had 
WI'tInt uwmtd that the load 
woUJ be "'011 across !hi! falseWOrk. 
"More aceiiti'ie cakulatlons showed 
that the load was not ei~1y " 
BOOKS ,',: " 
SariUago calatrm.~, / 
edition monograph on hIs.."ik. 
EdIted ~nnIs Sllarp. Publisher 
Chap""'n & iWL Price 114.99 
($22).' . 
Global change ilnplanel'3ItII.' 
l'Ttlft }.\~\elItt OtA.'D t\m!m 
series. Publlsh.ed by OECD Paris, 
Price ITrlSO; 6ut!~ Franco 
FFtl70 ($29) ($42.50). . 
A$phalt pav~r ~j~~-'ual,· 
'l\vdtb In a wits. Published 
Construction Industry 
Manufacturer>' Assoclalion, 
W-I$('.o/l$I)I, (;sA; 
YearbOOks. Concrete 162 ($90);" 
Ground Englaeerlnl162 ($00); 
Waste-recrllag Ind 
envlronmealal directory 145 
(£63); Water directory 5.25 
di.tributeil," ~ said. "Some 
suppor!S were more hea\ily loaded" 
biting them berond their capacity, 
aM this "lIS the main ea_ of the 
coUaP"'o". . 
'fu1 said the problem had been 
exacerbated br the spicl.nl of the 
support tOwel'$. ·Usll2lly, th.leg,~ or 
the $UppOrt structore "'ould be 
spread WIder the load,' )le !aid. 
"Here they Were coneentrattel 
between the carrbge .... ys so as 10 
I<al'e the free\\:a1 open.· 
The t<lllapse brought a lOOt 
precasl concrete beam down on the 
Jerusalem·bound airiageway ~f Ih •. 
.. ' Inolonvay, 8km easl ofTel Aliv.lt 
killed two motorists and a 
. eonstruc!lon Worker. 
nie triple ,\'eb beam \fS.S one or . 
str resting on f.1lseWork across the 
cmia&",,:ay as pm or. bridge 
widening sehenle on tbe Slu!.plrlm 
junction. A further sbt beams 
straddle the Tel A\1v can1age\\'31' 
and a ral!\l:a.Y runnillg along the 
central restlt'\'atlon: ... 
'l\lr uld the sUpport between the 
curIag~ W8S probably the first 
to fall "The tower ill the middle l'.ad 
the greatest load,' he uld. "It 
, CQUapsed under a combination of 
b\l(kling and dl1gorW pulls.· 
The Inquily committee decided 
that the conditions I.admgt<> the 
collapse lu!.d ~n pecu1Iu to the .. 
project. It recominended th:it work 
. on Slu!.plrlm jWlCtlon be Stopped 
unill the remaining falseworkwas 
Strengthened and t.M ~ed limit ' 
contractor Solltl Bonth before 
deciding where to lar hl1lne. 
Ma'atz orderlld strengthening of 
the falsework al\er \he accident. 
No""" from Ma'm or SoDeI was 
a>2ilahle to comment afttr the 
report as C7'ftlll to press, aJihough 
!hortly alter the accident Aia ·at~· 
director general lien Zlon Salmon 
did sat t1.at his departJntnt had 
d.signed the brl~and Supeni.o;ed 
worlc; ·We ha>e meralr 
mponslbl1lty," he md, "bul the 
CQntruetion ~ Is the 
rep5<lnslblllty of ihecontraet<>r." 
SAlm.mAlso AId the melhcld 
nud. "ith the beil}u~on: 
''CalSeW01t before tenslontng &ru! 
. eonnecuon to pemtlnenl,upporls, 
, Wa$ quite COlIIII\on, ... VO ha>" . . 
,..--...,.,.,..,...,,..,.,..=.;-,---...,...,,. ___ ._--. reduCt'd on the COllSU'Ucted IemP4fl11Y Wift'olillng 
for many bridges ,,'\thoul • .' , 
problem,- he said.: "We ehtelclld the 
des~D of this ~oldlng and it had 
• ...t~(_ . ..r\l<oo"" .... uw . 
beuuI. Th~ presrureon 1b1:lClII101d . 
,,:as i>nly 55% of the design load," . 
($3UO): Publishe.J ThOmaS 
Motel PubUC2tlons. 
. . 
•. Construction ollllls ;"ucODd 
editIon: !'art oCprac!lcal 
constructIon series. Edward J 
Monahan. Published John W'lIey 
aM Sons. Pric;; &49.50 . 
. ($72.50). 
Concrete. on Site. BOxed Sel or 11 
subject booklets: PubIL'iI.ed Brlttsh 
Cement A.ssoclation. . 
ArbHritlonpractlce I. 
construction. contracts. Third. 
edition. Douglas A Stepbel\SOn •. 
Published E & ffl Spon (ChapmlUl 
.\ Hall) Price SI6.50 ($24) 
sol\b:lck. 
. TIle tomplete 1II3nual of 
husebulldlng. RobOrt ~lathcws. 
Published J M ~nt and Sons. 
Price S14.99 ($22) softback. 
motOr\\-ay under th~ 
bridge: 
The report \$llOw 
("IM hand. of 1..-11 
HousUig Minister 
BenJanUn ~n Ltzer. 
He is waiting for the 
eonclU!k>ns or .. .. 
separate . .' 
In\'estig,aiions by 
cUent .Ma'at.: (the-
·piiblic "'Cries 
department) and, 
· ON STATION: One of Europe's 
biggest mobile cranes; this ' . 
.Mannesmann Demag PC 960D Is. • 
currentl, working on construction . 
of a new IIgnlt. or brawn .coal .. 
power station In farmer easlenl' 
Genriall)'. The machine, wJlb a 
· 112m main boom and 70m Jib baS .. 
to 11ft 'n up to 105t sleel sections 
for the boiler house on .the . '. 
6tlo"0p"" '0\.\1 ... ,I\d ".11 .. ...,···· 
between Halle and lelpllg. . 
Maximum tlft height Is 1SOm. Tbe 
huge power stallon, part ola .. 
· mass of Infrastructure being 
created In tbe so called Fonf Meve 
lande Is deSigned and built by . . 
Ruhr based firm Weber ICraftvlerke. 
Ruhr AG which will also operate 
Ibe 900MW slation wlten 11 comes' 
on stream In 1995. The project is 
financed 60</. br ICWR and 400/. by 
lahler Energle, a joInt ventule 
owned h' Britain's PowerlleJl and 
the US NAG Energy. The crane Is 
on hire from UK lilt specialist 
GraystDn White & SparrDw. 
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If.ne ut the Org,anlsatlollS . 
lim>h-ed mluldcolllment furthC,.r, 
but neither the cOntractor nor the 
pubHc Works dlTarnn~irt has 
2~ptedthe lIndlngs of the offie/al 
report. .'. : .. :." ..... 
MatlblnJ Pettipher. 
Case Ref. No. 14 Maryland, USA 
Source: November 1990, Construction Today 
.Mimi~~ojacollapse report 
'6lames overstressed6eam 
~Ot2(oJ.ework b~ 
caused. tho coUap5$ of a (orm"wk 
arch on aUS toad l,rldge during 
COI\O'eiepoaring, ~ • report by 
~ Mln!1e$Ola Department or 
Tnn.<portatiOJl. . 
Contr2C1M CS McCnlSlWl 
Constru<:lionfta$ /iled a $~AM llUil 
against bISe,,-orlt desi8ner 
R<hder-WeniP.J and bridge d'<;ign~r 
\Iowai'd Needles Hammen & 
Ilergendoll'to recoup danuges. 
McCrossan t...:s also decided to fight 
S95 000 worth of citati<>ns &eM.<! b1 
tbOOcCupatiOflal SIIf.ty & Health 
Administration (or aneged fallure to 
imploment oom!clsatety. . 
p~,""s on tile pl"<\iect; 
One man Illed ,.OOn tbO . 
s.ipporUng trUsS 0( rour braced 
pArallel """""'"can)ing th<l CIOW1I 
.of a lirldge ar? C:U1~.d duri~;.~ 
JIOistS(C1' J.-). The collipStd . 
arch ,.as part of a twin ~p4n bridge 
(or a JlIJIior MW citY street betwe.n 
Idioneapol;" and SI Paul, eiossing 
the MisslsSiJ.pl mer. ConstrueUon 
has lieenMla).-ed nint months. 
MOoT'! report coillimls th21..!!L 
'undersiud' lro!" beAm w ... ~ tM ... 
cause of the roll.""e and says that. 
'Ill< cilJculiW eompreSsM s\rem$ 
wm bigII enoor.h 10 cau.<e t~lding 
oflhe$leelllld to..l!!!£ipltateloo:al 
~ the w!ULifiililaJ!l~. 
. iil<IS that the com~leJlitY 
of !he entire supporting system 
made it dilIIclllt to> del6nnln. the 
.... ised lOad paU!$ and co-.quenll)'., 
it was 'dil!icuJt to d<lt'rmine """et\)' 
!he $tqllell« of Ii"", colapse'. 
J. M'IY, McClOOSaIi claimed that 
its consultant Rehder·Wc1t1cl had 
not cMckOOa support beam (or 
...... ",""",lIn.~_ 1110 new re!>Ort. 
compiied by indcp<'ndent . 
consulunt CoMtruction Technology' , 
Laboratories, seem' 10 3dd weight 
to MeCrO!.£au', ~urt ·a~Ul)n. Reh~tf 
Wel1%ei refused to cclinmrnl. 
Mecn ... 'WI said tl1al Us case 
agaJnst HNHUis (Iver dlC"'kin~ .' 
work. IINlIB partner Richard ,' .. 
Il<'clonan &lId !a.<1 mOllth thAt:1.i. .. 
firm had undertaken '120 hours Of 
cuis<lly overriew work', lie added: 
'IV .. Mve,"",n ... ry ~.ar'ful not to 
tall it (hocking Iw ... tL,e we do Mt 
'vieW it as suclI.' 
lI«\<mlln TVj«i..d 'M 
conclusions of the MOoT document::' 
lie said that wurk on sile 11\1)' not 
~ been carried out to design' . 
specification. The repOrt SaJ."$ U1A! 
'truss and support tower m.mb .. 
. siies generally ~orteSpondt'd to 
u..,., .11<""non fAl..;ewnrk . 
dtll .. ings'; 
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Case Ref. No. 15 USA 
Source: August 1989, Engineering News Record 
OOOOOOOOOOQOOOOOOOOOO 
ContractQriined . on . 
··bridge colfcipse 
.1 Gro s sde vi a t ion s ' from chie{of enforcement said there 
contractual plans caused the .. were'aIlllll1ber ofCvery>severc' 
collapse last year ()f falsework deviatipns from· the agreed plans, 
during-construction oia US of,which;th~ most significant 
hlghway,,:bridge, accordingto cop.cemedl12scrf!W' jacks at the 
Maty1and.sai~tyinvestigators. ..,..... top of the scaffold towers. TIle 
Worst of tllese·was·the use of . ,C9#rraC[oC·used····.·'jacks ·o{ ·()nly 
jacks'·· of insuffkient . cipacicyat... 44kNcapacitY'iastead·· of· r07kN 
. the too ofthe,;scaifold cowers. ··c~l1ed [or ",by the approved 
. Coorrictor JPSinithCo has been dhlwiilgs. ··A . fmc()fS71 00 was 
fined:S910220, a stare record , by I~Yif!dTOrf!ach jack. . 
theOsc\lP·~doIl.alSafe(y . &. ;"'rl~nilirig and . coordination 
HealthAdiiiiriistrauon. .. .... erigine~t; Roy tniWfotd· of the 
, :'. ··The'J8m'.span:bridge a1:E~:ae·r'~l., ···'liighway. 
Laurel~ MaiyJand,.was one' or' Administration's eastern federal 
four siIlii13.r ·st.nIctllres •. which· will l~cls·div~si().Ilwas surPrised that 
. carry: the ·tWo:car.Q.ageways •. of.. the contractOfhad'deViated so far 
Maryland Route. 198 . over . me •. fromtheagteed plans~Although 
Baltimore.·.WasrungtonparkWay, ·thediVision,which desimed the 
Inc f!rsrate295.The steel btidge~ had:'liII1ited exPerience' 
formwork collapsed midway .·oLJP Srniili Co,many. of its 
rhiougll pouringtfie deck slab employeC$> wercwell kno\ifn in 
last. August, inju~ing 14 people theindusUy.. . 
(CTOctober1989). ·,'JP·Smi~Co< president John 
CraigLowrY.M.arylarid OSHASritith declined 10 comment. . 
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Case Ref. No. 21 Heidelberg, W. Gennany 
Source: December 1985, Engineering News Record, p.14. 
i German bridge. topples :~\~nf;~~ah~~~~~t o~\Sa~~:::~ ~~ :::~ ;1,. 
tC'llIpor:lI1' pier. It call1ileverro, h:mging 
al)()llt 4 ft above the pcmnancflt pit'l' ~: 
Offidal5 sliIl don't know 311()"2 n above the other abuulIt',il. 1 
. what caused falsC'work 10 fail During lowering, the fOllr jack. ~ndcr t 
and<:lrop a.rrl:'ssive. newly ,:the f.llsewol'ktuwer were raLlcd.shghtlr-
hunched bridge aCf"055 rail· to a!lmv rcrrioY<i1 of someoflhc Slip-
road, tnlck'. in 'Heiddbt'l'g; pOl'llllg w:cl plates, and then lower~(! tt) 
West Germany... '. • .rcst the fal5ewOlk on. Ihe' remamms 
"/llc dall13ge is. going (0 ·sl.~·d pfalcs.TIle,lll'Oce.$s ~as to (ontin. 
be considerable,"· .says .Emil .. tiC. gradually.. UIlul the gu·der. was set 
Mulad; MalUlheim brand1 ' .. Bm during one(.( the .lowering round, 
clirectoroLBilIingcr . + the IOWC'1' belltat thrjacks and rlllml>ed 
BergerllauAG, refcnillg to· the ,.pan o. nw, ':. '.he. permanent pier. i1.:iJ".d 
both the expected $2 million the far,abUlmimt. l!&Bsays the girded! 
10 repair Ihe.'.SlnlCture and' a complete loss. . . .•... 
compensation for· disrupl~d ,,; .. \Ycdthcralld lailure of Ihe girder il~ 
mil service.' MU head.i the- sell have beerf ruled OUI 35 causes, In 
consortium building the lat'l, rngincers were sUlprised at how 
steel· bolt girtler bridge un;' "liule che, girder defonneil when it fell. ,. 
der a contract worth about The in,,~sligation is ~xpeCled' to fi>cus I 
. $6.5 million. A few workers on the Jacks' hydr3uhc .system and on 
suffered minor' injuries '. in the cimnection betw{'t'n the toupOtal1 I 
the collaps~. . pi~r 1I11~ Ihe ~uperstrllctllre: . . 
The ';.bridgc had bc:-en.. D,e Immedlate.concern after the (01·' I 
prcwelded from 33-ft.lo!1ll' '. bl'm~' was .. to remm'c (he w~bge, 
channel sections and W lirh stopped traffic on Ihe m;yor ttain' 
launched from' 'one or the rome .. Last week the. contractor started 
abutments into placr' ovel' Ruined bridge channel !3ys acro...s titigkl pi"" and abUtmOnl~' $Crallpi .... g !IlC~ smicmre. ~'r'or\:eTS placed 
. '10 rail tracks and a two-lane SleC piers at ·thrce pmnt! under. th~ 
road at Heidelberg Central ... ; .•.. ' . long!'r span and under onc point of the 
Station:' l.l\\'oilchitll\ Wla e,~mplded ·tht- 0110 WollT lIomhllTser Ihll Cmbll, ~hm" ... totlc. '11'9. cu' ,he J;.r .... r 01""" 
day beforC'. the c~napse., ;...... ~r Homburg-: a m<''ffih~ of the con~tnJc- ' amI moved the pieces to' tradside using 
·.111e.385.lon bndge channel was cO"'7.,uon COllSorllulIl. C!~.slgl1e~ the gIrder. two.mnes. Rc-JIIo,,,1 of the longest span 
posed of IWO.J.:!!!:~.m,~ connectrdhy'" .• H. omburger s~lb5i~11~ry Helll. l...ehm;mn was wrnj,ll"tediri less than two d.:lfS:. . 
bottom plate. n,C contractofw:lS te> cast . .').9 ..... "715 t::rectmg It. . .. 1he . a(Cidertl . is expected' to debi-
a <:omposile concrete dcck .10 complete r;: udn,I.:Chrnann laullched the girder work' I<')r . six. months. TI,e pre\ioll~ 
the'box section. 111e collapsed bl'idg ... \Crom fals~work<alop one :1butmenl . schedule, calledJilr completion: of the·, 
had lWO. spans. 223 and. I 04 ft long;. ~nd.' across, the touporary pkr. "l1,e tempo, ~l'~tlwo"lime bridge by next May an~ ll., .' 
.would have been the hrst of a pall' 0[. . rar)'. plcr s.,t on steel plates "ndon lOp slJllilar,sinKture to be completro besi<le ' 
two.lane crossings:' . ,OftWIl Pail'$;9f jacks: A~ler launt·hing. it by,mid.198;.. . ' ..• 
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Case Ref. No. 22 Colorado, USA 
Source: 28th November 1985, Engineering News Record, p.12 . 
. State supervision 'lacking' 
in Denv~r,viaduct collapse 
A consultatlt'$ report io tll<' Colorado 
Department of H!gh"'3l'S' says .colltrac-
tor misunderstandangs abouc a constnlc-
ti<>n' s~qucil('c and lack ,ot prof~ssiollal 
siJpen'1SI011 by 110ft englllt'er5 \\'t'r(~ t!le 
reasons for collapsc()fa .DeIll'cr ."Ia-
anCl, F~illlre of a concrete picr table 
dropix-d dg·ht .• COllcrctc. girders across 
rntCist3te 25 earlv last ITlontl}. lilling 
onc \\'orker~nd seriousl)' injllnng four, 
The report; r.repai'ed. by' consuhanc 
););IlN.-\, lnc,; ". ht'3t Ridge, .Colo.. "'as 
released under COUI1. order bi' the 
srale's anome,' general. afier the ',ife of 
an irUlIred \\'ork~rdt'maildcd iu n:lease 
in a ~ujl seeking damages. . 
.1re· ~ollapse OCCl,lrrrd during plan:-
mefllof the last of eight5S·ton gutiers 
.on(() a p;lrlially ~omple!e~ pie~ .!a~k , 
• (tNR 10/17 p. \{)),Thc:mI'CslIgallon 
(enlered 'on whelher' a constllJuion se· 
~tienceril!liiig for' a$ccoild, he;lVi1r re-
mforced II[(-:to compl~leJhe p,er cap 
before tht girders wl"re placed-:-w3s ad· 
eqiI3tely. spelled. o~Jt in ~ design ·pl3m .. 
The report detennUled 1t.·.W35 not,. aT· 
though the designitselr,,'asad"quate. 
. The COntractor, Manin K. Eby Con-
struction Go,; Wichila. "misunderstood 
the cOnstruction sequt"nc,.· intended by 
the dt'!;gn~r,"lhe rejlQn~aid,TJle 
plans. $Ubmllted' bv the .• deSigner, the· . 
Lakewood. Colo .. office of HO"'olrd Nee-
dle$Tammen 9< Beq:endotT (liNTS) 
"<Iid no!' cQntain a specific pier tiJ con· 
structioll sequenc .. ,. 1I0r ol ·.speCific COll-
crete girder erection' sequence," . Ihi! 
led co~stn:'rrlon pers(jiiriel 10 develop a 
seqlJell~ "based on their interpretation' 
of cenainnotes ill the COnir.lCl plans:~ 
.TIle notes "were !lot sufficiently dear' 
and ~marnbiguous':,"'. to propirly .• de-
scribe the. (I)nSll1JCI101l $e<juence by the 
designer." 111C rcp(11'( said ""ilher Col· 
ora,fo nOli personn..! lI')r Ihe ('ontra,· 
tor's field' personnel "could rras(lIlahly 
J2 ENR,NOVember 28. 1985 
beexpcctt·(j to t1lldC'rsl:llld structural 
cOlIscquen .. es of thdrplanned conitrUc-
lion 5cqucnce,~' The onl\' rcf~n"nCt'in 
the 12()'plige I'epon to the highway de-
p'aruncn~'s 5upcn'isol!' rol~ saId: ":"\1 fl() 
tllnc dunng lhe. constnlOlon ·of Pier 6J 
did am' [nOH) enginecr with thclrain· 
jug and (~xp("ri<."nc~. iU·Cl·~!ian· 10 reco~ .. 
nizC' the implications of lIie plall1ll1! 
cOllstrtlmon sequence ~'isil the site for 
the ·~pe.:ific purpose '(If "c\'i(,,,,ing the. 
progTCSS' of (onslnicii()n:~ The Slale 
[lOll has declined to' comment' on the. 
substance of the report.' 
A spOkeSJllollI for Eby COllslmt,tioll 
says .• the contraCI(lr bche'\'l."sil "acted 
properly under the. supervision, review, 
m.pectio·ri· and dircCtIon of the C{)lor.l-
do /lOH.K The l'epon.·llotes .thecomT3<--
tor'sfield person rid "disrt'ganled" stiue' 
regulations 011' the remo,·il.1 of falsewor'k 
$uworting tht: pi..-rop:. 
A Ia'''''t''r •• represenllng . H"'rll s31d 
"The plan.s 1)rl."]>3red by Hl>.'T1l depined 
pier 6Jas a smgJe .. structural member. 
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3n<l there was n\:i prO\;sion fm' SlOpping 
cOllStnlctiori al anv poillt prior to plac-
ing the girders •. The decision to hall 
construction after. the first. POll!' "'d! a 
decision w~"were ilOt involved ·in." . ' 
);1:1J:-iA ViC~ Presidelli johnJ;.; lIdgh' 
says, ":nie.design· \\'a~ just ,.,.',u...J, 
enough that. there' should. Ill'" .15; 
some· scquencing .. ·If. the"'d don!:' Ihalj' 
the accident wouldn't ha';( happent'd."t!.; 
. .•.... ' ......... "'4i 
Case Ref. No. 24 Sunshine Skyway, Tampa Bay, U.S.A. 
Source: 1 st November 1984, New Civil Engineer, p.1 O. 
• '. . ... ...... j; .. :. ...... . "ij 
Three· .. ·ffillhre·s···:possible 
.c;aus.e·of; SliY'way~ f~ll .. : 
Stro~g winds. ~nd a possible ,crane impact pr()babl~ contributed lo 
the collap8eofFlorida:s,S'u~hincSkywa.Y launch gantl'Y says a·: 
report published reeentlybythe aCcident investigators. . .' . 
The lOOm long steelspaceframe' secured bipres'tiel!!ed cables to· 
gantry slumped in August inJuril)lt the \)ier'8Ide (NeE 23/30 August). 
four men. Since then workhas: " 'The main culprit in the gantry 
~'on deck'segment' , failure was this. eccentric' . 
launching and aD investigation. coilliection to the bottom of the' . 
has been' underway. .,. ;. , ., " 'vertical trul8 on pieT five' says the : 
The 1!Xact combination ofStatic repOrt. 'A higher than expected· 
and dynamic forces which caused vertical load made the truss . 
the fnihire has yet to be ;'.' ,... '. . "apring" outwards and the . . 
determined says Zetlin Argo . . anchoring etrand snapped due to 
Structural InvestigationB oCNew . excessive tension;' 
York .. But failure of one of three' A second mode of failure 
structural elements within the considered in'the re»<iit.is possible 
gantryaupporl is thought to have local crushing of a clevi! joint .. ' . 
started' the eoinpiexcolhipse " between the top of the vertical 
mechanism.·'. .:' ,;. ':'" ,.. trufIBlInd the jacks which actually .. 
'A prestressed an.:horing alrand supported the gantry. 'This source, . 
securing a temporary vertical· . . and mod~ of.failure was pOI!Slble' ' 
truss over pier five .Jlopped and.:' but unlikely on the basis of .' . 
this hn been singled out 88 the . ; presently availableevidenco'. the 
element most likely to have .' report states,.The ",idence. Zetliri 
.started the cOlIaplW!. . .".... " Argo has includes the mangled : 
Th" gantry failed during'the. remains of the 150t Jiftingjacks 
crucial placement of a 220t bridge which were wrecked during the' 
segment for the new $230M ..' collapse a(ldwere Inter found on 
(£l88M) Tampa Day crossing, The . . the.Tampa Day Seobed. ". . 
original StnictureWAS wrecked In .'; . At the time of the incident. 
1980 when a freighter collided . . investigating .engineer Jim ' .•..... 
with it during fog, ... ;. ' .. ; ". .. lIinddey of Ze.tlin Argo told NeE:. 
Three piers supported the gantry 'It is easy to.Bee thAUhejatkA:'~ ..... 
at the time or th~ accident/and it have failed in axial and bending 
is the.vertical tru~ cOnnection.. forces simultaneously: , 
between tbe'pieraand the gantry .. Th.e third failure m~ ., ... ,. , 
which has attracted c1o.~est . . considered by Z'1tlin Argo looks at ' 
scrutiny d\lring .theinvestigat!on. ,. the local failure of aconerete.pier· 
TheJirst concrete segment to be .' wall. If the,cpncrete, corner support 
placed was within minutes or.' of pier flv" crumbled ,befor.e the'. 
being aeatedon top.ofpiCT, five collapse, not 8S8Te;'ult of It, ,the 
north when the 8Ci:ldent.occurrlld. truss woUld have failed instantly. 
Support 'at the top of pier five '" .' By comput~ri8e? compar~sonof ,,' 
north comprised avertleal truss the ga~tJ')' as doslgn~,d; b~llt and, 
ABOVE: The'first sogment was being placed a8 the failure occurred. 
RIGHT: Section through pier five gantry support, . 
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'. failed, ZetUn Argo has ~stab1l8hcd 
thQ most likely mode Q( collapse. 
'Buckling of pier fivQ support by 
ono of thl! three deScribed failure 
modes trlggeredthl"jle 
simultaneo\ls 'actions' )'cads the' 
report; . . . 
The front of the gantrY lost its . 
vertical support and slumped' 
· do\vnw·ards •. The fixings on top Of 
pier seven failed and then moved . 
southward. Lastly.this southward 
· moveluenl of the 2iippiJn. girders . 
shot the whole gantry southward, 
dBltUlging pier, five; . 
Hinckley strel8ed that his .' 
investigation hill! noiinc1udCd 
reeommendati.ona on how the ' 
collapse could have been avoided, 
'But it is evident that if the. 
sQuthward luid.nol·thward . 
mov~ment oHhe gantry ha'd been' 
locked the collapse might not have 
hnppened' he says; 
The gantry wa.~designed in th" 
· late 1970s for launching deck' . 
segments at. Seven Mile bridge In 
southern Florida. For the new 
Skyway job panel members were 
beefed up and member connections 
redesigned for grealerloods:'But 
· we have not been asked to '. 
compare the structural responses 
of the two designs' says Hinckley, 
'That 1$ another. hivesligation 
'; altogether;' So far ()Ur, work: hu 
only iiwolved analysing and ..... . 
categorising1heforecs in 'excess Of • 
purely static forces.' . . .... . . 
'Aa to whether heads are·likely 10 
.roll following recent publication of . 
the repOrt on August's accident in" 
which four,men were injured . . 
Hinckley replied; 'That remains to 
be seen. Cli~nt Florida., . 
Depnrtmont of TrnnsportllUon; 
contnlctor Paschen andd~slgncr 
Howard Needles Tainmen& . . 
Bergendoff eouldalJ be at fault but 
it~s not our job to attrib~te blame;'o 
,; ; 
Case Ref. No. 26 Ramp C, East Chicago, USA 
Source: December 1982, New Civil Engineer, p.6. 
:~)]~~ 
(ll1e Idlledin· a.nQther 
·US·· falsework failure 
America has suffered another the timber raIse work 
collapse of falsework to a collapsed. A concrete finishing 
bridge under construction just machine is . reported to have . 
a few months after a disastrous been approaching mid span at 
failure in East Chicago. the instantor collapse; . 
TilnberCalseworkto the main .. Theie'lJas<one fatality. a 
span of an over bridge on US Kansas· .. DoT inspector 
Route 36 in Kansas collapsed d.escribed as 'a young girl', 
. on 17·· November killing one who wns monitofingdischarge 
',and injuring eight workers. An . frorn a ready mixed concrete 
. inspection team has .. been on truck. This delivered the frlix 
!siteand is due to meet again on via a concrete pump to one 
14 December following which a side of thE;lJ 5,2lnwide,slightly 
report ...• may· be .. issued jf ramped . deck and by craned 
investigations are· complete. skip totheOtherside;She had 
.. The bridge was .the first of a to repeatedly cross the deck 
pair.planned to carry a· two widtharground level and was 
. .lane· Y1est!:>ound c!nriageway crushed. Theeighfinjured men 
.• over·an mterchange access . were amorigbperatives 
road being built by contractor working atdecklevelwho all 
AMCohron &Sbnof Atlantic.· 'rodedowIl'. the7.3m. to the 
Iowa; .. for client t}le Kansas ground as the deck lost. its 
. Departmentof·Transportation~ support. At least one is still· in 
,Cohron~s .. contract ror· two hospitaL····... ..•..•.•... ... .' .... ... . 
. . adjacent bridgeSisw ... orthabout·. Theinvestjgating·team's task 
£260000andlspartofa£12.SM .. has been aggravated·by the 
. ··scheIrieto· cross the Missouri immediate bulldozing < of the 
river.between Elwood, Kansas. debris to recover the 
andStJo~eph.Missouri. D~sign inspector's body thereby 
of the bndge was conventional destroying potential evidence. 
reinforced .. concrete slab falsework structure was 
c6rtstnictionand engineering founded on timber piles 
,.'consultant Wilson of Salina, capped with 355m square 
Kansas,· . says if has . executed section timber.. Thrust from 
some 100 siIriilardesigns. The screw jacks wastl'ansmitted 
firm is only responsible~it says, ··through 250IriIrist~ergiideis to [or design of the structure and 375mni· steel<sh:ingersruntling 
has no brief for construction parallel with the.· bridge's 
supervision which is the cenireline.These stringers 
r.espbnsibility· of Kansas DoT, supported curved timber infill~ 
or falsework design which is following the contour of Ihe 
said to be the contractor's. bridge soffit and. plywood 
.:Thethree span bridge has formwork was positioned on 
two·-11.9inside. spans' and a transverse timber studding; 
.IS.Gm main span which was The American Portland 
uhder construction when the Cement Association is"· also 
collapse occurred. 'Concrete making an . independent 
pouring . was in .... progress investigatioiLinto the. collapse 
aroundmiaspan although none· as well as the Kansas boT. 
was being discharged when· (See feature page 16) .• 
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Case Ref. No. 27 Chicago, USA 
Source: 29th Apri11982, New Civil Engineer, p.6. 
f~uy;r~pe use probed 
Im Chlcagoclieck 
S<lletyorticials c~nfiqned 
~ week Ihatinvesllgallon of 
April's disastrous, slipro,ad 
Jai!UI~ In East Chicago IS 
~nllln<Jongu yropes used to 
blllse the ill~fated .' 
ture's falsework arid • 
ndalion of the false work 
. ers, .,., . 
'Allhe same lime engineers 
the Indiana Depal1ment 
Highways said they were 
.tumining a new scheme to {It'move hanging concrete 
~hlls from site, . 
fCollapse oC the elevated' 
ir,.adwayoccurred five· weeks 
~andkilled.12·men (NCE " '·~!12April.),.Jtisea.rlY day. s.yet 
we have conducted 95% 
our mlerviewsandare . ' 
~nU311Y inspecting d~bris . UIScleared'S81dlndlana .intssionerofLabour . . .. 114rdWilliamson Monday, Wllhams has overall control 
~lhe Indiana Occupational' 
II:IY & Health '. . JllllIlStIalio. n .... ,10. SHA. ha. S I.e .•. n ,.ectors on site; four. of "m are under contract :rom ~ US Bureau .of.Standard~ ... · . 
l'We are partIcularly, .'. . .. . 
~cerned' about configuration 
'!tg'Jyropes meant to laterally 
~rameach pa!r of false~ork 
lWHS and bearing capacIty 
P;H~ was also looking 
Plelully: at the rr.anner, in . 
~cli contractor Supenor 
fa.slCuction had founded the 
~'ers, and bearing capacity 
~.~e SOIl beneath. 'Wewel'e taking soil . p!es last week' said 
foJI:ams, 'Much of the rubble 
!is been cleared and we are 
tI'Ii being held up by delay< 
II~moving the deck trough 
f hanging by its tendon!>.' 
Sc.ecialis\ engineermg firm 
Us Ralhs & ]ohnson of 
Chicago has been . .. 
commissioned bySuperioI to 
take down the hanging .. 
concrete. Ongmal proposal 
put to the highways 
department for approval . 
involved installing timber 
cribbing under the trough, 
splitting the concrete . 
longitudinally; then lowering 
each half after CUlling the 
tendons, 
This was turned down due 
to possible difficulties oC .... 
erectinglhe'cribbing. Now a 
second proposal is being 
considered; This is baseaon 
lifting the trough with two ..... 
cranes; sevedng the tendons 
with a lance point torch and 
dropping the debris onlO a 
specially constructed sand . 
embankment 'cushion' . 
'If our engineers gIve this. , 
method the OK we could, have 
the concrete. down by 
Thursdily'said a highways . 
. departmentspokesrnan ....... ," 
. earlier tnis week, Once on the 
ground the trough, win b~ . jack.. 
hammered and saw cut 1010 . 
manageable pieces; . 
Superior.currentlyhas a 
reducedworkforee on site 
following the accident. It is 
working in areas remote from 
the' elevated· sectlons; 
.' The comractor and ils ' 
consultant, Figg & Muller 
Engineers are reportedly in 
the process of evaluating 
allernalive methods of 
construction for Ihe elevated. 
sliproads. The highway 
department will be T()p;HIgh~Capacityshoring , 
approached for consent to towers should"have been . 
continue construction once a based on sand jacks, timber 
method has been chosen. blocks andprecast concrete 
Consent is likely 10 be'given pads.·ABOVE: Engineers are 
even if Ihe agencles ' . stillsuuggling for a safe and· 
investigating Ihe collapse have. effective method of lowering 
nol reported Iheirconclusioris,. hanging debris. . 
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Case Ref. No. 29 Saudi Arabia 
Source: 20 May 1982, New Civil Engineer, p.5. 
.. .t.: ~ .• • , • 
. . ' -?" ~ .' . . .~ ~:" .'~~~.:' i ;:".~ 
ON THE DECK: DemcHition ofdebris from this collapse in Saudi 
"l\.rabiajs due to startsQon. The collapse abl1iptly halted the 
construction programme' for,the."Riyadh.outerring ,road. ,The 
43Il}spanfell ~g:htd~t~.~.ft~_r. 9.o~~~~t~, ppu.PI)qin Jartuary~ It is 
beheved post tenslomng was m progress, when' the deck 
'~uclded and that 1,!!,9_e.' C"~r(§~·~~-iIiJ~, .. g~~~,f()x: anql1?~ ~d 
Jac~_!T1ayhave createc:rcnttcaIcompresslon forces ID the deck 
siaf) section. Contracto!on the three level ,Mecca interchange' 
is local finnAI-Muraibidhworking, to designsby'Renardet-Sauti 
'spa. 1wo or thIee othersj)ansare \hough~ to~a'Ve becni. " 
similarly com)tructed~Demolition by blasunq 1Sexpected~ 
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Case Ref. No. 30 Bombay, India 
Source: 25th June 1981, New Civil Engineer, pp. 1 0-11. 
B()mbay inquiry points 
tofalsevv()rk failure 
Judicial . inquiry into a flyover 
construction coliaps€is drawing to 
a closcio Bombay. India. Already 
the eVidence points to a failure of 
temporar'isuppo11, 
--coniij5ST01!Eiiired in the Byculla 
neighbourhood of Bombay one 
night last SepiemberCluring the 
final stages of construction; 
. Approach spans. had been 
finished and t\l\loof the structure's 
four longitudinal centrespan 
T-beams had been cast: . 
Firsiofthese . had been 
prestress~d .. sndw8s-s'e1f 
supporllng,· Its lalsework of 
a(J]ustablil steel props had been 
removed but the .beamwasstill 
supported ac either end by a 
trestling arrangement 2~6mabcive 
finTkk!V~ ... . 
IS was. to allow easY-access 
for presuessing·arid,was to have 
been a common feature bf an four 
beems' construction, 
mau' flUmbe' tWo~ meanWh~I~·;· 
had been cast but riot prestrllssed, ... 
; It was$upportea, by a~raaltlonal 
falSCwOrkof baiHs (woodenlogsl····· 
With bambOO braCing.Shuttering . 
for the third beam was just being 
started on props ·taken from beam 
one. 
From evidence. giVen ·.Illthe 
inquiry,it apPeara Thai beam one's 
trestle support was Inade uate. 
a e up o. steel cribs Ilnd .timber 
sleepers, • the . trestles had· shown 
%i~i\1 a1 t\\MUtamG 1eu~ 
before colli!p!l8. . . 
--MalO theory's that they'foiled 
. first, causing beam one to fafland 
to push over the second beam and 
, lemporziry· suppo11 . for thfiihird' 
local conSulting. engineer Tony 
Remedio$ told NeE. 
Other witnes$es at the inquiry 
suggest it was failure of the 
traditlonalfalsework under beam 
two which precipitated collapse. 
The flyover was· let to local 
contiector Model . Construction 
Company for Rupee·s 4M (about· 
£220 0001, arid· EiOrnb~y based 
consultant V:. S Dewanwas 
commissioned to undertake design 
and supervision. . . . .. 
Debris was cieared last month 
following examination by 
government appointed technical. 
experts. No-one was hurt in the·. 
collapse. --_. 
New CiVl7 Engineer, 25 June 1981 
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Case Ref. No. 31 Jalans Euros Flyover, Singapore 
Source: 12th July 1979, New Civil Engineer, p.26. 
B'oxouts probable 
causeof',Singapo re 
flyover·failure 
I r ! / 
Col!~pse laSI Februarv . ef . ihe 65m long 
ccntral.sectiort of a six lane flyover under 
conslruction.in Singapore may have been, 
caused by larger than planned temporary 
box. oul5 in the dec'" of the concrete bo)( 
superstructure, 
The findings of en internal inquiry by 
client, Ihe· Government's'. Public Works 
Oepartment,haveNet to be announced, 
but they are e~peCied 10 point to the bo~ 
outs' as the prime cause 01 failiJro and the 
investigation may well Single out a lack of 
on site co-ordination as a contributory 
faclor In the collapse, . 
OffiCial sCCrl!cYsliII. surrounding the 
colla ps..- neither the client nor the locally 
bilsetl contractor is willing to. discuss the 
incidenl- gave rise' 10 considerable 
speculinion OIl the island over why Ihe 
isolated spall dramalically failed soon alter 
its Supporting falseWork was removed. 
Duts~i9gestion$ofloW strength in situ 
concrete· .or inadequate prestressing have. 
now been firmly rul6d out. And the only 
question~ leh iHlansweredare should the 
, desigr'siill have b~iln adequate to 
accommodate the large boicouls. or 
alteinativelywhywere they not partially 
filled in prior to thtdalsework being 
stripped? ....." . .... .' 
The failed$tilicture, 10 tie knoWn as the 
': ,Jalan EUrlosflyover, is orie of 11 new 
'bridge$ needod for the ,. Pen Island, 
ExpressWsy,.a 25km long byPass to the 
, I ~ I . {------,-----4--..;.. 
~ _____ ._J 
I,...Civi/fngineer, 12J1I1V., 1979 
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north of Singapore citv. 
Some of thull.· bridges are being 
tendered byPWD as 8 deslgn/constmct 
package. some aro out to consultants and 
others are designed ",'holly by the clil'nt, 
The flyover, which will sweep the 
expressway overland providq'" an" 
interchang8with) a two lane north south, 
"mning highway, was designed in hOUse 
byPWD, .... .~ ... -- .,: ... 
---O'neof the island's Iargestcontraciors, 
Urn. Kah Ngsm. started the £2M conirect 
early lasf year. The, flyover, symm'etrleal" 
aboui its' ceniral point, was to' be 
conSTructed infilie sectionS and, by this 
February, the central span \lve, the funds 
Road was "irtually complete, 
. The structure'stwocarrlagew8yS ~"' : . 
sepaieted lorigillidinall),by a 25mm wide 
· e)Cpansion joint running the length of the 
: flyover. Each A:arriageway, comprises zi 
· twin conc~ete tiOx/ camed by V shaped,; 
concrete piers; . ...... . ' :' ;;,-', 
· The all in situ construction p~oriram'me: 
was dictated by the· stresSing sequence::; 
The central47rii long ~n plus a one fifth: 
length 0' the spa,nson either side were,t!'J. 
be built. first; thIS 65m long sectlon was; 
then to be stressed before Ihe' ~,;.,;o: 
• remaining sections 'on either side 'ot"il1dj 
central spanwer8 started, .' .'. . • .•. 
Stressing cables, up to six in each boil 
web; were .tooVerlepbetween the. 
construction sections; . with • the' :~~I)J~,s~ 
frorn stages .!WO and three runnln91!,~~qr.t· 
distance into each end of tpa centtQl s~nc 
Thus while .the central section was be!(\g, 
built access had to be left through the decl(t 
for insialling the anchorage .snd stressing: 
jacks for the s'ections on eithe~side; / ~:'< ~.~ 
The. original plan' Wile. io ,'o",",o:.O! 
recta~gula;,sha~ bOl( out ab?~,e;: th~i 
streSSing pOints III each of the SIX 'webs 
across the deck. The boxes were to be 
about 1.5m long; lm wide and 45On'1m 
deep. 
However LKN and, stressing 
slIbconlractor VSL Systems suggest.l'd 
that to' simplify. construction, provide" 
better eccess for stressing and oasl;'the" 
liKing of trOnsv?,,~9 deck steel a sl!}91~,RQ~:; 
out the full width of both carriageWayS, 
would be m'ore SUitable. longitudinal, 
, 'continued.overllia(' 
Case Ref. No. 32 New Zealand 
Source: 29th May 1975, Engineering News Record, p.12. 
er bridges'collapsealthree'sites 
" Graz Technische Hochschule and the 
r Carinthhlnstate. governmeritwhilethe' 
contractors will conduct their OWil in~ 
vestigation. . .. . .' .. 
s In New' Zealand, . a 270"ft~lorig . steel 
_~!:l~n:.~iEK!~~"~_~~I<:kle~ ,while< beirlg 
useo to cast concrete box girder sections 
t of a railroad'bridge aCI-clSsNotth Is~ 
; land's R.angitikerRiver~A short section' 
of moving boxgirderformwork filled 
, with' about 50 ell ydoffreshconcrete 
thathadjustbeen placed adjacent to 
the pier aJso collapsed.' . . .' . 
The accideritwasappareritly caused 
by the buckling ,of the steel pipe truss 
web l11embersadjacentto the pier and 
{. directly undertresho~tform\",ork car-
riage~ . • ..... '. . .... '. . ' .' 
.' The bridge\vm have, six continuous 
prestressed co Ilcre te spans supported, on 
reinforcedconcfet.e~ ~jngle bellt twin~leg 
pierS; CocldfaConstr1.lctiori,Ltd.had 
completed <\11 t~e. f()unda tions: and piers 
and hadcast one,shorespan,which~as" 
not stressed .yet.iAn. investigation. o(the. 
May 5 collapse is expected: to delay 
constructiollsixmonths. 
'In another 'New:'zealancl dty, a~ t 2-
ft span ofa concrete box girder high-
way rampcol1apsedthe follo\ving day 
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whenfalse~ork gave way. The Curved. 
superelevated 891~ft-lQI1g ramp, tinder 
. construction, in downtown: Auckland, 
had a single-cell; prestressed concrete 
box girder superstructure consisting or' 
sixspans,ranging from .96 t0212ft/ 1 . 
. According to the p-ublic works JT1in~ 
istry, j'r\tthe time oftbefailure:th~ 
Concrete in the stiperstrUct\l~e hli'd been .' ... 
prestressed for' ab6utaday; Thepte~·· 
stressing .. operatioIlstestilted ina 
change. of weight distribiitioriover. the· 
length of the temporarysuppoI"ting .' 
'structure. nlis resulted hi :i stibstt1ntial 
increase in the load at theerid of the 
concrete girder." . 
Case Ref. No. 33 Belgium 
Source: 20th June 1974, Engineering News Record, p.42. 
, ' , 
,Cantilever arm of box girder span collapses. taking footbridge with it 
Falseworkfailure blamecl· for bridgedollapse 
'Belgianpublicworksofficialshlamethe 
failure of steel falscwork SUPI)Orling a 
42-ft~long cantilever arm of a concrete 
boxgirdef bridge, under conslruction 
overtheMcuseRiver in 13c1gium"Jor 
" thecolhipse of the 500~tonsectioncar~ 
lier this month. 
"", The60-fHvide E.Os~:t~mi~E.~~~()n~ 
crete bridge atWepion, dc.~igned<and 
being built by Societe llclgcdes Hetons 
(sBn),Brtlsseis, will have lwo192.:ft-
long, main spans, each consisting of 
cantileverarrnsfroma s~orc pier and a 
mid-river pier, andadrop-ingirder b1!-" 
tween 'the arms; The' main spans a. re , 
42ENR June 20, 1974 
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flnnkcd by l·H~ft side spanS,extending 
fmm shorepi(' ... ~ In the al:>utmcl1ts. 
The collapse also took down Cl foot-
bridgethnt extends the ·lcngtl1 of one 
main spatl;snu had<j)oll, redih,e cOn-
'crete for the cantilever arin,which was 
curing at. thetinle<?LthecoHapse, blJt 
,h~d,not'post.tensjo'nedit. The arm. was 
supported oniubiJlarsteel falsework, 
designed by .thc Hrt1~~Cls-bascd ,', firm, 
Echafaudages Dcmontables en Acier~ 
,·Insurance repr~~~rtlalivcsfor:trye con· 
tractor ate currer,tly iilVestigaling the 
colhipse, accor:dingto the, government 
agency supervising-construCtion. 
g~~!? .. ' ~.~:#~ "':f:::~w 
....... :~;j.'I 
Failure Incenter span support frames during conCreting maybe cause .... 
Bridge falseworkcollapse:Rills nine'" 
The 72-ft-long center span of a (\vo':: of :ab~:lIlt 1,000 cu yd of concrete in a 
lane West GermanAutobahn bridge .. single operation starting at the. center 
under construction in Kempten, 70· and\vorkingtoward either side span. 
miles south\vest of Munich, collapsed Part of theI6:S-ft-wide deck slab was 
last weekjkilling nine workmen and se~ blocked olitwithtllbularcasingsabout 
riously injuring. 13. Preliminarya.rid 3 [tin diameter to save weight. . 
unofficial reports ~oint to faulty steel According.to·initial reports, the most 
falsework as the cause. critical. area of the falsework was be-
The collapse occurred after workmen .. neath the cCIHcr span,where :lted A-
placed about half of the concrete for ftainessparined the 72-ft-length to take 
the middle section of . the reinforced the enlireHiacl. 'l'ubular scaffolding 
concrete bridge, which was to be post~ towers restiilgon the bridge's founda-
tensioned later. The contractor's plan tion slabs:supporled:·the A-frames. A 
was to pour the entire three-span . deck structlU'lll failure reportedly occllrrcdin 
one or more of the cross-members hdr 
ing to supporllhe frames. . 
Rudolf Grimme, a hhmich engillc(' 
hired by the contractor, Schmitt nl,': 
Junk, MuniCh,says he had examlnt.: 
the falsework on the day before the cd 
lapse and had "'uncovered anunlberc' 
defects,"which Gfimme reported to I],' 
contractor. It has been compulsory i~ 
Germany for contractors to hire p'ri\-a!' 
consulthlg engineers to check r(\l~ew')11 
since tile Koblenz bddgc clllli"lp~('s i, 
1971 arid 1972 (ENR 11118/71 p.r 
and 9/28172 p. 22). 
A spokesman for the contractor sa~: 
that~nlymiil0r defeclshad beeilCstah 
lishedand that they had "nothing tot!· . 
with the safety of the falsework." Of}.-
spokesman says all the instructions ic 
Grimrne's rt'!port had been carried Oll: 
Grimme says he does no~ knowifh:, 
recommendations had been followed. 
An official panel probing. the ca USf r: 
the collapse has hot yet rep0l1edn: 
findings. 
The Kempten HighwayConstfIK 
tion Agency, a regional office ot t~ 
Federal Transport Ministry, design!; 
the I 95-ft-long bridge which crosses t!· 
LeubasRivcr in B:iva:ria;Roehro" 
Dusseldorf-based subsidiary of Thy ss er 
was re.~ponslble· for' falsework d~;r 
and erection. 
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Case Ref. No. 35 Sao Paulo, Brazil 
Source: 31st May 1973, Engineering News Record, p.l2 . 
.... . ~ .. 
·Cdncrete~pj)nc()l~pses during pour 
: .' .. "': 
. I.. . . 
W~hJ~nfaJ:;cw()rksupp()"lirlg fotfJlsfoc ·t·U1I<iPSCdnnMHY IlLkillin~~~ . 
the·i:H.TlCcnlcr ~pa'n nj"'nrcinfurcdJ 'nan and injtidng·.l\Vh·utl~ilfr(:­
concrcieovcrpas.-. near Sac) Paul(),Bra~ )risc Col~ncC.a wd) kflow~ Fr:cr!ch .. 
zil~ci)llapS<!dhl.sl week whileworkmehcmHraclnriri the il1cli,s.lfiatl":dJhullsin.l{ 
. werc.caslin~ concrcte for the la~l ·of Jfic.ld. was ereclingthe)5:spanstrucluc<: 
... three·· iOn~.{llUd'n<il ~iidcts. At Ic~tstsi:< lusll1~ the h:llarll:.:cdcanlllcv(!( 1111:1111)<1. 
mChWcr<! hurt when the 195~fl-hil.;,h ·'A crane hail c:rel:le(]hvcpn:c<isl hox 
span c.:amedown. ..... girder c:lC:nll!rlIS pfi*:t:ling rrrun one 
Initial indications arc that se\;eral pi(:r' and WelS linihgup cll(: siXlh\vhcn 
day~ of rain had loosened tht!sat~il the cullapse occurred. .. .. .•. . 
Under the falsew{~. causing I1 to imift. Until the city magistrate hem.,; tc.<iti-
Both 985-ft . side spans of the viaduct rnony. onicials wun't know thceause of 
had been c(implewd.and woud(:n rOl'ms lhecollapse. Howcv(:r.lhc timingofthe 
forthe Olh<:r tWI) centcr span girders accident has led cn.i.{in~rstn helieve 
wercsdllin place while the third was that either the crane bt,ekled~c~ 
beingp<>ured. leased the clement &Cfure ;it was· pre-
. The viaduct is one of three designed ~t esse to the prcvl!Hls yereclc scc-
and being built by F~-;critori() de Con;. lion. caus.0!UlJ1.ir~b~. .. 
slrucoe.~ eEngcnharis Eec! S.A. for a lO- q:onslrucfion ,if Ihcl,O.ft.high slruc-
tal t>fS·llO,OOO. tun:. with l'pans lip to 51:! ft, began laSI 
~;~·~:rfi·I'cu;':p4r{ of ~~preslrcsscd Scpt<:mhcl'<lnd was scheduled forcon1-
concrete viaduct under construction pletion by the end of this year. 
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Case Ref. No. 36 London, Berkshire, England 
Source: 2 November 1972, Engineering News Record, p.14. 
Bridge 'falls during concrete pour 
A partially completed section of a I1 (). .. . 
ftcOncrete bridge spancoJ)~lPsed40.ft 
into the River Loddonduring con~truc~ 
tion Ia.'>t wt."ek, 40 mil~ wc:stof London, , 
killing three workmen andirijuring 10 
othern; . 
The accident occurred after about 
500ton5 of concrete, about half the 
day's pour, had been placed. The .. 
woOdenformwork was ~upported by·· 
tubularsteelscalfoldingbraced by steel 
cross girders; the same scarfolding used 
tocortslruct aparallcl, 30-ft-wide twin 
span ccunpletedJast AU~5t. ' 
. Marpl~ RidgwayContradors. nathi 
held the S 12;5-miHion contract to con-struc(lhe32-sp~rl.post-tensioned via.. .. SC~ffo·'dlngandwelconcrete trapped creW. 
duct ~~t.~·:~~~ ~fk~:hirc Count.y Co.tin~.J;::· '. . . . .,: 
which:d~ignedthebridge. Thel,OOO·ft .. Sofarthcreis no d~e as to what 
viaduct will link two major highwayscau~ed the collapse, according to Joh!: 
. outsid.e·9f Reading; ... Clarke,.mariaging director of the con· 
. About 40 to SO men were working onstructioncompany. .. . 
the bridge when jtcollapsed~ The other, The British Science R~carch.Coun~ 
halfof the crcw was on a lunch break •.. dl arid·thc<>Construction Industry Re~ 
Eycwitriesscssaid the bridge vibrated 'search fnfQ;rnatic}n> A-.sociatlOn wll. 
all oveffor about 30 seconds, then there conduct >aSn,OOO·research project or. 
was a loud crack and the front of the . thedc.~ign and loading of scaffolding 
span dipped 3 in. before it collap~cd. The . decision to do the study Via; 
Workmeri were trapped under piles of prompted by the California bridgecoi. 
piping and wet concrete, making rescue Japsethatkillcd four last week (EN:, 
work difficult. . 10/19 p. J 1). 
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fBridge collapse· during concrete:: pour kills six men r ..., . '.... . .. .. 
l,A 150-ft section of ~n expressway J~bri. 'dge cblIapsedlas ..t week at Pasadena, , Calif., and plummeted 90 ft into a ra-::'yine as workers were· placing concrete; 
• .,gslX and injuring six others. ..' ' 
I Contractor 'Policb,B~nedict Con-
htruction Co., Inc., Rosemead, Cam:, 
~ihad completed one of the twin, 580·ft 
.; four-lane structures. At the time of col. 
l"~ Jap~ of the second box girder structure, 
i;; crews were placing concrete with a con· 
lIIYor for the Illain span. They had 
t poured about 450 cu yd of concrete, 
;, making up 135 f~ of the span. There 
); were about. 25 persons but no. heavy thatthe collapse was caused by any act Spanning a maximum of 70 ftb~t.weerI 
!f equipment on the 70-ft-wide spanwheo or omission of this company:' ... . <bents are .48~iri.~~eepplate girders~ On 
r it went down. ' . . .. Butth~ accident will probably spur top of them is a plank platform topped ! The Arroyo SecoBridge is part ora .Iegislative,probes inadditiontoinvesti.,.by timber pony bents and finally tim-
>, $9-million.1.2-mile Contract on the" gations launched by federal and state ber stringers aridjoists that carry the 
~ statc's Foothill Freeway and was sched- ,. highway and Safety agencles. Faihire of plywood forms; .. ' .. 
; \lIed for corripletion next ApriL. Dam~ falsework haS caused, seVen bridge col. . The state ~mbly's ~ectcoinmittee 
t'agc is' estimated at $300,000 to lapsesiri California'irithe" ',.. . on industrial safetywi1lconvenehear~ 
$400,000 and .Ihe project is expected. tolich·Benediet was contractorings Nov. 1 00 th.e. collapse.' plus the 
be delayed severalmqnths~ . ··nna'125~fto"erpass·that eoUapseddur:performance of the state's highway and 
, The causes ofthe~failure may never ingconstruction easto[r.osAngeles in ' safety divisions. Says Speaker Robert 
be determined; according to assistant May, 1970, killing a motorist.Statein~ Moretti, (D-Van Nuys), ('Many of us in 
highway· district engineer KeithvestigatorS said falseWork may' have the state', leg~lature have been con-
, McKean. because rescue workers been cv e £NIt SI .22 . vinced thatCalifomiaworkersare dy. 
moved much ohlle 2,000 trins of debris ccording', to CarF Vernor,state iog needlessly." U.S. Rep. GlenliAn:~ 
\~ in an all-night attempttoreachworkerSbridgeresidentengineerai, Arroyo derson (D-Calif.) called for an 
trapped under hardening concrete, 'fed Seco, there is nothing unusuaL about . investigation by theH()use rciads$ub~ .. 
Polich, Secretary of the construction the ia1sework' ihefe~.Thereare fourcommittee,ofwnich he is ,a' member. 
company, says, "We have no idea as to ben ts; each. with seven '~Iegged . towerS He says federal inspectors have not vis-
the cause. There. is no evidence thus far topped by wide~nange .beam caps.ited thejob sitesinccAugust. 
Oc!ober26.1972 ENR 11 
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Case Ref. No. 38 Koblenz, West Gennany 
Source: 20th December 1973, Engineering News Record, p.24 
Falsework blamed for b~idge col,apse 
. .", . . .. , . 
ilwestigators. have blamed inllufficient. pi-oach spans required si?edaI design 
reinforcing of a cross beam in thesteel measures at the base of two inner col-
falsew.ork as thecause of a coUapse hist'"Umns at the location of thecollapse..In-
year of a section of elevated prestressed s'teadof founding the twocoh.imnson a 
concrete, bridge approach under con- .. · cOmmon temporary concrete pile; they 
structionat Koblenz,Wcit Germany were set on twin steel I-beams, stabi-
(ENR9/28/72 p;22)... .' '., lized by diagonal struts, which bridged 
The co!l~pse, which 'e!tJik:;Work;. the water pipeline. The beams- trahs-
men and Injured 15 others, occurred as , ferredthe load to two independent con-
work'rnen wercabout halfway<through crete pi!es.· . 
pouring a 136.ft-Iong twin concrete box . ·'The:.beam, failed at thepoin! where 
gird~r span, theJ 2th of J 3 approach it transferred a load of 187 tons from 
span~;. . ... .. the colurnns to a sfl1aller !;.beam girder 
The steel falsework~ designed andin~ ontheuphiU concrete pile" . accordirig 
stalled by. subcontractor Hunnebeck; to Scheer. He says drawings by the de· 
Gm~H~,ofLintorf; consistedof..·four signercalled fOI-six O.5-in.~thick' stiff-
160·R.long truss girders supported.byeri~rsat,the point of load transferj but 
two sets of four columns each. . .... '. the subcontractor had installed only 
According to Prof;Joachim Scheerof twoO.4~in.-thick stiffenerS,' .' '. 
Hannovet Technical University; head "'While the't)eamsystemwaS used in 
of the investigation, the falsework, de"- previous' spans, 'a widened super-
sign was, for the most part.,conven- structure to accoinmodatea ramp at 
tional. However, sloping terrain and the point of the collapse made the load 
the need to avoid a major water pipe- heavier and eventually caused the col-
line running directly under the rip- lapse,:said Sheer. 
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Case Ref. No. 39 Route 50, Sacramento, California, USA 
Source: 31 st August 1972, Engineering News Record 
Steelfalsework collapses, 
but bridges are, undamaged 
.. " .. . ~...' , 
Steel SIJPport falsework used in the con· 
strtlction of two parallel freeway over· 
" p~l$SeS on.LT.S. ROIUte50 inCaHfornia 
('f)lIapsedJa.~t week,inJuringlOpersons, 
six of them construction'. workers. The 
br~dgeswere und3triaged-
The accident o'ccurred j'JstaJterrush 
hour>, about 10 miles ea&tof Sacra-, 
nlenlq.The concrete bridges span a ]0-
'~alstre,.rtand rai,Jroad tracks, ' 
The stale division, of highways re· 
/ported that workmen ,had begunwhlll 
Iwas.:tq:haveb~ent,hefinal nighfs\\'ork 
of ,removing, thepste~l,faJse\\'ork wh('n 
thibeams,ga\·eway. 'the' removar'work 
'had.S'faded three d3.\'searJier. 
. -:-.. -. < - ::", ". - ". . 
Guy" F. "Atkin~f)n Co :'So~th San 
Fran<:'isco. ccntractor orl the SlO·mil· 
liontree\~'ay project that included ~he 
h'iO bridges: had Q~gun :.,,·ork 1n June. 
197 L .The eight~laue fre~~'\'ayproj'!ct is 
schedul(:d>to epen ih Noven-:be'r . 
. The, con trac;or will 'in" t:.,.<-:igtlte tht 
ca u!'eof t hecl)Ha pse."'A t the Z1l0mellt 
we have nu idea: "r wha t t;3.'.!sed it~'~ 
saysaC(llnpa fly offi~ial. 
T\V{H:ars and a'truc~ tf3\eHng '.lnder 
the bridges were also crushed by the 
falling scaffoldi~lg. 
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Case Ref. No. 40 Dallas, USA 
Source: 13 July 1972, Engineering News Record, p.13 . 
.•. 
/. 
roncrete crushes car roor 
In slab formworkfallure 
Two men suffered minor irijuries last 
week when a 15 X21-ft section of 
, forrnwork gave way during a concrete 
: potirJor an elevated highway deck slab 
: in Dallas. About 11 cu yd of fresh con-
crete crushed the roof of theca.r in 
which they were riding. .' .... . 
U.S.Industries,.lnc., Jadcson, Miss., 
.. holds the SI0.6-million contract for the . 
~~J1lile segment or an Interstate 345 
. spur that g"osses s~veralmajor down~ 
town streets. In the' midrnorning acci-
dent, the car, stoppedfor'a traffic light~ . 
Was tile only oneben.eath .t~e structure." 
. The' bridge design consists of . two' 
malo girders .' with .. transverse noor 
beams spaced· every 20 ft~ For forming, 
: the contractor tlsedadjustable trusses as 
: . the· basic load-supporting members, 
l along w~th. plywood panels measuring 
. about 20X 20 ft. The ends of the truss 
joists' rested on members supported by. 
hangers Jrom the floor: beams. While 
the segment being cast could have con-
tained 185 cuyd,only65 yd had been 
placed to afull slab thickness of IOtA in. 
when the failure occurred. 
The identical system has been used 
for several years with no previous 
troul>le~Engineers on. the site speculate 
thehangers were at fault. A full investi-' 
gation is' under way. .. 
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Case Ref. No. 41 Elgin, Ill, USA 
Source: December 1971, Engineering News Record 
. .~. ...... , 
· Collap,$ed$pan to be rebi.i1il 
in test use of scrap plastic 
A SIll all concrete arch bridge in which 
scrap plastic replaced line . ~ggregate 
collaps~d during' construction .. . 
bere~\.1i1t in Elgin, IH.(EN 12/16/71 
p.3). The 100-ft span for pe. ~s 
and maintenance vehicles feUCis forms 
· were' stripped. ItwiU be l'e~erected, 
again ~siI1ggroun!1. up plastic .pottles to 
replace 30%. sand' by:vol ullle, after 
mOc}ifications by the original deSigner, 
ElgihfU'cllit~ctRobertLayer .. 
Use of the material had nothing to 
dowitll collapse of the 7 -ft,-widebridge, 
· a.c:<:c)1~aing to. city engineer. J ames 
, lJecker ..• Arr .•. invest!gatic)D .•.•. by Novak, 
Derilpsey&., Assoda tes', . Inc., St . 
. Charles,IlL',engine~r, indicated that i~ 
'occurred .·because of stress ·reversal 'as 
the fotrlls)~re remove'd .by:IllinoisH y-
. aI-aulic ConstrucuonCo;; Elgin,which 
.. will rebuild the $21 ,000 bridge .. ' 
The report says thecenterjoint was 
designedprlmafily to resist compression , 
an.d ,recommends that it should take. '., 
tensile,stress as welL Also, forms should 
ben::inoved from the centerfirst instead 
ofla~t, ~s ~asdone the first time. The 
new structl.1rewiIl be atwo;.hinged arch 
instead of three-hinged. 
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Case Ref. No. 42 San Bruno, California, USA 
Source: 29th April 1971, Engineering News Record, p.11. 
... COhcreteoverpass stringers fall ()n .,raifroad 
. . 
Fift~eit precast overpas~'gircJerS,;wejgh-is' invesiigatingthe accide~t. Officials at 
ing up to 90 tons and supported on t~.e,.s.i ... te.· ... s.p. ec .. u .. I .. a.t. c ... th.·.a. tt.h ... e ~.. :~...••..... ·•... ffi.Ol.?;..·. falsework; feU on railroad tracks last .~, maY',wh~vC? b~~17d .. or;.. ,,~)91S~ 
w&k hI· San ·Bruno, cam: Two, workel"s ~,.J'lJ~ced .. ·latetally py.' gIrder' ment. 
. were slightly injured when the lriter- . ltepresentativ(isof FeterKiewit:. Sons' 
state span fell 25 ft.. ... .. < Co.,Omaha"contractor'()n'lhe$4-mil-
"Theprestr'essed, inverted T-beams: lion project,deetin'edto comment.. .• 
are 95 ft long, mostly weighing 40 tons. ~ The tWo"spalls'with:pr~t~ed· std n-. 
Three with decorative fasciasare h.eav,: gers are partofapaitoffour~larieover~ 
ier. Falsework' consisted cif steeL scaf~. passes 1 ,000 Ttlorig that win carry 1-380 
folding .• b,:~!i,!)lLQ!!-, ~_Q9_qplanks... and between San Francisco International 
.... topped by . timber.· The concrete . girders Airport and 1-280, Most of the coricrete 
>restedon wide-flange steel beams paral- superstructure willbecast inplace.The 
lelingthe line of three columns at each spans civer the two railroad tracks were i 
end of the spari. Thecollapseoceurred built with precast'girders, h()wever; to . 
with all the girders in place for one avoid extensivefalsework· that would 
span as two truck cranes set the first hav~ blocked trairis; 
. girder for a paraJleltwin span., Kiewit dragged the fallen girders off 
The mid~afternoon collapse report- the tracks with crawler tractors and ser-
edly occurred slowly. Workers heard a vice was restored the followingmoming 
tlac~ then felt the girders sag slightly. on the commuter railroad: 
... ne of the three men'-atop the structure The highway division estimates cost 
leapt to a column while the others rode of the damage at S 100,000 to S 150,000. 
the falling girders to the ground.< . Completion of the job, set for this Octo-
The California Division of Highways ber, is not expected to be delayed. 
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Case Ref. No. 45, 48 and 49 
Source: D.W. Smith, B Eng, MA, FICE, Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs, Part 1, 1976,60, Aug., 
pp.367-382 
w 
'" C> 
7921 Bridge failures 
Table 1. Failures during constructIon 
Bridge 
Tay' 
Quebec" 
Quebec',. 
Odcr, ·Oarlz· 
Sando' 
s«ond Narrmo.'s, 
.. Vancouver-
Dartan. unes 1 
Banon: Lancs· 
Fire-
C31der, Yorn'· 
\Villc.ml.d. 
. CUr3~Ou 
Fourth Danube. 
Vlennal3 
Seebrucke," Been-· 
ru:rautob2hn 1). 
Milrord Ha~n" 
SObOlh, AUSlri." 
West Oat., 
Mdbournc'" 
K()blc:nz''l 
R'~~·· ,",.~h~"".·· 
•• .. wt.ktM.. . . (; ••• 11u,"11 la" 
Loddon; Ncrks lit 
Lcubas. Kemptco, 
W. G~rm"ny:' 
Gmilnd. Austria"" 
Type of (aihirc 
I Spans 12 and Il reil du'rin; hi,h wind . . 
. : Cantilever collap$.Cd by buckling of main cOinpmsii)n chord 
· ; Suspended span collapsed due 10 railure of supporting casting . .... ... .. I Two .pans collapsed when riVer pier failed due 10 faultyworkrnal'lship in concrete· 
Date 
2 Feb •• 1877 
29 Auc.. 1901 
11 Sep.,' 1916 
1925-6 
, . placed under wat<r·· . ..;...,: "';. ... : :.", 
, Temporary timber 244 m span lied arch cenlerinc collapsed when supporting part ··Aug. 1939 
Remarks 
I workman 
·10$1 . 
14 killed 
13 killed 
,: ,weighl Dfconcrele bridec. possib!y due lo·weakening ohimber by prolonged damp 
, Stceltruss spans collapsed due to Inadequate base of temporarY column June 1958· 18 killed I - . I 51«:1 Birde~ ren due 10 buckling or temporary supporls Feb. 1959 .I' jl 4 killed +-
I Four steel pl2t" &ird.~ overturned before beins adjusted for level or braced 10gelbcr Dec:. 1959 ,/ 2 killed Superstructure of road oYCrbridge collapsed due 10 bucklinl of lemporary supportS 22 June. 1962 3 killed / 
• aftcr concrele they were supporttnc hod set 
1'6 m con:rcte span coHapsed due to low strength and inadequate lorating of ste .. \23 Aug., 1967 4 killed +-beams In lemporary supporls 
I 51«:\ bridge collapsed due to brittle fracture of anchor ban at unaulhorized(?) No,'. 1961 v 20 killed 
I "..,Id, I I 210 m centre span of $Ieel bOll girder brid~. buckled ""thoul coUapse due 10 tem· I 6 Nov., 1969 • 
, peratute contraction or lOP /lange .. .... .. . i ' I .. 
.1 Concrele superstructure severely deformed by 1·1 m differentia' mo' .. menl offoun- Nov. 1969 
, cations ne~r Jake side . j.Slcel box girder ccll~pscd during eantilever ",eelion due 10 buckling of support 2 June, 1910 , 4 killed diaphragm . . I I 192 m lenglh of concrete 00" girder collapsed, possibly due. 10 fraclure of temporary July 1910 1 killed 
• stay by crane" ".".. t . 1112 m sl .. lbo!! girder collapsed by L"Ompr .. sioa buckling or lOp flange 115 Oct .• 1970 ,34 killed 
: Steel box airder collapsed during eantHewr erection by bottom flang .. bu~kling a\ I 10 No ... ~ 1971 1. n killed 
i "hie joint: .. :: .:' I I 
:. ;-::~~~~.~~~!~'~'~'~~'~~I,~i!~ ::I~~~~:'i~{::~~ ~:~~;~~~~~'~e:!'~'~;~'!':~\J~~rf:O\fu:d ~~:. I 'i,~1. 2~ tm~~ 
\."cnUc i,'",'u&'e "r_". fU 177", I .... ., 'U' ..... IUI<: " ... tI ... "~I·.Ju,u'.', rl:.a~.n·. vI ~,'n~rcIC • oCl.. 1972 
~ due '''' failure 4)( J:'l$cwork . .:.: . .... ; 
i 241'n span collapsed dunn, placin. ot (oncr~'c due la failure of (4J~work .. .. I (}(:t. 1972 ! Centre section collapsed durine pl.ciro3 or .:oneret. when centering became ui,looged : 30 Apr •• 1914 
j ,{rom scaffold towtr : . ' 
I Coner,,' 00. ~ &irdtreoUapsed due to compression failur. ofbouonl flange, 3 h aflct ! 16 May J97S moSI5C,'ere CAntil .... er condition hod been passed: Wldth/lhickn •• s ralio app.TCnl- • 
I ty over 24 .. . I I . . . 
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I (, killed 3 killed l 9 killed 
! 10lcitled 
I 
Case Ref. No. 
49 
48 
45 
APPENDIXC 
Flow Chart of Fifty Failure Cases 
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Figure C.I: Case Ref. No. I Shenzhen, China [DJ 
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Figure C.2: Case Ref. No. 2 Castle Peak, Hong Kong [D] 
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Figure C.3: Case Ref. No. 3 Siu Sai Wan, Hong Kong [DJ 
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Figure C.4: Case Ref. No.4 Sai Wan Ho, Hong Kong [D] 
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Figure C.5: Case Ref. No. 5 Tsing Vi, Hong Kong [D] 
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Figure C.6: Case Ref. No. 6 Guangzhou, China [D] 
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Figure C.7: Case Ref. No. 7 Rn Ynan, Guangdong, China [D] 
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Figure C.8: Case Ref. No. 8 Kwai Chung, Hong Kong [D] 
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Figure C.9: Case Ref. No. 9 Jakarta, Indonesia [D] 
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Figure C.l0: Case Ref. No. 10 Tseung Kwan 0, Hong Kong [B, D] 
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Figure C.11: Case Ref. No. 11 Route 3, Hong Kong [B, D] 
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Figure C.12: Case Ref. No. 12 Macao [D] 
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Figure C.13: Case Ref. No. 13 Israel rC, A] 
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Contractor's consultant under-designed the steel beam (Registered Engineer) 
Figure C.14: Case Ref. No. 14 USA [C, B] 
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Figure C.15: Case Ref. No. 15 Maryland, USA lC, B] 
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Figure C.16: Case Ref. No. 16 Chongqing, China[D, B) 
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Figure C.17: Case Ref. No. 17 Taipei, Taiwan [D, B] 
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Figure C.lS: Case Ref. No. 18 Taipei, Taiwan [D, B) 
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Figure C.19: Case Ref. No. 19 Tsing Vi, Hong Kong [D, BJ 
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Figure C.20: Case Ref. No. 20 Taiwan [C] 
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Figure C.21: Case Ref. No. 21 Heidelberg, W. Germany [C] 
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Figure C.22: Case Ref. No. 22 Colorado, USA [D, BJ 
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Figure C.23: Case Ref. No. 23 Taiwan [C] 
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Figure C.24: Case Ref. No. 24 Sunshine Skyway, 
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Figure C.25: Case Ref. No. 25 Taiwan [Cl 
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Figure C.26: Case Ref. No. 26 Route 36, Kansas, USA [C] 
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Figure C.27: Case Ref. No. 27 Ramp C, East Chicago, USA [C, B] 
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Figure C.28: Case Ref. No. 28 Tuen Mun, Hong Kong [B, C] 
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Figure C.29: Case Ref. No. 29 Saudi Arabia [Cl 
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Figure C.30: Case Ref. No. 30 Bombay, India rC, B) 
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Figure C.31: Case Ref. No. 31 Jalans Euros Flyover, Singapore [C) 
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Figure C.32: Case Ref. No. 32 New Zealand [C] 
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Figure C.33: Case Ref. No. 33 Belgium [C] 
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Figure C.34: Case Ref. No. 34 Kempton, West Germany [e, B] 
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Figure C.35: Case Ref. No. 35 Sao Panlo, Brazil [Cl 
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Figure C.36: Case Ref. No. 36 London, Berkshire, England le, B] 
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Figure C.37: Case Ref. No. 37 Anoyo Seao Bridge 
California, USA(pasadena) [C] 
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Figure C.38: Case Ref. No. 38 Koblenz, West Germany rC, BJ 
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Figure C.39: Case Ref. No. 39 Route 50, Sacramento, California, USA [Cl 
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Figure C.41: Case Ref. No. 41 Elgin, Ill, USA [C) 
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Figure C.42: Case Ref. No. 42 San Bruno, California, USA [C) 
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Figure C.43: Case Ref. No. 43 Birling Road Overbridge, Kent, UK [e] 
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Figure C.44: Case Ref. No. 44 Johannesburg, South Africa [B) 
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Figure C.4S: Case Ref. No. 45 Calder, Yorks, UK [C] 
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Figure C.46: Case Ref. No. 46 Heron Road Bridge, Ontario, Canada 
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Figure C.47: Case Ref. No. 47 Welsbpool Road Overpass, W. Australia [C,B] 
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Figure C.48: Case Ref. No. 48 Fife, UK [C) 
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Figure C.49: Case Ref. No. 49 Barton, Lanes, UK [C] 
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To: Mr. S. W. Poon 
From: Mr. Hua Zhao Lu 
I am director and general manager of a building construction firm. 
I have over 17 years experience in falsework construction and I have witnessed· 
several falsework failures and undertaken remedial measures. The falsework 
collapsed normally during concrete casting or near completion of the concreting 
operation. 
The design of falsework is very important but is often not properly checked. I would 
suggest the factor of safety of falsework to be reduced by 20% after erection. 
Your model of analysing and predicting falsework failure would be very useful for 
controlling falsework construction on site. 
~~ 
Mr. Hua Zhao Lu 
Director and General Manager 
China Construction Builders Pte. Ltd. 
10 June 2002 
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To: Mr. S.W. Poon 
From: MsXu Yuqing 
Comments on the Model of Analysing and Predicting Falsework Failure 
Currently I am a procurement manager of a large contracting firm and have twenty 
years experience in construction in China, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
During the last six years I have involved in falsework construction. The design and 
stability of falsework are very important but regrettably they are frequently ignored. 
From my experience, no design, no checking particularly no independent checking are 
common errors. 
I would estimate the factor of safety of falsework would have been lowered by twenty 
precent after erection. Your model developed can be very useful in assessing the 
safety of falsework and predicting possible failure. 
~~~ing 
B.Eng., MSc 
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To:~.S. VV.Poon 
From: Dr. George Zhou 
Comment on the Model for Analysing and Predicting Falsework 
I am a professional engineer with extensive experience in temporary works design and 
construction. Since 1992, I have been employed as independent checking engineer for 
over one hundred jobs of faIsework construction. I have also investigated falsework 
collapses and undertaken remedial works. 
From my experience, many contractors attempted to lower the factor of safety of 
falsework in the design, thus control of falsework is very important and essential. In 
many instances, only if the resident Engineer insists, otherwise no independent checking 
of the design and no approval certificate would be required. VVithout the third party 
checking, I would predict twenty to thirty percent of falsework construction would have 
failed. I agreed fully with the flowchart, illustrating the activities and duties, developed 
for the three control systems. 
VVith my knowledge and experience, I can judge the factor of safety of falsework would 
drop from 1.6 to 1.7 in the design stage to about 1.2 in the loading stage. Proper control 
and prediction of falsework at various stages would be essential. 
Dr. George Zhou 
B. Eng. PhD (Japan), AIStructE, MIES 
Chartered Eng (UK), P. Eng. (S'pore) 
10 June 2002 
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